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Abstract 
This thesis is a defense of extreme moral particularism, the view that morality cannot 
be codified in principle into necessarily true natural-moral moral principles, be they of 
the absolute kind or the pro tanto kind. My defense of it is negative rather than 
positive in the sense that instead of producing any positive evidence for my claim, I 
argue that two prominent arguments, the supervenience argument and the argument 
from the atomism of reason, that have been proposed by its opponents, the absolute 
principlists and the pro tanto principlists, are toothless against extreme moral 
particularism. If I am right about the failures of these arguments, I think we can be 
more confident about the claim of extreme moral particularism. 
Here is the plan of the thesis. The introduction introduces the general 
background of the debate between principlism and particularism. Chapter 1 lays out a 
conceptual taxonomy of various types of principlism and particularism. Here, I make 
it clear that my thesis is devoted to defending a particular kind of moral 
particularism—or what I call 'extreme particularism', the view that there are no 
necessarily true natural-moral moral principles, be they of the absolute kind or the pro 
tanto kind. Chapter 2 deals with some businesses arising from the taxonomy. I try to 
head off some worries about the taxonomy and forestall some preliminary objections 
to the view of extreme particularism. Chapters 3 to 5 consist of an examination of the 
supervenience argument that is advanced collaboratively by Frank Jackson, Philip 
Pettit, and Michael Smith on behalf of the absolute principlists to establish the 
existence of absolute moral principles of the relevant kind. Chapter 3 is devoted to the 
reconstruction and elucidation of the argument whereas in chapters 4 and 5 I argue 
that Jackson et al. have not provided us compelling reasons to accept its premises. 
Chapters 6 and 7 examine an argument proposed by the pro tanto principlists to 
establish the existence of pro tanto moral principles of the relevant kind. It is the 
argument from the atomism of reason. I argue that it fails chiefly for the following 
reasons: (1) There is no reason for us to believe that the atomism of reason is true. (2) 
The atomism of reason faces a problem of individuation of features such that it does 
not really tell us how a feature qua reason behaves. (3) The argument begs the 
question against extreme particularism. 
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VI1 
Introduction 
"The ideal of normative ethical theory is a false one, that vanquishing the specter of 
non-cognitivism is not sufficient for legitimizing it, and that the popular new justifications for the 
enterprise fail in mischievous ways."—Cheryl Noble (1989, p. 49) 
"We cannot take the fact that moral philosophy is dominated by principled approaches as 
evidence that morality really is principled."—McKeever and Ridge (2006, p. 1) 
A common metaphysical picture of morality has it that morality is made up of a true 
and coherent set of moral principles.' It follows from this picture that if one negates 
the existence of moral principles, one negates morality altogether. For without moral 
principles, it seems that there would be no morality. 
In pursuance with this common metaphysical picture of morality, one chief 
concern of normative ethics has been to formulate basic moral principles that govern 
the moral terrain. It is generally believed that in basic moral principles lies the 
ultimate source of moral truths. Principlists, though arguing over what the correct 
basic moral principles are and over the number of them, all tacitly agree that a major 
part of normative ethics is built upon the articulation of the basic moral principles and 
their application to practical moral issues. 
While the debate about the correct formulation and application of the basic moral 
principle(s) continues, the common metaphysical picture underlying it has not 
received proper attention—not until the appearance of the contemporary particularists. 
Contrary to the principlists, the particularists argue that morality does not depend 
upon the existence of a true and coherent set of moral principles. On this view, 
general principles fail to capture the complexity and uniqueness of particular 
circumstances (Nussbaum 1990, p. 69). Exceptions to principles are common and 
exceptions to exceptions are not unusual (Davis 2004, p. 1). According to this view, 
there are no principles of the sort which the principlists have in mind. The 
particularists believe that the moral status of an action is not determined by moral 
' Non-cognitivists do not have to deny this as it is common for them to argue that it is okay for them to 
speak of ethical truths. In saying that a moral principle is true, one need not beg the question against 
non-cognitivists. Dancy (2004, p. 140) quite correctly points out in Elhks Without Principles, that 
"[t]he realist language which 1 have been using should not really be a stumbling block, since it is 
characteristic of non-cognitivists to maintain that they can perfectly well talk of ethical truths, facts and 
properties without signing up to the sort of realism that is involved in taking such talk, as they see it, 
too seriously." 
principles; instead it always relies on the particular configuration of its contextual 
features. 
In my thesis, part of my aim will be to examine the debate between the 
principlists and the particularists with special focus on the question of whether there is 
any true and coherent set of moral principles that codifies the moral landscape 
metaphysically speaking. 
If there is not, as the particularists suggest, then there is a need to revise our 
common principled conception of morality and change our current practice in 
normative ethics and applied ethics. Instead of trying to formulate basic moral 
principles to distinguish between right and wrong in general, normative ethics should 
then concern itself with how the particular configuration of the action's contextual 
features come to determine its moral status. Similarly, if particularism is true, then the 
landscape of applied ethics will also need major reconstruction. Instead of trying to 
subsume practical issues under the governance of the relevant moral principles, we 
will need to be aware of their limitations, especially of their defeasibility. 
If, on the other hand, we find our traditional principled conception of morality 
more plausible at the end of the day, our investigation will still not have been wasted. 
For we will by then have come to have a better understanding of the nature of 
morality and have helped to fend off particularists' attacks on our principled 
conception of morality. The current practice in normative ethics and applied ethics can 
thus proceed on firmer grounds. 
But having said this, I do not believe that our principled conception of morality 
can remain untouched at the end of the day. In fact, the other part of my aim in this 
thesis is to defend a metaphysical version of particularism which claims that there is 
no true and coherent set of moral principles that codifies morality. There is at some 
prima facie case that can be made for this claim at this stage. For after all, the whole 
history of moral philosophy has witnessed brilliant moral philosophers searching for 
true moral principles that codify the moral landscape, yet no principles have generated 
wide agreement. One explanation for this is that there are no true moral principles to 
be had in the first place. Parallel situations like this are common in many corners of 
philosophy. Many brilliant philosophers have spent their whole life's time analyzing 
concepts of probability, truth or knowledge, trying to supply non-trivial, non-circular 
necessary and sufficient conditions for them. As is generally acknowledged today, it is 
extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible, to come up with a widely accepted 
analysis. One plausible explanation is that no analysis of the kind is to be had in the 
first place. I am not saying that there cannot be alternative explanations. But until they 
are produced, I think that there is at least a prima facie case that can be made for 
doubting whether there are any true moral principles just as there is a prima facie case 
that can be made for doubting whether conceptual analysis can produce non-trivial, 
non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for the meanings of many 
philosophically interesting terms. 
My position is among the extreme sorts of particularism. Yet it is significantly 
different from the positions of other extremists like McDowell, Dancy and Little. 
McDowell defends particularism mostly on epistemological grounds. He (2002, p. 73) 
writes: 
Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying 
universal principles, but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees 
situations in a certain distinctive way. (emphasis added) 
For McDowell, reaching the correct moral verdict does not depend so much on the 
grasp of the right universal principles as on the cultivation of virtuous character. 
While this might be true, the claim is quite compatible with the claim that there are 
true universal moral principles at the metaphysical level, which could correctly 
capture the moral status of various types of actions. It might well be the case that the 
universal moral principles are extremely complicated such that any mechanical 
application of them will inevitably "strike one as wrong", as McDowell (2002, p. 58) 
puts it. But complexity does not negate their existence. 
Dancy, although defending particularism mostly on metaphysical grounds, 
admits that there might be a few privileged true moral principles established by the 
existence of moral reason whose moral valence (rightness or wrongness) remains 
invariant. Here is what he (2000, p. 131) says: 
Perhaps I will have to admit that not all reasons are [context-sensitive]—that 
there are a privileged few, including probably the intentional inflicting of 
undeserved pain, which necessarily constitute the same sort of reason wherever 
they occur. 
I regard this move as unnecessarily reconciliatory and threatening to make Dancy's 
position incoherent since Dancy's original intention was to prove "the non-existence 
of [true] moral principles" as to make plausible a thorough particularist view that "our 
ethical decisions are made case by case, without the comforting support or awkward 
demands of moral principles." (1983, p. 530). If there were true moral principles 
established by the existence of invariant reasons, as his concession implies, then it 
would be difficult to see how Dancy could support the thorough-going particularist 
view. This is not to say that Dancy could not come up with other arguments to support 
the thorough-going particularist view. He may indeed, for instance, argue that moral 
principles, even if they are true, are useless in guiding our ethical decisions. But this 
would reveal that whether the thorough particularist view he favors is plausible or not 
has nothing to do with the existence or non-existence of true moral principles. 
Finally, although Little shares my view in denying the existence of true moral 
principles, I do not think she comes to it through the right route. Little (2000, p. 286) 
argues against the existence of moral principles by arguing that they are not 
"explanatory generalities". I think she is quite right in pointing out that if there were 
some sort of generalities established by moral supervenience, they would be quite 
useless in explaining the moral status of an action (Little 2000, p. 285). But the fact 
that moral generalities do not explain does not mean they do not exist. The point is 
worth emphasizing that the principlists at the metaphysical level are only committed 
to the existence of true moral principles, they need not commit themselves to the 
epistemological view that those principles play a useful role in moral explanation. I 
will elaboron on this point in chapter 2. 
My position being extreme, the goal I wish to achieve in my thesis is quite 
moderate. I do not aim to prove positively that the version of particularism I favor is 
true. Rather, I want to argue negatively that no arguments that have been advanced by 
principlists against it are compelling. It might well be argued that I have not 
considered all the possible strategies available to the principlists and perhaps new 
challenges to particularism might come up in the future. These are reasonable doubts. 
But if my thesis succeeds in showing that none of the major arguments that have been 
advanced so far by the principlists are successful, then the burden of proof is on the 
principlists to show how the existence of true moral principles can be established. 
Until more compelling reasons for principlism are produced, I think that moral 
particularism deserves at least a more sympathetic hearing from us than it sometimes 
gets. 
Here is the plan of the thesis: Chapter 1 aims to clarify the debate between 
principlism and particularism. I provide a taxonomy of various types of principlism 
and particularism one can hold in the debate. The sort of particularism I am going to 
defend in my thesis is what I call extreme particularism—the view that 
metaphysically speaking, there are no necessarily true natural-moral moral principles, 
be they absolute or pro tanto. In chapter 2,1 deal with some businesses arising from 
the taxonomy. My main purpose in this chapter is to head off some worries about the 
taxonomy and forestall some objections to the view of extreme particularism. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on an argument developed collaboratively by Frank 
Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith to refute extreme particularism. I call the 
argument by the name of 'the supervenience argument' since Jackson, Pettit and 
Smith think that considerations that start from the thesis of supervenience can cause 
serious problems for extreme particularism. In fact, they contend that the 
supervenience argument can estabhsh the existence of necessarily true natural-moral 
absolute moral principles. If so, extreme particularism will be falsified. In chapters 3, 
4 and 5,1 argue that the supervenience argument fails. 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the argument from the atomism of reason, which is 
invoked to support pro tanto principlism, the view that there are necessarily true pro 
tanto natural-moral moral principles. If the argument is sound, then pro tanto 
principlism will be proved to be true. Extreme particularism, the view that there are 
no relevant moral principles of the absolute and the pro tanto kinds, will thus be 
falsified. However, I will argue that the argument from the atomism of reason is not a 
persuasive argument, chiefly for the following three reasons: (1) The atomism of 
reason is poorly motivated. (2) The claim of the atomism of reason is not very 
informative about how a feature qua reason behaves. (3) The argument begs the 
question against extreme particularism. In chapter 6,1 will try to lay out and explain 
the argument from the atomism of reason. In chapter 7,1 focus on the objections to it. 
Chapter 1 Clarifying the Debate: 
A Taxonomy of Principlism and Particularism 
The principlism/particularism debate is one of the most lively ones in the scene of 
contemporary moral philosophy. Although it has aroused many discussions, many 
participants in it have complained of a lack of a proper contrast between particularism 
and principlism. Dancy (2000, p. 130) points out that many people hold particularism 
without knowing what they are really committed to. In addition, Vayrynen (2002, p. 2) 
argues that what makes the principlism/particularism debate occasionally frustrating 
is that it involves different views of what the debate is fundamentally about. In this 
chapter, I try to offer a clarification of the claims of principlism and particularism. 
The purpose of doing so is to identify the sort of particularism I am going to defend in 
this thesis—extreme particularism, the view that there are no necessarily true 
natural-moral moral principles, be they of the absolute kind or the pro tanto kind. 
1.1 Examples of Apparent Moral Principles 
To a first approximation, principlism is the view that there are true moral principles. 
Particularism is the opposite view that there is none. To understand these views better, 
we need a better grasp of what kind of creature a moral principle is. Although it is 
difficult to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a moral principle, I think the 
following examples will help: 
(1) Lying is absolutely wrong. 
(2) Lying is pro tanto wrong. 
(3) Lying is prima facie wrong. 
(4) Ceteris paribus, lying is wrong. 
(5) Lying has a dispositional tendency to be wrong. 
(6) Lying is wrong by default. 
(7) Other things being equal, not lying is a better course of action than lying. 
(8) If an action is a lie and that's it, then it is wrong. 
(9) A dishonest action is pro tanto wrong. 
(10) A just action is right. 
The list above provides some apparent examples of moral principles. What we mean 
by 'moral principle' refers to creatures like those. Both principlism and particularism 
agree on this. Their difference is the following. When principlism claims that there are 
true moral principles, it claims in effect that there are some moral principles that are 
like the ones mentioned above and that they are true. Particularism, although agreeing 
with principlism on the claim that there are moral principles that are like the ones 
mentioned above, argues instead that none of those moral principles is true. 
1.2 Schema 
The way I characterized principlism and particularim in section 1.1 is only a first 
approximation. In the first place, particularism as I characterized is rather extreme. As 
far as I know, no one really holds such an extreme position. Jonathan Dancy, a 
card-carrying particularist, does not deny that there are true moral principles that are 
like (6) for instance. (Never mind what 'default' means now. I will explain the notion 
later in chapter 2, section § 2.2). If we characterize particularism in the way I did, then 
no one is a particularist. Not that such an extreme position is not logically open. It is. 
However, when real-world particularists claim that there are no true moral principles, 
what they mean, I take it, is the following: there are no true moral principles of certain 
kinds. 
Corresponding to each kind of moral principle, there is a type of particularism 
which claims that moral principles of that kind are not true, on the one hand, and also 
a type of principlism which claims that moral principles of that kind are true, on the 
other. In what follows, I will use a schema to represent the claim of principlism. It can 
generate various types of principlism, depending on the kind of moral principle it 
claims to be true. Once the various types of principlism are in place, we can go on to 
define various types of particularism as their negations. 
Now, let 'F ' stand for the kind moral principles belong to. Principlism can then 
be represented by the following schema: 
F-Principlism: There are true F moral principles. 
With the schema in place, we can fill in F with the kind a moral principle belongs to. 
However, a crucial question here is: what is a kind? Apparently, it depends on our 
criterion of categorization. Moral principles can be divided into the following two 
kinds if we will: those that are first advanced by a philosopher whose last name starts 
with letter 'k ' and those that aren't. However, for the purpose of mapping the 
principlism/particularism debate, three sets of distinctions that divide moral principles 
into kinds are especially useful. They are as follows: contingent/necessary. 
natural-moral/moral-moral and absolute/non-absolute. 
1.3 Contingent vs Necessary 
The first useful distinction to be made between moral principles is the distinction 
between contingent moral principles and necessary ones. Is the truth of moral 
principles contingent upon empirical facts of the world or is it necessary? (The same 
question can be asked about the falsehood of moral principles; however, for the ease 
of exposition, I will just focus on their truth.) Kant (2002, p. 24) famously argues that 
all true moral principles are necessary in that they are not derived from 
generalizations about empirical facts of the world. As Kant sees it, the empirical facts 
are too fickle to provide morality a solid ground. Mill, on the other hand, argues that 
morality cannot be detached from empirical facts. The principle of utility can only be 
"proved" based upon the empirical fact that "human nature is so constituted as to 
desire nothing, which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness (1991, 
p. 172)." 
Both Kant and Mill seem to capture some important aspects of morality. Mill is 
right to the extent that the principle of utility, if true, does seem to depend 
contingently upon human nature. Were human nature differently constituted such that 
happiness is not something we desire, then the principle of utility may well come out 
false. On the other hand, some moral principles, if true, seem to transcend empirical 
facts. Judith Jarvis Thomson contends that the moral principle 'it is wrong to torture 
babies to death for fun' is not only true, but necessarily true (1990, p. 19). Whether 
this is indeed so can be further disputed on particularist grounds. I do not mean to 
settle the issue here. More on this later in chapter 2, section § 2.7. However, in terms 
of categorization, I think we can usefully divide moral principles further into the 
following two categories: 
Contingent Moral Principles 
Necessary Moral Principles 
As it can be a matter of great controversy which categories the ten examples fall under, 
I do not give any examples of the above two categories. However, it is fair to say that 
Mill and Kant provide us with at least some prima facie reasons to believe that there 
are at least some examples in each category. Even if we discover after some 
philosophical reflection that all moral principles turn out to be necessary or all of 
them turn out to be contingent, we can still hold on to a conceptual distinction 
between these two kinds of principles. 
Now, with the contingent/necessary distinction in place, now we can fill in the 
schema. Taxonomically, we can get principlism of the following two kinds: 
Necessaiy Principlism: There are necessarily true moral principles. 
Contingent Principlism: There are contingently true moral principles. 
Given that Kant thinks that all moral principles are necessarily true, it should come as 
no surprise that he can be regarded as a champion of necessary principlism. On the 
other hand, philosophers of the Millian tradition tend to support contingent 
principlism. Peter Singer (2009, pp. 161-162), for instance, contends that given the 
contingent fact that there are people who are dying because of hunger, it would be 
wrong of us not to contribute as much as we can to relieve their suffering. Were we to 
live in a world abound with 'milk and honey' and no one starves, it may not be wrong 
of us not to contribute as much. Hence, the moral principle that demands contribution 
is merely contingently true. 
In this thesis, I will be concerned solely with necessary principlism. 
1.4 Natural-Moral vs Moral-Moral 
In addition to the contingent and necessary kinds moral principles can fall under, 
moral principles can also be divided into the following two kinds: 
Natural-Moral Moral Principles: (l)-(8) 
Moral-Moral Moral Principles: (9)-(10) 
Let me clarify the difference between these two kinds of moral principles. To begin 
with, a natural-moral moral principle is a moral principle that links a natural property 
with a moral property. Examples are provided by (1 )-(8) in section § 1.1. To a first 
approximation, a natural property is typically taken to be a property that is studied by 
natural sciences and is thus distinguished ft-om a moral property. Michael Ridge (2008, 
introduction) rightly complains, however, that this account of natural properties is not 
very illuminating in that natural sciences are typically taken to be the sciences that 
study natural properties. So there is a problem of circular definition here and the 
account of natural properties is thus not very illuminating. Although I agree with 
Ridge that this account of natural properties is not very illuminating, I think it will 
suffice for our current purposes. For moral properties are certainly not a subject that is 
studied by our current natural sciences and hence are distinguishable from natural 
properties. Should moral properties one day become the subject matter of natural 
sciences, they are still very different from the other natural properties we currently 
study, for they are typically taken to be 'objectively prescriptive' in nature, to use 
John Mackie's words. Hence, a conceptual distinction can still be made between these 
two kinds of properties, whatever they are called eventually.^ 
On the other hand, a moral-moral moral principle is a moral principle that links a 
moral property with another moral property. Examples are provided by (9)-(10) in 
section 1.1. The kind of moral-moral moral principle that is most often discussed is 
the one that links a thick moral property with a thin moral property of it.^ Roughly 
speaking, if we take a McDowellian view of the distinction between the thick and thin 
moral properties, a thick moral property, such as dishonesty, justice or piety, is a 
moral property that is thick with cultural implications such that an outsider lacking an 
understanding of the relevant cultural implications cannot have a full grasp of its 
meaning. For instance, a westerner who knows nothing about traditional Chinese 
culture might have difficulty understanding how an aged adult, dressed up in colorful 
costumes, dancing in front of his aged parents like a clown, is performing an action of 
filial piety. By contrast, a thin moral property, such as badness or wrongness, is thin 
with cultural implications such that any moral creatures, including the outsiders 
external to the culture, can in principle grasp the meaning of the property. To put it 
more concretely, westerners and Chinese alike, they both know what it means to say 
something is wrong even though they don't know anything about each other's culture. 
For to say X is wrong is for both of them, inter alia, to say that X is the thing not to be 
done. 
Now, with the natural-moral/moral-moral distinction in place, we can now 
proceed to fill in the schema. Taxonomically, we can get the following two kinds of 
principlism: 
Natural-Moral Principlism: There are true natural-moral moral principles. 
Moral-Moral Principlism: There are true moral-moral moral principles. 
Let me explain what each kind of principlism means in more detail. Let's start with 
^ David Chalmers makes similar comments in his The Conscious Mind{\991, pp. 162-163). The 
contrast there, though, is not between moral properties and natural properties, but rather between 
phenomenal properties and physical properties. Chalmers contends that even if all phenomenal 
properties can be reduced to physical properties in the ftiture, those physical properties must still be 
very different irom our current physical properties. 
^ There might well be other kinds of moral-moral moral principles, such as ones that connect thick 
moral properties with thick ones or ones that connect thin moral properties with thin ones or ones that 
connect thin moral properties with thick ones. However, 1 will use 'moral-moral moral principles' to 
refer to ones that connect thick moral properties with thin ones, except otherwise indicated or where the 
contexts suggest otherwise. 
natural-moral principlism. 
Natural-Moral Principlism: There are true natural-moral moral principles. 
Kant and the utilitarians, although they disagree with each other over what the 
fundamental principles of morality are, and about whether those principles are 
necessary or contingent, nevertheless agree on the claim that there are true 
natural-moral moral principles. For Kant, it is true that lying is wrong, whereas 
for act-utilitarians, it is true that promoting happiness is right. They both 
acknowledge that there are true moral principles connecting a natural property 
with a moral property. 
Moral-Moral Principlism: There are true moral-moral moral principles. 
Commonsense morality abounds with moral principles that connect a moral 
property with another moral property, especially a thick one with a thin one. For 
instance, a just action is right, whereas an unjust one is wrong. A kind action is pro 
tanto right while ceteris paribus, a dishonest conduct is wrong. In philosophy, 
Ross can be interpreted as a classic example of one who contends that there are 
true moral-moral moral principles. In his book The Right and The Good (2002), he 
contends that there are seven pro tanto duties: duties of reparation, gratitude, 
fidelity, justice, self-improvement, beneficence, and non-maleficence."^ These 
duties are duties for actions. Namely, the actions fulfilling these duties are pro 
tanto right. 
With the above two kinds of principlism in place, it has to be pointed out that my 
focus in this thesis is natural-moral prinicplism. 
1.5 Absolute vs Non-Absolute 
In addition to the contingent/necessary and the natural-moral/moral-moral distinctions, 
a third distinction that is relevant for our purpose is the distinction between absolute 
and non-absolute. The moral principles in the ten examples can be categorized into 
the following two kinds: 
" It is generally agreed that although Ross himself talks of 'prima facie' duties instead of 'pro tanto' 
ones, what he really has in mind is the latter rather than the former. For those duties are not just duties 
at first glance; they are in fact our duties when there are no other relevant duties in play. See Dancy 
(2004), p. 5, footnote 2 
Absolute Moral Principles: (1) (10) 
Non-Absolute Moral Principles: (2)-(9) 
The distinction between these two kinds of moral principles is not easy to capture. 
However, intuitively, everyone can agree that there is a distinction between moral 
principles that are classified as absolute moral principles, such as (1) and (10), and 
those that are classified as non-absolute moral principles, such as (2)-(9). Here, I will 
not attempt to clarify the distinction. I shall just rely on readers' intuition that there is 
indeed a distinction and call that distinction the absolute/non-absolute distinction. 
What is especially important for our purpose in this thesis is the distinction 
between absolute moral principles and one kind of non-absolute moral principles, the 
pro tanto moral principles. Some examples can be given to illustrate what they are 
respectively: 
Absolute Moral Principles: (1) (10) 
Pro Tanto Moral Principles: (2) 
The distinction between the above two kinds of moral principles is, again, hard to 
capture with any precision. But again, everyone agrees that there must be some 
distinction between moral principles such as (1) and (10) and those such as (2). I will 
call it the absolute/pro tanto distinction. According to Dancy (2009), the distinction is 
roughly the following: the absolute moral principles are moral principles that are 
about the overall moral status of an action whereas the pro tanto ones are not. Rather, 
the pro tanto moral principles are about the moral status of the features of an action. 
Dancy's idea of an absolute moral principle is probably quite straightforward. Take (1) 
for instance. It is an absolute moral principle against lying. It says in effect that the 
action of lying has the overall moral status of wrongness. By contrast, the idea of a 
pro tanto moral principle needs more clarification. Why is a pro tanto moral principle 
about the moral status of a feature of an action? What is a feature? 
To begin with, the word 'feature', in the mouth of Dancy (1993, p. 117), means a 
property. Take the action of killing to illustrate. It has many features. In addition to the 
feature of killing, an action of killing might well have other features, such as the 
feature of putting an end to suffering, as it is in the case of 'mercy killing'. The moral 
status of an action is determined jointly by all the morally relevant features it has. 
Some of them are right-making and some of them are wrong-making. Or to put it 
differently, some of them tend to make an action that has them right whereas the 
others tend to make an action that has them wrong. For instance, the feature of killing 
is typically wrong-making because it tends to make an action that has it wrong. 
whereas the feature of putting an end to suffering is typically right-making because it 
tends to make an action that has it right. It has to be noted here that an action that has 
wrong-making features, such as that of killing, may turn out to be overall right, due to 
the other right-making features it has, such as that of putting an end to suffering. 
According to Dancy's understanding of pro tanto moral principles, they are in the 
business of specifying these right-making or wrong-making features (Dancy 2004, p. 
76). For instance, a pro tanto moral principle which claims that killing is pro tanto 
wrong is actually claiming that the feature of killing is wrong-making (such that an 
action that has it is pro tanto wrong). On such a construal, a pro tanto moral principle 
is in fact about the moral status of a feature (the wrong-makingness of the feature of 
killing). This is different from the claim of an absolute moral principle against killing, 
which is about the overall moral status (or wrongness) of killing. 
Strictly speaking, however, the distinction Dancy has made between absolute and 
pro tanto moral principles is not a sharp one. For pro tanto moral principles, in one 
sense, can certainly be about the overall status of an action too. For instance, i f ' lying 
is pro tanot wrong' is understood as the claim that the action of lying has the property 
of being pro tanto right, then it is a moral principle that is about the overall moral 
stams of an action. Nevertheless, it seems to be clearly a pro tanto moral principle 
instead of an absolute one. For our purpose, however, I shall ignore this complication. 
I think we can work with Dancy's way of drawing the distinction with the caveat in 
mind that the distinction may not be sharp. 
Now, with the absolute/pro tanto distinction in place, we can go on to fill in the 
schema. Taxonomically, we can get the following two kinds of principlism: 
Absolute Principlism: There are tme absolute moral principles. 
Pro Tanto Principlism: There are true pro tanto moral principles. 
Let me clarify the above two kinds of principlism in more detail. 
Absolute Principlism: There are true absolute moral principles. 
Kant and Mill are famous defenders of absolute principlism. In "On a Supposed 
Right to Lie from Altruistic Motive", Kant (1994) (in)famously claims that lying 
is wrong in all kinds of circumstances. Lying is morally forbidden even in 
circumstances where the Nazi police are asking you about the whereabouts of a 
Jewish girl who is hiding in your house. On the other hand. Mill regards the 
principle of utility as being true and absolute in that it holds without exceptions 
in all moral circumstances. 
Pro Tanto Principlism: There are true pro tanto moral principles. 
In Jonathan Dancy (2004, pp. 5-6)^ and Robert Audi's (2004, pp. 70-71) 
interpretation, W. D. Ross can be regarded a defender of this type of principlism. 
Ross argues that there are seven pro tanto principles that are true in the sense that 
the valence of those features specified in the pro tanto principles is invariant. 
Here, the term 'valence' needs some explanation. Dancy and Audi take the 
valence of a feature to be either negative, positive or neutral, depending on 
whether the feature is wrong-making, right-making or morally irrelevant. Thus 
understood, a feature that is wrong-making has a negative valence, right-making 
a positive valence, morally irrelevant a neutral valence. Take 'breaking a promise 
is pro tanto wrong' for instance. Ross endorses a principle like this as being true. 
That is, Ross thinks that one essential characteristic of the feature of 
promise-breaking is that it is always wrong-making. 
1.6 Various Kinds of Principlism and Particularism 
Now, since all the three major distinctions we need are in place, we can proceed to 
make some headway towards providing a taxonomy of the principlism/particularism 
debate. To begin with, I want to draw the readers' attention to the fact that the three 
major distinctions actually crisscross each other. So there can be necessary 
natural-moral absolute moral principles or there can be contingent natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles. For the purpose of mapping out the debate and understanding 
the various sorts of positions one can hold in the debate, the 
natural-moral/moral-moral and the absolute/pro tanto distinctions are especially 
important. I will keep the contingent/necessary distinction latent in the background at 
the moment and come back to it in section §1.8 . 
Now, since the natural-moral/moral-moral distinction crisscrosses the 
absolute/pro tanto distinction. There can be four kinds of moral principles: 
natural-moral absolute moral principles (such as 'lying is wrong' as endorsed by 
Kant), natural-moral pro tanto moral principles (such as 'breaking a promise is pro 
tanto wrong' as endorsed by Ross), moral-moral absolute moral principles (such as 'a 
just action is right' as endorsed by commonsense morality), and moral-moral pro tanto 
moral principles (such as 'an action of beneficence is pro tanto right' as again 
endorsed by Ross). Correspondingly, using our schema of principlism—there are true 
' It has to be noted though W. D. Ross himself calls the principles by the name of 'the principles of 
prima facie duty'. See Dancy (2004, pp. 5-6) 
F moral principles, we can get the following four positions: 
(A) Natural-Moral Absolute Principlism: There are true natural-moral absolute 
moral principles. 
(B) Natural-Moral Pro Tano Principlism: There are true natural-moral pro tanto 
moral principles. 
(C) Moral-Moral Absolute Principlism: There are true moral-moral absolute 
moral principles. 
(D) Moral-Moral Non-Absolute Principlism: There are true moral-moral 
non-absolute moral principles. 
Equipped with the above taxonomy of principlism, we can now proceed to define four 
corresponding kinds of particularism respectively as their negations. 
(-A) Natural-Moral Absolute Particularism: There are no natural-moral 
absolute moral principles. 
(-B) Natural-Moral Pro Tanto Particularism: There are no natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles. 
(-C) Moral-Moral Absolute Particularism: There are no moral-moral absolute 
moral principles. 
(-D) Moral-Moral Pro Tanto Particularism: There are no moral-moral pro tanto 
moral principles. 
In the light of these distinctions, it should be clear that there are numerous positions 
one can take in the principlism/particularism debate. Dancy, for instance, holds true 
(-A), pro tanto version of (-B), and (-C) while confessing that a pro tanto version of 
(D) might well come out to be true, with the qualification that no serious damage will 
be made to the kind of particularism he favors. Dancy rejects (A) and (C) chiefly for 
the reason that they cannot accommodate the phenomenon of moral conflicts (2004, p. 
4). For true absolute moral principles cannot conflict. However, moral conflicts are a 
real phenomenon in our everyday moral life. For instance, I made a promise to meet 
my friend, and yet on my way to see him, I come across a car accident whose victims 
need my help. There is a moral conflict between my duty to keep the promise and my 
duty to help those in need of urgent assistance. (A) and (C) fail to take the 
phenomenon seriously. Of course, the supporters of (A) and (C) may well contend 
that there is only one true absolute principle around such that no real moral conflict is 
possible. The moral conflict is merely apparent. What is wrong with this? Dancy 
contends that the problem with this view is that it leaves no room for regret. (The sort 
of regret here is "the regret we feel when, though what we did was the right thing to 
do, still there were strong reasons to do something else." (2004, p. 4)) If views like (A) 
or (C) were right, Dancy contends: 
there [would be] no reason to do the other thing at all, since only one principle 
applied to the case, and it was decisive, and the only reasons around were those 
which depend for their existence on that principle. If I suppose that I did the right 
thing [according to the principle], then, I should suppose that there was no reason 
to take the alternative course, and so I should not have anything to regret. (2004, 
p. 4) 
So much for Dancy's reasons for rejecting both (A) and (C) (or accepting (-A) and 
(-C)). With regard to (-B), Dancy argues for holism of reason to support it. Holism of 
reason is roughly, the view that reasons can change their valence. I will explain what 
exactly this means in chapters 6 and 7. For our purpose now, it suffices to note that for 
Dancy, reasons are features specified in the pro tanto moral principles. For instance, to 
say that 'lying is pro tanto wrong' is to say that 'the fact that an action has the feature 
of lying serves as a reason that counts against an action.' Or, to put it somewhat 
differently, the feature of lying, as a reason, carries a negative valence. If the feature 
of lying, as a reason, can (and do) change its valence from negative to positive (or 
from wrong-making to right-making), as holism of reason contends, then pro tanto 
moral principles will be thus falsified. Dancy argues that holism of reason is not only 
true of a few features but is a widespread phenomenon. The feature of lying is usually 
wrong-making but no so when it is embedded in a context of playing a game of 
Diplomat. The feature of causing pain is usually bad-making but not so when you 
have to give someone a shot to inoculate him. The best explanation for these 
phenomena is that there are no true pro tanto natural-moral principles. Should there 
turn out to be some, it would be a sort of "cosmic accidenf, to use Dancy's metaphor 
(2004, p. 82). 
With regard to (D), Dancy (2009) also contends that holism of reason holds. That 
an action involves the feature of consideration is usually good, but not so when you 
considerately wipe the sweat from the brows of a torturer who is hard bent on his job. 
That an action involves cruelty is usually bad, but no so when a cruel response is 
exactly what is called for in the circumstances. Judging from these phenomena, it also 
seems reasonable to infer that there are no true pro tanto moral-moral principles. 
However, there seems to be one exception, as Dancy readily admits: "I am admitting 
pro tem that justice is an invariant reason [specified by a true pro tanto moral 
principle] (2004, p. 120)." However, Dancy contends that the feature of justice is 
rather exceptional, and there are not too many thick features like it (2004, p. 121). 
Hence, the fact that justice is an invariant reason is, he contends, "no real damage to 
the particularist' assault on the standard principle-based conception of morality (2004, 
p. 82)." 
Little (2000), although seeing eye to eye largely with Dancy on (-A), (-B), and 
(-C), disagrees with Dancy over (-D) and explicitly rejects it. She comments: "I part 
company with Jonathan Dancy, who urges that even thick moral concepts have 
variable valence, (p. 289, fn. 21)" In fact. Little believes that there are morally thick 
features, when functioning as reasons for or against actions, are "guaranteed of 
carrying a given valence of moral significance (p. 289)". It is reasonable to infer that 
she believes that there are true moral-moral pro tanto moral principles that specify 
features that have invariant valence. 
Rossians, unlike Dancy and Little, deny both (-B) and (-D) (or accepts both (B) 
and (D) indeed.) They nevertheless agree with both Dancy and Little that (A) and (C) 
are both false. By and large, they contend that when there is a moral conflict between 
pro tanto moral principles, there is no absolute moral principle one can invoke to 
settle it. Rather, the solution lies in 'perception'*" (Ross, 2002, p. 41). 
To make things clearer, it is useful to have the following graph (N: denial of the 
existence of the kind of moral principle at issue; Y: endorsement of the kind of moral 
principle at issue) 
A: Natural-Moral 
Absolute Moral 
Principles 
B: Natural-Moral 
Pro Tanto Moral 
Principles 
C:Moral-Moral 
Absolute Moral 
Principles 
D:Moral-Moral 
Pro Tanto Moral 
Principles 
Dancy N N N N (with 
qualification) 
Little N N N Y 
' Whether 'perception' should be taken literally or figuratively is open for debate. 1 do not take a 
particular stand on this issue. 
The positions of Dancy, Little and the Rossians do not by far exhaust all the 
possible positions one can take. One may for instance subscribe to (-A) and (-C) while 
negating both (-B) and (-D). Or one may accept (-A) and deny all of (-B), (-C) and 
(-D). We can of course list all the possible positions and give each of them a label if 
we want to. But doing so, I fear, will only muddle rather than clarify the debate, as it 
is quite cognitively demanding to remember all the labels. 
I think a more useful way to proceed is this: whenever we come across someone 
who claims herself to be a particularist or a principlist, we can ask her which among 
(A), (B), (C), and (D) are the positions she accepts, rejects or wishes to remain neutral 
about. Of course, a person committed to unadulterated principlism will deny all of 
them while a person committed to unadulterated particularism will accept them all. 
But there are a lot of adulterated positions in between. 
The positions I am interested in exploring in this thesis are (A), (-A), (B) and 
(-B). I should mention that I intend to remain neutral about (C), (D), (-C) and (-D) for 
reasons of limited space in this thesis. Unless otherwise indicated by the context, I 
will henceforth use the label 'principlism' to refer to a position that upholds the truth 
of (A) and (B), and the label 'particularism' to refer to a position that upholds the 
truth of(-A) and (-B). 
In what follows, when I say 'principlism' and 'particularism', they are used as 
abbreviations for the following two views: 
Principlism: There are true natural-moral moral principles. 
(A) Natural-Moral Absolute Principlism: There are tme natural-moral 
absolute moral principles. 
(B) Natural-Moral Pro Tanto Principlism: There are true natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles. 
Particularism: There are no true natural-moral moral principles, be they 
absolute or pro tanto. 
(-A) Natural-Moral Absolute Particularism: There are no true 
natural-moral absolute moral principles. 
(-B) Natural-Moral Pro Tanto Particularism: There are no true 
natural-moral pro tanto moral principles. 
I will henceforth leave the 'natural-moral' qualifier latent in the background, since it 
is not an issue of contention between principlism and particularism. Both agree that a 
natural-moral moral principle is one that links a natural property with a moral 
property. The real issue is whether any natural-moral principle, be it of the absolute 
kind or of the pro tanto kind, is true or not. 
To take stock, we now have the following views in place: 
Principlism: There are true natural-moral moral principles. 
(A) Absolute Principlism: There are tme natural-moral absolute moral 
principles. 
(B) Pro Tanto Principlism: There are true natural-moral pro tanto moral 
principles. 
Particularism: There are no true natural-moral moral principles, be they 
absolute or pro tanto. 
(-A) Absolute Particularism: There are no true natural-moral absolute 
moral principles. 
(-B) Pro Tanto Particularism: There are no true natural-moral pro tanto 
moral principles. 
1.7 Extreme Particularism 
In the last section, we have demonstrated the various positions one can hold. It is now 
time to clarify the sort of position / will hold in this thesis. Before I do so, however, it 
is important to notice the following four new possibilities that are generated out of a 
combination of (A), (B), (-A) and (-B) we mentioned in the last section. 
(1) Extreme Principlism: (A) + (B) 
(2) Modest Principlism Version 1 : (A) + (-B) 
(3) Modest Principlism Version 2: (-A) + (B) 
(4) Extreme Particularism: (-A) + (-B) 
In the following discussion, I will explain the above four positions in more detail. In 
doing so, I shall keep the 'natural-moral' qualifier latent in the background, since all 
the moral principles we will be talking about are natural-moral ones. 
(1) Extreme Principlism contends that there are both true absolute and pro tanto moral 
principles. Richard Brandt's version of rule-utilitarianism provides an example of 
this view. Brandt (1968) contends that while the principle of utility is absolutely 
true and provides an ultimate criterion of rightness, there are many true pro tanto 
moral principles, such as 'lying is pro tanto wrong' or 'killing is pro tanto wrong', 
that we have to take seriously. A moral agent needs to have some commitment to 
these pro tanto moral principles so as to facilitate the promotion of utility. 
(2) Modest Principlism Version 1 contends that while there are true absolute moral 
principles, there are no true pro tanto ones.^ It is a modest view because 
compared to extreme principlism, it admits the non-existence of true pro tanto 
moral principles. At the risk of some simplification, natural law theorists may well 
be regarded as supporters of this view. They typically think that morality can be 
reduced to a coherent set of true moral principles endorsed by our rational nature. 
'Lying is wrong' is a paradigmatic example. How many more moral principles are 
in the set can be a matter for further dispute. What goes without dispute for all 
natural law theorists is that they are all absolute. 
(3) Modest Principlism Version 2 contends that while there are true pro tanto 
principles, there are no true absolute moral principles. It is a modest view because 
compared to extreme principlism, it admits the non-existence of true absolute 
moral principles. The most prominent defender of this view is W. D. Ross. He 
(2002, p. 41) famously contends that "for the estimation of the comparative 
stringency of these [pro tanto] obligations, no general rules can, as far as I can see, 
be laid down." In other words, should there be a conflict between pro tanto 
principles, there are no absolute principles we can invoke to settle it. The decision 
about what is the right thing to do, Ross (2002, p. 41) quotes Aristotle approvingly. 
Admittedly, it is not entirely clear whether modest principlism version 1 is a coherent position for 
anyone to hold. For typically, the existence of true absolute moral principles entails the existence of 
true pro tanto moral principles (although they are different creatures about the moral status of different 
things, as 1 have illustrated in section § 1.5). For instance, if killing is wrong absolutely, it seems that it 
must be pro tanto wrong too. However, it might well be contended that if an action is absolutely wrong, 
it cannot be pro tanto wrong. Because for an action to be pro tanto wrong means that there might be 
some occasions in which it turns out to be not wrong whereas if it is absolutely wrong, then there are 
no occasions in which it is not wrong, 1 do not mean to settle the issue here. All I need here is that 
modest principlism version 1 at least has some prima facie plausibility to it; whether it is indeed so can 
be a matter of fijrther dispute. 
"rests with perception." 
(4) Extreme Particularism contends that there are no true moral principles, be they 
absolute or pro tanto. Margaret Little defends this view in her 2000 paper, "Moral 
Generalities Revisited". She (p. 277) argues that particularism grounds a radical 
metaphysical claim: "we have reason to believe there are no codifiable law-like 
moral generalities whatsoever, even those tempered [by pro tanto clause] to 
seemingly innocuous forms." 
Laying out the four positions above enables us to see clearly what the defense of each 
position requires. Take the defense of extreme particularism for instance. It not only 
faces challenges from extreme principlism, but challenges from modest principlism 
version 1, and modest principlism version 2 as well. To give extreme particularism a 
forcefiil defense, one at least has to argue that none of extreme principlism, and two 
forms of modest principlism have compelling reasons for them. In other words, 
extreme particularism at least has to argue that there are no compelling reasons for 
believing in the existence of true absolute moral principle or pro tanto ones. Extreme 
particularism will be falsified if the three kinds of principlism mentioned above can 
prove the existence of either true absolute moral principles or true pro tanto ones. 
For the record, I will defend extreme particularism in my thesis. My strategy is to 
argue that there have not been any compelling arguments to believe in the three kinds 
of principlism; that is, I argue that there have not been any compelling arguments to 
believe in the existence of absolute moral principles or pro tanto moral principles, i.e. 
there have not been any compelling arguments to believe absolute principlism or pro 
tanto principlism. Although this does not prove extreme particularism to be true, 
however, if I am right about this, it will at least lend some indirect support for extreme 
particularism. 
1.8 Caveat 
Having clarified the view of extreme particularism as the view that there are no true 
natural-moral principles, be they of the absolute kind or the pro tanto kind, there is an 
important caveat to be noted here. That is, the moral principles here are the necessary 
ones. Or so I take them to be. For as I pointed out in section § 1.3, necessary moral 
principles are the sort of moral principles we are concerned with in this thesis. So, to 
be more precise, the view of extreme of particularism can be represented as follows: 
Extreme Particularism: There are no necessarily true natural-moral moral 
principles, be they absolute or pro tanto. 
Similarly, the views that oppose extreme particularism can also be represented with 
more precision as follows: 
Absolute Principlism: There are necessarily true natural-moral absolute moral 
principles. 
Pro Tanto Principlism: There are necessarily tme natural-moral pro tanto moral 
principles. 
Remember that in this thesis, extreme particularism is the position we are going to 
defend. It is attacked by both absolute principlism and pro tanto principlism. If we 
succeed in showing that the major arguments that have been advanced to support the 
above two doctrines are no good, then we will be providing a good defense of extreme 
particularism. This is what we will do in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Before we do so, 
however, we need to deal with some businesses arising from the taxonomy we 
provided in this chapter. This is what we will do in chapter 2, the next chapter. 
Chapter 2 Businesses Arising from Taxonomy 
In chapter 1, we have provided a taxonomy of various kinds of principlism and 
particularism and identified extreme particularism and two kinds of principlism as the 
chief concerns of this thesis. Remember that our goal is to defend extreme 
particularism from the attacks from absolute principlism and pro tanto principlism. In 
chapters 3 , 4 and 5, we will look at an argument, the supervenience argument, that is 
meant to support absolute principlism. In chapters 6 and 7, we will look at another 
argument, the argument from the atomism of reason, that is meant to support pro tanto 
principlism. In these chapters, we will argue that neither of these two arguments 
works. If we are right, then we will be providing a forceful defense of extreme 
particularism against these two kinds of principlism. Before we do so, however, there 
are some businesses arising from the taxonomy we provided in chapter 1 we have to 
deal with. The purpose of taking care of these businesses is to head off some worries 
readers might have about the taxonomy and to forestall some objections to the view of 
extreme particularism. 
2.1 Epistemology vs Metaphysical 
As we indicated in the taxonomy in chapter 1, the issue that divides principlism and 
particularism is the issue of whether there are any true moral principles of particular 
kinds. It is very different from another issue that is also hotly debated in the terms of 
principlism/particularism debate—that is, the issue of whether moral principles are 
useful for explaining the moral status of actions or guiding actions. 
To make things clear, I think it is worthwhile to distinguish between the 
following two debates: 
(M) Metaphysical Debate: Are there true moral principles? 
(E) Epistemological Debate: Do moral principles play a useful role in explaining 
the moral status of actions or guiding actions? 
(M) and (E) are very different questions. (M) is concerned with the truth of moral 
principles whereas (E) is concerned with their usefulness. Some might conflate these 
two questions and operate on the following two assumptions: (1) A 'yes ' to (M) 
automatically obligates us to say 'yes ' to (E), as true moral principles must be useful. 
(2) A 'yes ' to (E) automatically obligates us to say 'yes ' , as useful moral principles 
must be true. 
In my view, neither of these assumptions is correct. On the one hand, a moral 
principle can be true while being epistemologically useless. It is not hard to imagine 
that a true moral principle can be so complicated that we can never comprehend it. 
Hence, it is not useful for explaining the moral status of actions or guiding actions. It 
has to be noted here, however, that this is not to deny that true moral principles can be 
implicitly operating at an unconscious level. 
On the other hand, a moral principle may well be false, yet can still be extremely 
useful in most cases. Take 'always tell the truth' or equivalently 'telling the truth is 
right' for instance. It might not hold when Nazi Police is asking you the where-about 
of a Jewish girl, who you know is hiding in your attic. Nevertheless, it is still a very 
useful rule of thumb in most cases. There is no a priori conceptual connection 
between the truth of a moral principle and its usefulness. 
Distinguishing between (M) and (E) can allow us to distinguish metaphysical 
principlism from epistemological principlism, and metaphysical particularism from 
epistemological particularism: 
Metaphysical Principlism: Yes to (M) 
Metaphysical Particularism: No to (M) 
Epistemological Principlism: Yes to (E) 
Epistemological Particularism: No to (E) 
More importantly, distinguishing between (M) and (E) has the further advantage of 
allowing us to define two hybrid views: 
Hybrid A: Metaphysical Particularism + Epistemological Principlism 
Hybrid B: Metaphysical Principlism + Epistemological Particularism: 
Hybrid A suggests that one can coherently argue that although there are no true moral 
principles, nevertheless moral principles are still useful for action-guiding and 
explanation of the moral status of an action. In fact. Little endorses this view in her 
2000 article 'Moral Generalities Revisited'. There she argues that although the 
existence of true moral principles is chimerical, moral principles nevertheless hold in 
normal conditions and are indispensable for moral explanation. She contends that we 
are perfectly justified in appealing to moral principles for moral clarification as long 
as we know we are not in a post-apocalyptic scenario where everything is out of its 
normal order. 
On the other hand, Hybrid B suggests that although there are true moral 
principles, they might be useless for action guiding or explaining the moral status of 
actions. Although Dancy is generally regarded as taking a particularist position with 
regard to both (M) and (E), his moral metaphysical views sometimes give the 
impression of leaning towards Metaphysical Principlism. He acknowledges (I think, 
somewhat inconsistently with his other views) that there might be a few privileged 
exceptionless moral principles; however, he claims that they are too indiscriminate to 
serve any explanatory purpose (Dancy, 2000, p. 131, p. 136). 
Having distinguished two hybrid views, two other straightforward views as 
follows should also be laid on the table: 
Straightforward Principlism: Metaphysical Principlism+Epistemological 
Principlism 
Straightforward Particularism: Metaphysical Particularism+Epistemological 
Particularism 
Supporters of Straightforward Principlism include philosophers such as Kant and Mill. 
Kant famously contends that all true moral principles are categorical imperatives. 
Their truth is necessary a priori, holding independently of human desires or 
inclinations. The moral principle, 'don't lie', as an action guide, is not only useful but 
has to be obeyed in all relevant circumstances. Mill, on the other hand, reckons the 
principle of utility to be true in all cases. Although he does not recommend using it as 
an action guide for reasons of self-serving bias or miscalculations, he thinks that there 
are moral principles which can serve as useful rules of thumb insofar as following 
them promotes happiness in general. 
With regard to Straightforward Particularism, its most prominent champion is 
probably Jonathan Dancy. In his 1983 paper, "Ethical Particularism and Morally 
Relevant Properties", Dancy advocates particularism as the view that there are no true 
moral principles such that 'our ethical decisions are made case by case, without the 
comforting support or awkward demands of moral principles.' In his 2004 book. 
Ethics Without Principles, he defends particularism as the view that 'the possibility of 
moral thought and judgment does not depend upon the provision of any moral 
principle at all.' Namely, the moral principle does not have any use when we are 
engaged in moral thinking and judgment. Combining Dancy's two views of 
particularism at different periods, we can derive a hybrid view which is not a million 
miles away from Straightforward Particularism. 
The two hybrid views and the two straightforward views outlined above reveal 
four options available to a participant in the principlism/particularism debate. The 
hybrid views are particularly interesting in that they illustrate the possibility that the 
metaphysical debate and epistemological debate can proceed somewhat independently. 
But having said so, I am not suggesting that investigation concerning either one of 
these debates can or should be brought to a conclusion without any regard at all for 
our views about the other debate. For our views about metaphysics and epistemology 
must cohere. There is no particular reason to think that any view about moral 
metaphysics can be combined with any view about moral epistemology. And I do not 
deny that a certain position in moral epistemology may well be best supported by a 
certain position in moral metaphysics and vice versa. What I am suggesting is merely 
that apart from external support, each position in either the metaphysical debate or the 
epistemological debate can be assessed in its own intrinsic merits. 
Most discussion in the past has focused on the Epistemological Debate while the 
Metaphysical Debate is largely ignored. Indeed, many of epistemological 
particularists' insights have by now been absorbed by epistemological principlists. It 
is now widely accepted that no mechanical application of universal principles will 
issue the correct moral verdict in all cases. Judgment, sensitivity and interpretation 
play an essential role in moral reasoning. In the words of Little and Lance (2005a, p. 
567): 
If they underscored points too often forgotten or mislaid in the history of moral 
theory, they are claims no one, when reminded, will object to. Everyone should 
agree: crude theory is bad theory, and no theory deploys itself 
By 'theory', I take Little and Lance to mean 'overarching principle' such as the 
principle of utility or the Kantian principle of respecting autonomy.^ The nub of the 
passage is that even overarching principlists such as utilitarians or Kantians cannot 
apply their principles mechanically and afford to ignore the importance of judgment, 
sensitivity and interpretation. 
On the other hand, epistemological particularists have also absorbed many 
insights of epistemological principlists. For instance, Dancy (1993, p. 67) comes to 
recognize that moral principles are certainly very useful as indicators of what is 
^ A reviewer points out that the bioethicists, such as Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, tend to 
speak of "the principle of respect for autonomy" whereas Onora O'Neill (2003) distinguishes Kant's 
Formula of Autonomy from this one. Readers who are interested in the differences are advised to 
consult O'Neill (2003). 1 am grateful to the reviewer for helpful comments. 
generally morally salient.^ Indeed, it seems an impossibility to distinguish the salient 
features of the situation from the non-salient ones without the aid of moral principles. 
Without some knowledge of moral principles, there is not a chance one can identify 
morally salient features when one engages in practical moral reasoning. But this is not 
to say that one must be conscious of those moral principles when one applies them. 
For they might be so deeply ingrained in our dispositions that we could apply them 
almost intuitively when the relevant circumstances arise. 
So now there seems to be great convergence between the claims of particularists 
and those of principlists about the Epistemological Debate. However, I think that the 
divide between them about the Metaphysical Debate still remains wide. The 
battleground between principlists and particularists should thus be shifted to the 
Metaphysical Debate. In any case, this will be the debate I deal with in my thesis. 
2.2 Varieties of Non-Absolute Principlism 
In section § 1.5 of chapter 1, we pointed out that there is a distinction between 
absolute and non-absolute moral principles. However, we have only discussed one 
sort of non-absolute moral principles, i.e. the pro tanto ones. In fact, there are many 
other kinds of non-absolute moral principles, such as (3)-(9) we mentioned in section 
§ 1.1 of chapter 1. Corresponding to each kind of non-absolute moral principle, there 
can be a kind of principlism. For the record, they are as follows: 
Prima Facie Non-Absolute Principlism: There are true prima facie non-absolute 
moral principles 
Commonsense morality endorses the claim that there are true prima facie 
non-absolute moral principles. 'Prima facie' means 'at first glance'. For 
commonsense morality, it is true that lying is always prima facie wrong in the 
sense that lying always appears to be wrong at first glance. However, this does 
not exclude the possibility that it may turn out to be right in fact. 
Ceteris Paribus Non-Absolute Principlism: There are true ceteris paribus 
non-absolute moral principles. 
' Dancy (1993, p. 67) comments that "[t]he suggestion I want to make here is that a moral principle 
amounts to a reminder of the sort of importance that a property can have in suitable circumstances. It 
seems to me that this suggestion makes good sense of a number of puzzles in moral philosophy, in a 
way that is perfectly compatible with the spirit of particularist arguments against generalism in the 
theory of practical reasoning." 
Margaret Little, although claiming herself to be a particularist in her 2000 paper 
"Moral Generalities Revisited", expresses support for this type of principlism in 
her 2008 co-authored paper "From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics". In 
her 2008 co-authored paper, she and Mark Lance argue that ceteris paribus 
statements in general are not empty. Rather, they reveal something about the 
nature of things. To say that 'ceteris paribus, lying is wrong' is to say that 'it is in 
the nature of lying that it is wrong-making'. Little and Lance contend that any 
adequate morality should recognize the truth of ceteris paribus moral principles 
like this one. 
Dispositional Non-Absolute Principlism: There are true dispositional 
non-absolute moral principles. 
Luke Robinson can be regarded as a supporter of this type of principlism. He 
advances a view called moral dispositionalism in his 2006 paper "Moral Holism, 
Moral Generalism and Moral Dispositionalism". According to moral 
dispositionalism, moral principles express moral dispositions of actions. 
Robinson contends that 'lying is wrong' should be construed as 'lying is 
dispositionally wrong' rather than as 'lying is occurently wrong.' The difference 
between the two statements lies in the following. When lying is dispositionally 
wrong, it may not manifest an occurent property of wrongness; namely, the 
property of wrongness is latent in the action of lying. Only when certain 
background conditions obtain, such as, let's say, the conditions that it is done out 
of a malicious motive or it is done to a person who deserves to know the truth, 
etc., will the property of wrongness be manifested. On the other hand, if lying is 
occurently wrong, this means that the property of wrongness is manifested 
without further ado. 
Luke Robinson contends that only when a moral principle is construed as 
expressing moral dispositions rather than occurent moral properties of a kind of 
action can we explain the explanatory roles it plays in our moral thought, theory 
and practice. 
According to Robinson, moral principles when construed as statements 
about the occurent moral properties of a kind of action do not explain. To 
illustrate with an example he gave, even i f ' a l l promise keepings are obligatory' 
were true, it would not explain why any particular promise-keeping is obligatory 
just as 'All men are mortal' is incapable of explaining why Socrates is mortal. 
According to Robinson's diagnosis of the problem, these statements are universal 
statements and the truth of a universal statement—although it entails the truth of 
its instances—is "utterly irrelevant to why its instances are true." (p. 351) 
By contrast, when moral principles are construed as statements about moral 
dispositions of a kind of action, they can serve explanatory purposes. The fact 
that promise-keeping is obligatory can explain why my keeping my promise to 
John is obligatory because, according to Robinson, for promise keeping to be 
obligatory is to for it to be dispositionally obligatory and for a particular promise 
keeping to be (occurently) obligatory is for it to manifest a disposition to be 
obligatory (p. 352). For the above reasons, moral principles ought to be 
construed as statements about moral dispositions rather than about occurent 
moral properties of a kind of action. 
Default Non-Absolute Principlism: There are true defauh non-absolute moral 
principles. 
According to some self-styled particularists, such as Jonathan Dancy (2004), and 
principlists, such as Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever (2006), true default 
non-absolute moral principles are something that everyone in the debate ought to 
accept'"; it is argued that denying the existence of such principles will lead to 
absurd consequences—'the flattening of the moral landscape', as Ridge and 
McKeever (2007, p. 55) put it. 'The flattening of the moral landscape' is a 
metaphorical way of putting things. What it really means is this: some features 
that we typically regard as morally significant are in fact no more morally 
significant than others we typically regard as morally insignificant. Thus, the 
'flattening' metaphor—those features that typically occupy a moral high ground 
are relegated to ground zero, as it were. To illustrate the 'flattening' phenomenon 
with Little's vivid examples (2000), the feature of killing is no more morally 
significant than the color of one's shoelace. Of course, this seems plainly absurd. 
Why? The explanation for this is the following: killing is wrong by default 
whereas the color of one's shoelace is not. 
However, it is not entirely clear what the notion of a default comes down to. 
Dancy illustrates it in a somewhat metaphorical way: "some considerations 
arrive switched on, though they may be switched off if the circumstances so 
conspire." By contrast, non-default features "arrive switched off but are switched 
on by appropriate contexts." (2004, pp. 112-113) 
Ridge and McKeever, in their 2008 paper, "Turning on Default Reasons" 
unpacks the metaphor along the following lines: to say that a feature is right or 
wrong by default is to say that that feature needs no 'enablers' to be morally 
10 For a dissenting view, see Alan Thomas (2007). 
significant in the way it is. For instance, for the feature of killing to be morally 
significant in the way it is (namely, carrying a negative moral import by default), 
it needs no other features to 'switch it on' or, putting it somewhat differently, it 
needs no 'enablers' to enable it to be morally significant in the way it is. By 
contrast, the color of one's shoelace, if it is to have any moral significance in 
some particular contexts, need some 'enablers' to enable it to do so, or need 
some further features to 'switch on' its moral significance. The enablers can be 
various and many. To give a rough idea, if the color of one's shoelace figures into 
the content of a promise, then it will come to have some moral significance. The 
feature of promising functions as an enabler to enable the color of one's shoelace 
to assume some moral significance. 
It seems clear that there is a contrast between the feature of killing and the 
color of one's shoelace. To capture the contrast, it is argued that we need to 
maintain the existence of a true default moral principle that specifies a feature 
that has moral significance by default. Otherwise, we run the risk of causing the 
'flattening of the moral landscape'. 
Other-Things-Being-Equal Non-Absolute Principlism: There are true 
other-things-being-equal non-absolute moral principles. 
Other-things-being-equal non-absolute moral principles are widely accepted 
because of their intuitive plausibility: other things being equal, lying is morally 
worse than not lying, not harming is better than harming. What can be more 
obvious? However, I suspect there is unjustified optimism involved here. It is not 
entirely clear what it means to hold other things equal. Can other things really be 
equalized? Take the feature of lying for instance. Can there be a feature of not 
lying that resembles it in all other aspects? What are these other aspects? Do they 
include the consequcnces? If they include the consequences, the 
consequentialists might well argue that when the consequences of lying and not 
lying are the same, lying is not morally worse than not lying; rather, they are 
morally on the same par. 
On the other hand, there are some things that can never be equalized. A 
feature of lying always involves at least the following: a liar, his motive for lying, 
and a person being lied to whereas a feature of not lying involves none of these. 
How can these things be equalized? If we rid the feature of lying of these 
essential features, it is no longer a feature of lying. On the other hand, if we 
supplement these features to the feature of not lying, the feature of not lying will 
no longer be a feature of not lying. It is unclear, when we do hold these other 
things equal, whether 'other things being equal, lying is morally worse than not 
lying' makes any sense. 
That's-It Non-Absolute Phnciplism: There are true that's-it non-absolute moral 
principles. 
This type of principlism is defended by Richard Holton in his 2002 paper 
'Principles and Particularisms'. In that paper, Holton argues that the gist of 
particularism, as he construes it, is entirely compatible with the existence of true 
that's-it non-absolute moral principles. He takes the gist of particularism to be 
the following: 
given any action whose features are described in non-moral terms, and a 
principle that says that an action having those features will be good, we can 
always think of some further feature which is such that, were the action to 
have that feature too, it would become a bad action. So the principle is 
inadequate as it stands. It must be modified, or a further principle must be 
given outlining the exception. But once we have done that, an exception to 
the amended principle(s) will be found, and we will be forced to amend 
again. And so on. (Hohon 2002, pp. 196-197) 
Let us follow Holton in calling the above view Supersession as there is always 
the possibility that an amended principle outlining the exception has to be 
superseded by another further amended principle, and so on." 
Holton takes Supersession to be compatible with the following view he 
thinks is plausible: moral principles play a justificatory role in showing why 
certain actions are right (or wrong), (p. 196) Let us call this view Justification. 
The view that accommodates both Supersession and Justification, Holton calls 
by the name of Principled Particularism. Roughly, it is the following view: 
Principled Particularism: a justified true moral verdict about the moral 
status of an action is always entailed by true that's-it non-absolute moral 
principles together with non-moral facts and a 'that's it' clause. 
' ' It has to be noted though, Hohon thinks that Supersession leaves open the possibility that the 
possibility of encountering exceptions might never be actualized. He contends, "If there were these 
other features, they would make the action not right. But there aren't. We are concerned with the 
features that actually do obtain, and they, together with the principles, make the action right." (2002, p. 
198) 
For Holton, the that's-it non-absolute moral principles take the following form: 
(x) (if X is a killing and that's it, then x is forbidden). 
The 'that's it' clause means the following: there are no further relevant moral 
principles and non-moral facts in the particular case. To see how a moral verdict 
about the moral status of an action can be derived from true that's-it non-absolute 
moral principles, we can construct an argument as follows: 
PI. This is a kiUing 
P2. (x) (if x is a killing & that's it)->it is morally forbidden 
P3. That's it 
C This is morally forbidden. 
According to Holton, the that's-it moral principle, P2 in this case, only has a 
truth value in the context of an argument because of the indexical character of 
'that's it'—there are no other relevant moral principles or non-moral facts 
bearing on this particular case. Apparently, the above argument is valid. 
Justification stands in this case in that the moral status of this particular action is 
justified partly by appealing to the that's-it moral principle in the premise. Now 
the question is: Can Justification still stand while Supersession takes place? 
Holton's answer is yes. 
Let us suppose with Supersession that there are further relevant moral 
principles and non-moral facts bearing on the case. Let's say, the killing is done 
out of self-defense. Then, given the indexical character of 'that's it', namely the 
fact that there are no other relevant moral principles or non-moral facts bearing 
on this particular case, the above argument will have to be superseded hy the 
following: 
P4. This is a killing 
P5. This is done in self-defense 
P6. (x) (x is a killing & x is done out of self defense & that's it)-^it is 
not morally forbidden 
P7. That's it 
CI This is not morally forbidden 
As we can see, the above argument is still valid. Justification still stands in this 
case in that the moral status of this particular action is justified partly by appeal 
to a that's-it moral principle in the premise, namely, P6. Suppose that 
Supersession takes place again, we can still construct another argument in which 
Justification stands, and so on. Hence, Holton thinks that Principled 
Particularism is a plausible view to hold. A true moral verdict about the moral 
status of an action is always entailed and therefore justified by true that's-it 
non-absolute moral principles together with non-moral facts and a 'that's it' 
clause. To boot, Principled Particularism is apparently committed to what we call 
That's It Non-Absolute Principlism, the view that there are true that's-it 
non-absolute moral principles. 
Summmy 
All the above kinds of non-absolute principlism are interesting positions to explore in 
their own right. However, for the purpose of this thesis, I will set them aside except 
where relevant. They are not the major sorts of non-absolute principlism that concern 
us in this thesis. The only sort of non-absolute principlism that concerns us in this 
thesis, as a reminder, is pro tanto principlism. 
2.3 Non-Cognitivism against Principlism 
Another issue to be settled before we move to the examination of the arguments for 
principlism (or the indirect arguments against extreme particularism) is the issue of 
non-cognitivism. Some might contend that if non-cognitivism, the claim that moral 
claims are not truth-apt, is true, then principlism will be automatically falsified. For 
principlism is the view that there are ti-ue moral principles. 
I think that it is indeed the case that if non-cognitivism is true, then principlism, 
as I construe it, will be falsified. However, I also think that appealing to 
non-cognitivism to reflate principlism misses the point. First of all, non-cognitivism is 
controversial and not a position all philosophers accept. If the refutation of 
principlism rests on the plausibility of non-cognitivism, it is not a firm ground it rests 
on. I don't think this is a promising route for those who want to refute principlism to 
take. Second, more importantly, even if non-cognitivism provides a firm ground for 
refuting principlism, it will refiite particularism as well. For particularism, as I 
construe it, is the claim that there are no true moral principles. However, it does not 
deny, and in fact endorses, the claim that a moral claim about the moral status of a 
particular action can be true or false. If non-cognitivism is true (i.e. no moral claims 
are truth-apt), then moral particularism will be falsified as well. 
So I think the issue of non-cognitivism is not an issue that divides principlism 
and particularism. Both doctrines endorse the claim that there are true moral claims. If 
non-cognitivism stands, both doctrines will fall together. Neither side has an edge 
over the other on this issue. Non-cognitivism is a threat common to both principlism 
and particularism. 
Having said this, it has to be noted that the threat only arises due to the 
cognitivist presuppositions of both principlism and particularism. However, these 
presuppositions need not be made in the first place, as Dancy (2004, p. 140) correctly 
points out.'^ The debate between principlism and particularism can be conducted 
entirely in terms of non-cognitivist language. If one holds to a non-cognitivist view 
about moral claims, the issue still remains whether the moral claims of moral 
principles are correct or not.'^ Principlism argues that there are at least some moral 
principles that are correct whereas particularism argues that there is none. Nothing 
will be lost if the debate between principlism and particularism is reformulated in 
terms of non-cognitivist language. I have no objection to readers with non-cognitivist 
sympathies thus reformulating the debate. 
2.4 Error Theory against Principlism 
In the last section, we have argued that appealing to non-cognitivism to refute 
principlism misses the point. There is another similar issue that needs to be addressed 
before we move on to examine the arguments for absolute principlism and pro tanto 
principlism. It is an issue that arises out of error theory. Error theory, according to 
Mackie (1990), subscribes to the cognitivist view that moral claims are truth-apt. It 
claims in effect that moral claims purport to represent a world having moral properties 
in it. However, adopting a naturalistic view of the world, Mackie thinks that moral 
properties, being objectively prescriptive in their nature, are 'queer' and the world 
contains no such properties. Hence, all moral claims attributing moral properties to 
actions are false (or in error). If error theory can stand, principlism will of course be 
falsified. 
Again, however, error theory, if true, will not only falsify principlism but 
particularism as well. For particularism merely denies that there are true moral 
principles; it does not deny, actually endorses for that matter, that there can be true 
moral claims about the moral status of particular actions. Hence, error theory, if true. 
Dancy (2004, p. 140) contends that "[t]he realist language which I have been using should not really 
be a stumbling block, since it is characteristic of non-cognitivists to maintain that they can perfectly 
well talk of ethical truths, facts and properties without signing up to the sort of realism that is involved 
in taking such talk, as they see it, too seriously" 
" As is well known, Blackburn (1998, p. 318) even thinks that non-cognitivists (or quasi-realists) can 
retain their truth talk v^thout commitment to any metaphysically repugnant truth entity by adopting a 
deflationary theory of truth. 
is a problem both principlism and particularism have to face. Neither side has an edge 
with regard to the issue of error theory. Although an investigation of the plausibility of 
error theory is a worthwhile research project in itself, it is somewhat tangential to the 
debate between principlism and particularism. To win the debate, neither side can 
appeal to error theory since doing so would entail self-defeat. Hence, I think that we 
can examine the debate between principlism and particularism independently of the 
issue of error theory. 
2.5 Extreme Particularism and Normative Ethics 
Some might have the worry that extreme particularism is extensionally equivalent to 
consequentialism (Olson & Svensson 2003; McKeever & Ridge 2006, pp. 31-32). For 
extreme particularism, like consequentialism, does not rule out a priori the moral 
permissibility of some actions typically forbidden by deontology, such as killing, 
lying, torturing, etc. On the other hand, even if extreme particularism can be 
distinguished from consequentialism, there is the further concern about how different 
it is from deontology. So my task here is to clarify that extreme particularism provides 
a genuine alternative to consequentialism without collapsing into deontology. 
In my diagnosis, an extreme particularist can tap on the resources of 
consequentialism without buying its defects. Extreme particularism is a much more 
flexible position than consequentialism in that it does not hold that promoting the 
good is always the only thing that matters in the determination of the moral status of 
an action. Extreme particularism may well accommodate agent-relative options not to 
promote the good or agent-relative constraints against lying, killing, stealing or 
torturing even if so doing promotes the good. 
But certainly, with regard to agent-relative constraints, an extreme particularist 
does not hold that they are absolute such that no amount of goodness is sufficient to 
give the agent a warrant to violate them. Nor does she hold that agent-relative 
constraints have a fixed threshold such that in all cases the agent can only violate a 
constraint when a certain amount of good at stake is above the threshold. Endorsing 
either absolute constraint or constraint with a fixed threshold is to endorse one sort of 
deontological principle. Instead, an extreme particularist holds that how to balance the 
promotion of the good against the violations of constraints is dependent upon the 
circumstances and determined case by case; there is no principled way to settle the 
conflict. 
The situation is similar with respect to agent-relative options. Extreme 
particularism distinguishes itself from deontology in that it is not committed to 
absolute agent-relative options. It can allow for situations in which agent-relative 
options are undermined or outweighed when the cost to the moral agent is relatively 
small compared to the gain in overall good. On the other hand, neither does extreme 
particularism commit itself to a fixed threshold of agent-relative options such that 
when a fixed amount of good is at stake, agent-relative options are automatically 
undermined. Commitment to either absolute agent-relative options or agent-relative 
options with a threshold means commitment to a deontological principle. Without this 
commitment, extreme particularism holds the view that whether there is an 
agent-relative option depends on the particular configuration of the contextual 
features of an action. In some contexts, there is indeed such an agent-relative option. 
In others, there is not. This distinguishes the view of extreme particularism from 
consequentialism in that consequentialism allows no agent-relative options 
whatsoever.'"' It also distinguishes the view of extreme particularism from deontology, 
for even those deontologists who hold the threshold view of agent-relative options 
think that agent-relative options exist in principle in all contexts (although they might 
well admit that the amount of good that is required to meet the threshold is very high 
such that the pre-conditions for agent-relative options to become effective are rarely 
satisfied in real world contexts.) 
Summing up, admittedly, what I said above does not by far do enough justice to 
the huge amount of current literature on whether all normative ethical theories can be 
reduced to consequentialism (Smith 2009). However, given what I said, I think that 
there is at least some good reason to think that extreme particularism provides a 
genuine alternative to both consequentialism and deontology as typically conceived in 
any introduction-to-ethics textbook. 
2.6 Virtue Theory: Friend or Foe? 
Although extreme particularism may be distinguished from both consequentialism 
and deontology, crucial questions remain: is it a kind of a virtue theory? Is virtue 
theorist a friend or a foe of particularism? To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
distinguish between different conceptions of virtue. I distinguish four models of virtue 
below and argue that on first two models of virtue, virtue ethicist is a foe. On the 
latter two models, however, she is a friend. 
Four Models of Virtue 
I am fully aware of the recent trend to reduce all moral theories to consequentialism; see for instance 
Smith (2009). However, the reduction, I suspect, cannot be done without some sophisticated account of 
the agent-relativity. Personally, 1 do not believe that the reduction can be successfully carried out; 
however, I don't have space to argue for my own view here. I shall just ignore this complication and 
stick to the good old way of understanding consequentialism. 
(1) Absolute Virtue: A virtuous person is a person of absolute principle. The 
requirements of virtue can be reduced to the requirements of a single absolute 
principle or a set of absolute principles, depending on whether one takes a 
monistic or a pluralistic view of absolute principlism. On this conception of 
virtue, virtue is rule-following.'^ 
(2) Pro Tanto Virtue: A virtuous person is a person who has a commitment to pro 
tanto moral principles and feels compunction about breaking them. She follows 
the dictates of pro tanto moral principles when no conflicts between them arise. 
Should a conflict arise, she knows how to adjudicate between them without 
recourse to further moral principles. Unlike the conception of virtue mentioned 
in (1), it is not merely rule-following. It has a substantive adjudicating role to 
play in our moral reasoning processes. 
(3) Prima Facie Virtue: A virtuous person is a person who subscribes to some 
prima facie moral principles. She treats principles as quick and easy rules of 
thumb and follows them most of the time. Unlike a pro tanto virtuous person, she 
feels no compunction about breaking a rule when she sees that doing so is what 
the requirements of virtue dictate. Rules have no intrinsic values. Rather, they are 
useful tools to the extent that they help a virtuous person to perform what virtue 
dictates. When they cannot do their job, they should be put aside without tears. 
Virtue thus plays the role of discerning the occasions in which moral principles 
ought to be rightfully infringed to carry out the right action. 
(4) Principle-less Virtue: A virtuous person is a person who simply 'sees' the 
right thing to do. Principles, be they absolute or pro tanto, are simply useless at 
their best or even harmful at their worst to her (McNaughton, 1988, p. 190). 
Morality is not about equipping one with the right set of principles but about the 
sharpening of one's moral vision (Davis, 2004, p. 1). In short, virtue consists in 
an ability to 'see' the right thing to do on each occasion.'^ 
Virtue ethicists who adopt the first two models will find extreme particularism 
uncongenial (and vice versa), as extreme particularism entails that there are neither 
true absolute moral principles nor true pro tanto moral principles. On the view of 
extreme particularism, it is wrong-headed to think that virtue consists in 
I use 'rule' and 'principle' interchangeably in this thesis. 
These four models are taken from my paper. See Tsu (2010b, p. 152). 
rule-following or in an ability to adjudicate between conflicting pro tanto moral 
principles. However, extreme particularism will find virtue ethicists friendly if they 
adopt the latter two models of virtue. With regard to model (3), although other types 
of particularism might find the existence of true prima facie principles repugnant, 
extreme particularism, as I define it, takes no particular stand on whether there are 
true prima facie moral principles. Hence, extreme particularism may well accept the 
view that virtue consists in an ability to discern the occasions in which prima facie 
moral principles are to be rightfully infringed, if this turns out to be the most plausible 
view of virtue. With regard to (4), extreme particularism can embrace it with open 
arms, as (4) clearly implies the non-existence of true absolute moral principles and 
pro tanto ones. 
2.7 A Simple Argument against Extreme Particularism 
With the position of extreme particularism further clarified in sections §§ 2.5 and 2.6, 
there is one final worry we have to deal with before we can move on to examine the 
arguments against extreme particularism in the following chapters. The worry is this. 
If the view of extreme particularism is the view that there are neither absolute nor pro 
tanto true moral principles, as we construe it to be, it will only take a very simple 
argument to refute it. Extreme particularism, as we construe it, cannot even get off the 
ground. We are holding a position that is trivially false. In this section, I will argue 
that the simple argument is not a good one against extreme particularism. 
The simple argument the objectors have in mind goes as follows. 
Simple Argument: 
PI: There is obviously a true moral principle, e.g.: (T): Torturing an innocent is 
wrong. 
P2: Extreme particularism entails the view that there are no true moral principles. 
C: Hence, extreme particularism is false. 
Notice that the structure of the argument is reminiscent of Moore's argument against 
idealism. Moore thinks that he can prove idealism to be false by brandishing his hands 
in the air. 
Moore's Argument: 
P I ' : There are obviously objects of the external world. (Here is one hand. Here is 
another. Moore raises both of his hands to show this). 
P2': Idealism entails the view that there is no external world. 
C : Hence, Idealism is false. 
In taking the above argument to be a knockdown argument against idealism, Moore 
seems to be unduly optimistic. After all, one philosopher's Modus Ponens can be 
another's Modus Tollens. Idealists might well reply to Moore's Argument by denying 
P I ' or by denying that Moore has a non-question-begging way of vindicating it. 
Similarly, principlists seem to be unduly optimistic too if they take the Simple 
Argument to be a knockdown argument against extreme particularism. For extreme 
particularism can reply to Simple Argument by denying PI. 
At first glance, (T) is apparently true. Upon critical reflection, however, its truth 
might not be as obvious as the principlists like to think. Imagine the following 
scenario. 
Thought Experiment 1: If you torture an innocent person, Mr. A, the other ten 
thousand innocent persons will not be tortured. If you don't do it, then someone 
else will take your place and torture not just Mr. A but also the other ten thousand 
innocent persons, and only in a more cruel way. 
Given a case like this, if you decide to take upon yourself the task of torturing Mr. A, 
it is at least arguable to say that your doing so is not obviously wrong, since it is 
inevitable that Mr. A will be tortured and your torturing Mr. A is the only way to 
prevent the other ten thousand innocent persons from being tortured. Here, I am fully 
aware of the fact that there are philosophers out there, who argue that even in a case 
like this, torturing is wrong, the reasons being that one of the following claims stand: 
(1) there are agent-relative constraints against harming (Nagel, 1972): the moral agent 
should not torture even if doing so would minimize the overall amount of harm. (2) a 
distinction between doing harm and allowing it is morally significant (Quinn, 1989): 
doing harm is always worse than allowing harm. (3) numbers do not matter (Taurek, 
1977): in a conflict case, it is not morally required, other things being equal, that we 
ought to prevent the group of a larger size from suffering. However, none of the 
above-mentioned claims are not without controversy. It is not clear that they can 
refute my claims conclusively. Remember that here I only wish to argue that torturing 
as described by Thought Experiment 1 is not obviously wrong. I do not claim that 
torturing in this case is absolutely permissible. To the extent that it is debatable 
amongst sagacious philosophers whether torturing is morally wrong in this case, this 
would serve my purpose to show that (T) does not constitute a knock-down case 
against particularism. 
To find a clear knockdown case, some principlists turn to the following principle 
instead: 
(Tl) Torturing an innocent merely for fun is wrong 
Because of the 'merely for fun' qualifier, (Tl ) is immune from the counterexample to 
(T) in Thought Experiment 1. However, its truth is again not so obvious. Torturing an 
innocent merely for fian may not be wrong at all (not even pro tanto wrong) in a 
context of consensual sexual intercourse where the innocent being tortured has 
masochist dispositions and enjoys the whole process of being tortured. 
Suppose you are still not convinced'^, and suppose for the sake of the argument 
that it is indeed wrong to torture an innocent merely for fun, does it thus refute 
extreme particularism? Not obviously. There is at least the following reply extreme 
particularism can make: The term 'innocent' is apparently morally loaded (Timmons, 
2002, p. 259). If so, 'torturing an innocent merely for fun is wrong' is what we have 
previously defined as a moral-moral principle. However, extreme particularism is an 
abbreviation for the view that there are no true natural-moral principles. Hence, the 
truth of (Tl ) does not threaten the truth of extreme particularism. This sort of reply 
still applies even if the principlists concede that (T l ) is not an absolute but a pro tanto 
moral principle, for the same reasons I have just given. 
To conclude, extreme particularism cannot be refuted by the Simple Argument 
advanced by the principlists. The principlists, of course, can strive to come up with a 
different moral principle that is more specific or more natural-moral looking. 
However, it will be no wonder the extreme particularists will strive to come up with 
more stories to tell. This to-and-fro dialectic can go on and on. However, as Margaret 
Little (2000, p. 279) nicely quips: 
There's something not a little farcical about measuring dialectic success in terms 
of who can outlast whom—those who want to refine the principles or those who 
want to find exceptions. 
In order to refute extreme particularism, the principlists need to provide more 
sophisticated arguments. I will evaluate whether they are successful or not in the 
' ' Some might contend that if the sexual intercourse is consensual, then the case we produced is not a 
case of torture. However, it seems wrong not to describe what the masochist experiences as torturing 
just because he consents to it. This is because if what a masochist experiences is not torturing, there is 
no explanation for why he, as a masochist, enjoys it. But in any case, my argument against the simple 
argument does not rely particularly on this point. 
chapters to follow. 
Chapter 3 The Supervenience Argument 
My goal is to defend extreme particularism against the attack from absolute 
principlism and pro tanto principlism. The way I do it is to argue that there are no 
compelling arguments for these two kinds of principlism. In this chapter, my aim is to 
lay out and elucidate an argument that has been advanced to support absolute 
principlism (or to defeat extreme particularism)—the supervenience argument. 
The supervenience argument is commonly used as a weapon to beat 
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particularism. It comes in various versions. Its chief contenders include Hare (1981) , 
Bennett (1995, p. 19), Sinnott-Armstrong (1995, pp. 5-6). In this chapter, I will focus 
on a specific version of the supervenience argument that is advanced by Frank 
Jackson, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith, in their 2000 co-authored paper, "Ethical 
Particularism and Patterns". In that paper, they (p. 86) argue that "considerations that 
take off from the fact of supervenience raise serious problems for particularism." 
Three questions immediately arise. (1) What are those considerations? (2) What 
are the serious problems? (3) And what is the sort of particularism they attack? These 
initial questions need some clarification. Henceforth, 1 shall follow Jonathan Dancy 
(2004, p. 109) in calling these three authors of the paper the Canberrans, as they all 
worked in Canberra in Australia when they wrote the paper. 
First, what is the sort of particularism the Canberrans have in mind? They 
(Jackson et al., 2000, p. 80) follow Margaret Little in characterizing particularism as 
the view that "[denies] the existence of any codifiable generalities linking the moral 
and non-moral properties." The codifiable generalities linking the moral and 
non-moral properties, I take it, are what we call the necessarily true natural-moral 
absolute moral principles in Chapter 1. So particularism can be construed as a view 
that denies the existence of necessarily true namral-moral absolute moral principles. 
Next, what are the serious problems for this type of particularism? According to 
the Canberrans, they argue that there must be some necessarily true natural-moral 
moral principles linking the natural properties of an action to its moral properties. 
That is, the Canberrans try to vindicate what we call absolute principlism in Chapter 
1—the view that there are necessarily true absolute natural-moral moral principles.'^ 
If absolute principlism is true, then particularism is of course in serious trouble. How 
do the Canberrans prove the truth of principlism? They appeal to "consideratons that 
Although in Mora! Thinking, Hare (1981) uses the term 'universalizabihty' to mean what most 
people mean by 'supervenience', as Dancy (1993) correctly notes in his Moral Reason, Appendix II, 
" Moral principles linking the natural properties of an action to its moral properties are absolute 
because they are about the moral status of actions. With regard to the difference between an absolute 
moral principle and a pro tanto one, we have already illustrated it in section § 1.5 in chapter 1. 
take off from the fact of supervenience." This relates to our next question. 
What are the considerations that take off from the fact of supervenience? It is not 
easy to state the answer in a few words. In section §3 .1 ,1 will firstly provide a 
thumbnail sketch of the major considerations. The purpose of doing so is to tease out 
the structure of the argument based on these considerations. Once the overall structure 
of the argument has come out, I will explain in detail what its consisting premises 
mean respectively in the following sections. The purpose of this chapter is, as I have 
mentioned, to reconstruct and elucidate the Canberrans' argument from supervenience. 
In the following chapters, i.e. chapters 4 and 5,1 will argue that there is no good 
reason for us to believe that it is sound. 
3.1 Structure 
According to the Canberrans, the fact of supervenience can establish a necessarily 
true natural-moral conditional of the form (x) (Nx^Mx)^° (domain: action; N: 
natural property; M: moral property). They argue that such a conditional must be 
'shaped' (Never mind what 'shaped' means now. It is a somewhat obscure notion. I 
will explain the term in more detail later.) For if the conditional were not shaped, then 
this would lead to at least three absurd consequences: (a) we cannot think or talk 
about morality; (b) there are no correct application conditions of a moral term; (c) we 
risk violating the requirements of rationality. (I will explain more about these 
consequences later.) By reductio, the conditional must be shaped. If so, the 
Canberrans contend that it establishes a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. 
Particularism is thus falsified. I shall henceforth call the argument that takes off from 
the fact of supervenience 'The Supervenience Argument'. To see the structure of the 
argument more clearly, we can divide it into three stages: 
The Supervenience Argument: 
First Stage: 
PI: The thesis of moral supervenience is true. 
P2: If moral supervenience is true, there is a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) (Nx^Mx) ' . 
I use arrow for material conditional. P ^ Q is true iff (P is true and Q is true), or (P is false and Q is 
true), or (P is false and Q is false). 
CI: There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx^Mx) ' . (PI, P2 Modus Ponens) 
Second Stage: 
P3: Either the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped or (exclusive or) 
it is not shaped (or shapeless). 
P4: If the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not shaped, then there will 
be Absurd Consequences: (a) we cannot think or talk about morality; (b) a moral 
term does not have a correct criterion of meaning; (c) we can not use a moral term 
consistently and violate the requirements of rationality). 
P5: But Absurd Consequences are false (i.e. we do think and talk about morality; a 
moral term has a correct criterion of meaning; we can and do in fact use a moral 
term consistently and obey the requirements of rationality). 
P6: It is not the case that the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not 
shaped. (P4, P5 Modus Tollens) 
C2: The necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped. (P3, P6 Disjunctive 
Syllogism) 
Third Stage: 
P7: There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
( N x ^ M x ) ' . ( C l ) 
P8: If there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
( N x ^ M x ) ' , it must be shaped. (C2) 
P9: If a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) (Nx->Mx)' is 
shaped, it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle 
PIO: If there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx->Mx)', it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P8, P9 
Hypothetical Syllogism) 
C3: There is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P7, PIO Modus 
Ponens); absolute principlism is true; (extreme) particularism is thus falsified. 
A brief commentary is in place here. There is a nice division of labor amongst the 
three stages in the Supervenience Argument. The first stage is concerned with whether 
the fact of supervenience can establish a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of 
the form '(x) (Nx->Mx)'. The second stage is concerned with whether the necessarily 
true natural-moral conditional is shaped or not. In the third stage, the positive 
conclusions of the first two stages are shown to be essential as premises for deriving 
the conclusion that there is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. The three 
stages collaborate jointly, as it were, in getting the conclusion. 
What I have said so far is mainly concerned with the structure of the 
Supervenience Argument. In the rest of this chapter, I will flesh out the details of each 
stage. 
3.2 First Stage 
This section is devoted to the elucidation of the first stage of the supervenience 
argument. 
(3.2.1) PI: The thesis of moral supervenience is true 
The thesis of moral supervenience says the following: moral properties supervene on 
natural properties. What does this mean? In particular, what does it mean to say that 
one set of properties supervenes on another? 
To illustrate the general idea of supervenience, David Lewis (1986, p. 14) gave 
an illuminating example: 
A dot-matrix picture has global properties—it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and 
whatnot—and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of 
the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They 
supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without 
differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn't a dot. 
To elaborate a little bit, let's call the dots in the picture the local properties and follow 
Lewis in calling the "patterns in the dots" the global properties. In the example Lewis 
gave, the global properties supervene on the local ones. This means that there cannot 
be a difference in the global properties without a difference in the local ones. If there 
is a change in the global properties—say, the dot-matrix picture is no longer 
symmetrical, then this means that there must be a change in the local properties (in the 
arrangement of dots in Lewis's example). 
Armed with a better understanding of the general idea of supervenience, we can 
now proceed to clarify the thesis of moral supervenience. The thesis of moral 
supervenience is the general idea of supervenience applied to the realm of ethics. 
Roughly, it can be stated as the following view: 
The Thesis of Moral Supervenience: moral properties supervene on natural 
properties; i.e. there cannot be a difference in moral properties without a 
difference in natural properties. Hence, things with the same natural properties 
are morally identical, i.e. have the same moral properties. 
The Canberrans take the above thesis to be tantamount to the view that "descriptively 
identical situations, actions, characters and so on are [morally] identical." (Jackson et 
al., 2000, p. 84) One clarification about terminology has to be noted here. The 
descriptively identical situations, actions, characters and so on are things with the 
same natural properties. Things with the same natural properties are descriptively 
identical in that they are picked out by the same descriptions. For instance, two 
actions with the same natural properties of killing are descriptively identical in that 
they are exactly the same in their descriptions—how the action is performed, by 
whom it is performed, to whom it is performed, etc. Hence, to say that "descriptively 
identical situations, actions, characters and so on are morally identical" is to say that 
"things with the same natural properties are morally identical", which is exactly what 
the thesis of moral supervenience asserts. 
The Canberrans (Jackson et al., 2000, p. 84) contend that the thesis of moral 
supervenience can be further divided into the following two versions: 
Inter-world Global Supervenience: Descriptively identical worlds are morally 
identical. 
Intra-world Supervenience: Descriptively identical acts, states, etc. within a 
world are morally identical. 
Both versions have their own supporters. Richard Hare, the first prominent 
philosopher who advanced the idea of supervenience, endorses the intra-world version. 
He holds the following view: "That moral properties supervene on non-moral 
properties means simply that acts, etc., have the moral properties because they have 
the non-moral properties (2000, pp. 21-22, emphasis added)." To elaborate a bit, 
descriptively identical acts (within a world), since they have the same non-moral 
properties, must have the same moral properties. By contrast, the Canberrans endorse 
the inter-world global version rather than the intra-world version in their 2000 
co-authored paper. The Canberrans do not state their justifications for preferring the 
global version; however, a reasonable speculation is that the intra-world 
supervenience is too weak to capture the modal connection between the descriptive 
and the moral. It is widely accepted in moral philosophy that there cannot be a moral 
difference without a descriptive difference.^' However, intra-world supervenience 
allows for the following: there can be a moral difference without a descriptive 
difference if the descriptively identical acts or states occur in different possible worlds. 
Hence, intra-world supervenience is too weak to capture the modal connection. The 
Canberrans have a good reason not to adopt it. 
(3.2.2) P2: If the thesis of moral supei-venience is true, there is a necessarily true 
natural-moral conditional of the form (x) (Nx-^Mx) 
The Canberrans argue that from the global version, "it follows that there are necessary 
truths that take us from the descriptive way things are to the moral way they are." 
(p.84) When the Canberrans talk about the descriptive way or moral way things are, 
what they have in mind are the natural properties and the moral properties picked out 
respectively by descriptive terms and moral terms. For our purpose, we can construe 
the Canberrans' view in the following way. It follows from global supervenience that 
the natural properties of a world necessarily determines its moral properties. 
A natural question arises. Does it follow? The Canberrans contend that it does for 
the following reason: if the moral properties of a world cannot vary independently of 
its natural properties (as global supervenience implies), the natural properties of the 
world fix its moral properties. Such being the case, the Canberrans go on to argue, a 
complete specification of the natural properties of a possible world—a specification 
that is true of that possible world and of all possible worlds that are naturally identical 
to that world—necessarily determines whether or not, say, X is (morally) right in that 
world. Therefore, the Canberrans contend, there will be a raft of necessarily true 
conditionals whose antecedents are complete specifications of the natural properties 
of a world and whose consequents say that X is right. The conditionals will look like 
the following: 
Michael Smith (1994, pp. 21-22), in his book, The Mora! Problem, goes even further and contends 
that the inter-world global version of supervenience is so plausible that no one denies it. 
I f N l , t h e n X i s right. 
I fN2 , then X is right. 
We can combine all these necessarily true conditionals into a single necessarily true 
conditional of the following form: 
If N1 or N2 or..., then X is right. 
For our purpose, we can formalize the above necessarily true conditional as follows: 
(x) (Nx->Mx) (domain: action; Let N stand for N1 or N2 or...; M for moral 
Tightness) 
From the above necessarily true conditional, we get our conclusion of the first stage: 
(CI) There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) (Nx->Mx)'. 
3.3 Second Stage 
The aim of this stage is to prove the truth of (C2): the necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) (Nx->Mx)' must be shaped. 
(3.3.1) P3: Either the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped or it is not 
shaped (or shapeless). 
P3 is a tautology. Its truth is guaranteed by its logical form (p v -p) . We don't even 
have to know the meaning of ' shaped ' contained in the sentence to see the truth of P3. 
(3.3.2) P4: If the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not shaped, then there 
will be Absurd Consequences 
P4 is significantly different from P3 in the following respect: we need to know what it 
means for a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form'(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' to 
be 'not shaped' or 'shapeless' before we can determine whether some absurd 
consequences will follow from this. For the ease of exposition, let us use the label 
'NM' in short for a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form'(x) 
( N x ^ M x ) ' 
The Canberrans do not provide a straightforward answer to the question of what 
it means for NM to be shapeless. However, we can discern some clues in their view of 
what it means for morality to be shapeless: 
Shapeiessness Thesis: "There is not even a highly disjunctive commonality or 
pattern that unites the right acts when described in descriptive terms." (p. 83, 
emphasis added) 
To understand the above thesis, we need to be clear about what 'disjunctive 
commonality or pattern' means. The Canberrans adopt a somewhat unorthodox 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's example of a family resemblance term 'game' to 
illustrate these notions. In what follows, my task is twofold. First, I will clarify how 
this unorthodox interpretation can enhance our understanding of terms such as 
'disjunctive commonality or pattern'. Second, I will explain how the shapeiessness 
thesis can illuminate an account of what it means for NM to be shaped. 
(3.3.2.1) Unorthodox Interpretation of Family Resemblance 
In the orthodox interpretation^^, Wittgenstein's idea of a family resemblance term 
'game' is as follows. All the instances that fall under the extension of the term 'game' 
have no common property; rather, they are connected via an overlapping network of 
similarities. To further illustrate, suppose that Gl, G2, G3, and G4 are all instances of 
games. According to Wittgenstein, Gl and G2 are similar (or resemble each other) in 
that they might have a common property PI, so are G2 and G3 because they have 
another common property P2, and so are G3 and G4 because they have still another 
common property P3. However, Gl , G2, G3, G4 have no property that is common to 
them all. 
By contrast, in the unorthodox interpretation the Canberrans adopt, there is still a 
property that all of them have in common, that is, a disjunctive property of being PI 
or P2 or P3. Namely, there is still 'a disjunctive commonality or pattern' that unites all 
the instances of a game; if X is a game, then it has the following disjunctive property: 
the property of being PI or P2 or P3. Here, I do not mean to settle the issue of which 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's view is closer to his own. Rather, my purpose is to 
clarify what the 'disjunctive commonality or pattern' is the Canberrans have in mind. 
(3.3.2.2) Clarification of Shapeiessness Thesis 
^^  See Biletzki & Matar's (2009) entry on "Ludwig Wittgenstein" in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy for instance. 
Armed with an understanding of the 'disjunctive commonality or pattern' the 
Canberrans have in mind, we can now proceed to clarify the thesis of shapelessness. 
As a reminder here, the thesis of shapelessness says that there is not even a highly 
'disjunctive commonality or pattern' that unites 'the right acts when described in 
descriptive terms'. Let us suppose that Nl , N2, N3, and N4 are all descriptive terms 
that describe the right acts and that the right acts they describe are all the right acts 
there are. The shapelessness thesis says that it is not only the case that the right acts 
picked out by these descriptive terms do not have any common property in the 
orthodox Wittgensteinian understanding of common property, but it is also the case 
that they do not have any common disjunctive property of the unorthodox sort 
indicated by the Canberrans that unites them all. Hence, the shapeless thesis implies 
that the term 'right' is not even a family resemblance term, for to be a family 
resemblance term, there is at least a common disjunctive property of the unorthodox 
sort indicated by the Canberrans that unites all the items the term refers to. 
There is a caveat to be noted here, however. That is, there is still a much weaker 
sort of common disjunctive property that unites the right actions picked out by N l , N2, 
N3 and N4, that is, the disjunctive property of being an action picked out by Nl or N2 
or N3 or N4; X is right iff X has the disjunctive property of being an action picked out 
by Nl or N2 or N3 or N4. The Canberrans (Jackson et a l , 2000, p. 87) think that the 
shapeless thesis does not deny that there is a disjunctive commonality or pattern like 
this. Namely, when the shapeless thesis claims that "there is not even a highly 
disjunctive commonality or pattern that unites the right acts when described in 
descriptive terms", it can allow for there being a very weak disjunctive commonality 
of the sort I just indicated. This shows that there must be some principled differences 
between the sort of disjunctive commonality the Canberrans have in mind and the sort 
in case here. Whether this is indeed the case need not concern us here. It is an issue I 
will deal with in Chapter 4. For now, all we have to remember is that the shapeless 
thesis implies that there is no disjunctive commonality or pattern of the unorthodox 
sort the Canberrans have in mind (henceforth C-commonality or C-pattern in short). 
(3.3.2.3) From Shapelessness of Morality to Shapeless Natural-Moral Conditional 
Armed with the above understanding of the shapelessness thesis, we are now in a 
position to clarify what it means to say that a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form, (x) (Nx->Mx), is shapeless. Remember that in the 
formulation of the necessarily true natural-moral conditional (x) (Nx^Mx) , N stands 
for a disjunction of various properties specified by various descriptions such as Nl or 
N2 or N3, or.... And let us suppose that M stands for moral Tightness here. As we 
have seen in section § 3.3.2.2, the shapeless thesis entails that the right acts picked out 
by N l , N2, N3 and so on do not even have a C-commonality or C-pattern. So, to say 
that a natural-moral conditional of the form, (x) (Nx->Mx), is shapeless is to say that 
N l , N2, N3 and so on do not even have C-commonality or C-pattem. 
(3.3.2.4) From Shapeless Natural-Moral Conditionals to Absurd Consequences 
So far we have seen what shapelessness is; in this section, I will elucidate why the 
Canberrans think that shapeless natural-moral conditionals lead to absurd 
consequences. To begin with, we have seen by now what sort of creature a shapeless 
natural-moral conditional is like. As I have explained in section § 3.3.2.3, to say that a 
natural-moral conditional of the form, (x) (Nx->Mx), is shapeless is to say that N l , 
N2, N3 and so on do not even have C-commonality or C-pattem. What sort of absurd 
consequences does the shapelessness of the natural-moral conditional lead to? There 
are at least three: (a) we cannot think or talk about morality; (b) a moral term does not 
have a correct criterion of meaning; (c) we can not use a moral term consistently and 
violate the requirements of rationality. 
(3.3.2.4.1) Absurd Consequence A: We cannot think or talk about morality. 
The Canberrans argue that if NM is shapeless in the sense that there is not even a 
C-commonality or C-pattem amongst N l , N2, N3 and so on, there is not a chance we 
can become competent with moral concepts, let alone think or talk about morality. 
This is because for us to become competent with moral concepts, the Canberrans 
argue, there must be some sort of pattem that we latch unto. The pattern can be 
unifying in the sense that all the items a moral concept refers to have a common 
property in the orthodox sense of 'common' . However, it need not be. If moral 
concepts turn out to be family resemblance concepts, the Canberrans argue that the 
pattern can be disjunctive. Namely, the commonality can be a C-commonality. 
Without any pattern or commonality at all, the Canberrans think that our conceptual 
competence with the moral concepts become totally inexplicable. 
Take the moral term 'right' for instance. There is an infinite number of right 
actions. In order for us to become competent with the concept 'right', there must be 
some sort of commonality, either of the common orthodox sort or of the unorthodox 
C-sort, that unites the class of right actions. For if there is not, we finite creatures 
could not have grasped through a finite leaming process (the only sort there is, 
according to the Canberrans) the concept 'right'. In other words, it is empirically 
impossible for us to acquaint ourselves with the infinite occasions where the concept 
'right' can apply. 
(3.3.2.4.2) Absurd Consequence B: A moral term can not have a norm of meaning. 
The Canberrans argue that if NM is shapeless in the sense that there is not even a 
C-commonality or C-pattem amongst N l , N2, N3 and so on, then a moral term can 
not have a norm of meaning that governs its employment. Here, let me first of all 
explain what it means to say that a term has (or does not have) a norm of meaning that 
governs its employment. 
According to the Canberrans, a term must have a norm of meaning that governs 
its employment, a norm that marks the correct uses of a term in accordance with its 
meaning from the incorrect ones. Take the term 'dog' for instance. The term 'dog' 
means dog. Given what the term means, it is correct to apply it to a dog, incorrect to a 
horse. In other words, our use of the term 'dog' is governed by a norm in accordance 
with what the term means. Likewise, given what the moral term 'right' means, our use 
of it is also governed by a norm in accordance with what the term means. If we apply 
the term 'right' to a thing that is apparently wrong, then we violate the norm of 
meaning that governs our employment of the term and can be rightly accused of 
misusing the term. 
With the notion of 'the norm of meaning' in place, the Canberrans argue that 
such a norm is a given. Denying its existence would lead to "meaning skepticism", 
which is a high price for the particularists to pay, according to the Canberrans. Here, 
two clarifications are needed. First, the Canberrans' construal of "meaning 
skepticism" is, I take it, inherited from Quine. From a Quinean perspective (Quine, 
1953, pp. 20-46), meaning skepticism is typically taken to be the view that meaning is 
not an entity that can be had by a term; i.e. the view that a term does not have a 
particular meaning. Indeed, Quine argues that a term can just mean anything if we are 
open to drastic enough revisions to our language. Take the term 'dog' again for 
instance. It can be taken to mean horse so long as we are willing to grant all the true 
sentences about horses in the original language to be now cashed out in terms o f ' d o g ' 
in the revised language and meanwhile use a different term in the revised language, 
let's say 'horse', to mean dog to avoid confusions. In the revised language, 'a dog eats 
grass' is held true whereas 'a horse eats grass' is held false. The revised language is 
still a workable language if we accept the revisions. Hence, the Canberrans contend 
that a meaning skeptic wouldn't accept the existence of a norm of meaning such that a 
term has to mean one thing rather than another. Second, why is it too high a price for 
the particularists to embrace meaning skepticism? The Canberrans do not say in their 
2000 article, but the reasons can be many. One may argue that meaning skepticism is 
strongly counterintuitive. To argue for a counterintuitive claim requires especially 
compelling arguments. This imposes some dialectic burden on the shoulders of the 
particularists. Or in a more theoretical vein, one may adopt a Kripke-Wittgensteinian 
(1982) view of language and argue that a term has a particular meaning by convention. 
Or one may argue, pace Grice and Strawson (1956), that using the term 'dog' to mean 
horse involves a conceptual change.^^ The fact that the revised term 'dog' now means 
horse doesn't change the fact that the original unrevised term 'dog' has to mean dog. 
So a norm of meaning is still in operation. Due to the above-mentioned considerations, 
the Canberrans may well contend that particularism does not only have to pay a high 
intuitive cost if it embraces meaning skepticism but it will also invite 
theoretically-minded criticisms of some formidable opponents in the likes of Kripke, 
Grice and Strawson. Hence, meaning skepticism does not seem to be a worthwhile 
philosophical investment for particularism to make. 
Now, we have seen that a denial of the existence of a norm of meaning involves 
meaning skepticism; however, we haven't demonstrated why the shapelessness of NM 
involves a denial of the existence of a norm. Let me illustrate with an example. Take 
the term 'wrongness' for instance. It can apply to the following things: betraying your 
friend, lusting for your neighbor's wife, breaking your promise to take your daughter 
to a movie on her birthday, stealing a candy bar from a convenient store and lying to 
your parents about your school grades, and so on. Equivalently, the employment of 
the term 'wrongness' is governed by a norm like the following: 
X is wrong iff X is betraying your friend, lusting for your neighbor's wife, 
breaking your promise to take your daughter to a movie on her birthday, stealing 
a candy bar from a convenient store and lying to your parents about your school 
grades, or... 
The norm entails the following: 
If X is betraying your friend, lusting for your neighbor's wife, breaking your 
promise to take your daughter to a movie on her birthday, stealing a candy bar 
from a convenient store and lying to your parents about your school grades, or..., 
then X is wrong. 
So the norm must entail a NM conditional (Let N1 be an action of betraying your 
friend, N2 be one of lusting for your neighbor's wife, N3 be one of breaking your 
^^  I follow David Chalmer's interpretation of Grice and Strawson (1956) here. See Chalmers 
(forthcoming). 
promise to take yoxor daughter to a movie on her birthday, N4 be one of stealing a 
candy bar from a convenient store, N5 be one of lying to your parents about your 
school grades, and so on.) If the NM conditional were shapeless in the sense that there 
is no commonality, either unifying or disjunctive, amongst Ns, it follows that the right 
hand side of the norm would be shapeless too. However, the Canberrans contend that 
the right hand side of the norm cannot be shapeless. It is constitutive of the right hand 
side of a norm that it must have a shape; i.e. a norm with a shapeless right hand side, 
strictly speaking, is not a norm. Why? For without a shape, or a pattern or a 
commonality, either of a unifying sort or of a disjunctive sort, in the various Ns, then 
there is nothing the class of wrong actions has in common that separates it from the 
class of right actions or the class of morally irrelevant actions. If so, a norm that tells 
you to apply the moral concept 'wrongness' only to those actions that are wrong will 
break down, for there is no way we can tell the class of wrong actions from the class 
of right ones or from the class of morally irrelevant ones. If a norm breaks down, it 
follows from this that any semantic decision with regard to how to use a term is as 
good as another (2000, p. 88). If so, this shows that no norm is in operation. In brief, 
the argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
Al : I f N M is shapeless, then the right hand of the norm of meaning is shapeless. 
A2: Strictly speaking, a norm of meaning with a shapeless right hand side cannot 
be a norm. 
C: Hence, I f N M is shapeless, then there is no norm. 
(3.3.2.4.3) Absurd Consequence C: We can not use a moral term consistently and thus 
violate the requirement of rationality. 
Although the Canberrans do not make this observation, it is easily imaginable that 
someone could do so on their behalf For simplicity, I shall henceforth talk as if the 
Canberrans do make this observation. For who makes the observation is no matter. 
The point is rather that it is an interesting observation worth exploring in itself 
anyway. The Canberrans might reason as follow: if NM is shapeless in the sense that 
there is not even a C-commonality or C-pattem amongst N l , N2, N3 and so on, we do 
not use a moral term consistently and violate the requirements of rationality. How so? 
I f N M is shapeless in the sense that there is not even a C-commonality or 
C-pattern amongst N l , N2, N3 and so on, this just means, according to the Canberrans, 
that there is no norm of meaning that governs our uses of a moral term. This we have 
seen in section § 3.3.2.4.2. If there is no norm of meaning, this means further that we 
can just apply a moral term in any way we like. When I say we can just apply a moral 
term in any way we like, what I have in mind here is not just that we can apply a 
moral term such as 'wrong' to an act that is apparently right. For one can consistently 
apply the moral term 'wrong' to acts that are apparently right. Rather, a point that is 
more relevant to our discussion here is that when I say here that we can apply a moral 
term in any way we like, this means that we can call an action wrong but another 
action that is similar to it in all morally relevant descriptive aspects not wrong. It is 
certainly inconsistent to use a moral term in such a way. How so? 
To get clear on this, it will be useful to investigate Hare's theory of the meaning 
of a moral term (Hare, 2000, chapters 2 & 3). Hare argues that the meaning of a moral 
term consists of two components—the prescriptive and the descriptive. Roughly 
speaking, the prescriptive component is to prescribe actions whereas the descriptive 
component is to convey information. Take the term 'wrong' for instance. When we 
call an action of setting fire to a kitten wrong, we are not only prescribing sanctions 
against it, but we are also conveying some information—it causes suffering, it 
conduces to sadistic dispositions, and so on. Due to the descriptive component of a 
moral term, Hare contends that its application is governed by the same sort of rule that 
governs the application of a purely descriptive term. 
So what is the rule that governs the application of a purely descriptive term? 
According to Hare, it is the rule of umversalizability. What does this mean? Take a 
purely descriptive term 'chair ' for instance. If we apply a descriptive term 'chair ' to a 
particular object because it has four legs and is made for people to sit on, etc., then the 
rule of universalizability requires that we ought to apply the term to any object that is 
similar to it in these relevant descriptive aspects. It is certainly inconsistent in our uses 
of the term 'chair ' if we call an object that has the relevant descriptive aspects 'chair ' 
but refuse to apply it to another object that has exactly the same descriptive aspects. 
Similarly, we ought to apply a moral term consistently to any act that is similar in 
relevant descriptive aspects. For instance, if we apply the term 'wrong' to an act 
because it causes suffering and conduces to sadistic character and so on, then we 
ought to apply the term to any action that is similar to it in these relevant descriptive 
aspects. If we do not do so, we are simply inconsistent in our application of the moral 
term. Imagine someone who calls an action wrong because it causes suffering and 
conduces to sadistic character but calls another action that he thinks has exactly the 
same consequences not wrong. He is apparently inconsistent in his uses of the moral 
term 'wrong'. As rationality requires consistency, it is not rational of him to apply a 
term arbitrarily. 
Now, we are in a better position to see how the shapelessness of NM can lead to 
the absurd consequence that we do not use a moral term consistently and thus violate 
the requirements of rationality. To summarize, if NM is shapeless, this means that 
there is no norm of meaning that can govern our uses of a moral term. If so, we can 
use a moral term in any way we like, including using it inconsistently. When we use a 
term inconsistently, we violate the requirements of rationality, as rationality requires 
consistency. 
(3.3.3) P5: Absurd Consequences Are False. 
The absurdity of the absurd consequences should be easily seen by the reader. First, 
we do think and talk about morality. It is not unusual to hear folks talk about the 
following: Bill Clinton did a very wrong thing by having an affair with Monica 
Lewinsky; George Bush was wrong to invade Iraq; or it is only right of me to keep 
my promise to my wife not to get drunk again. We are fairly competent users of moral 
concepts such as 'right' or 'wrong'. We are not only capable of thinking and talking 
about morality. We DO think and talk about them. Second, there is certainly a norm 
that governs our employment of a moral term. We can't just apply a moral term to 
anything we like. For instance, on pains of misusing it, we cannot apply the moral 
term 'rightness' to something that is apparently wrong. Similarly, we cannot apply it 
to something that is completely morally irrelevant (e.g. the tree was right to conduct 
photosynthesis.) These examples show that there is a norm that governs our 
employment of a moral term, distinguishing its correct uses from incorrect ones. 
Finally, it is obvious that we can and do in fact use a moral term consistently. If we 
call an act of torturing a cat wrong, we do seem to call another similar act wrong too. 
Moreover, it should also be obvious that rationality requires consistency in our use of 
a moral term. A man can be rightly accused of being irrational if he calls torturing 
kitten A wrong but calls the same action done to kitten B not wrong without thinking 
that there is any morally relevant difference between the two cases. 
(3.3.4) P6: It is not the case that the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not 
shaped. (P4, P5 Modus Tollens) 
Any reader familiar with first-order logic can tell that P6 follows validly from P4 and 
P5. No more explanation is needed here. 
(3.3.5) C2: The necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped. (P3, P6 
Disjunctive Syllogism) 
Again, any reader familiar with first-order logic can tell that C2 follows validly from 
P3 and P6.1 shall save my breath here too. 
3.4 Third Stage 
(3.4.1) P7 and P8 are exactly the same as CI and C2.1 have explained respectively in 
sections §§ 3.2 and 3.3 how the Canberransjustify their belief in them. More 
explanation here would only be redundant. I shall say no more here. 
(3.4.2) P9: If a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) (Nx->Mx) ' 
is shaped, it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle 
Why do the Canberrans think that a shaped NM is a moral principle? To answer this 
question, we need to get clear on why the Canberrans mean by a moral principle. For 
them, a moral principle is a creature with the following feature: a moral principle 
displays "patterned connections between descriptive ways things might be and moral 
ways things might be." The patterned connections, according to the Canberrans, can 
be cashed out at least in the form of a C-commonality. This means, of course, that the 
patterned connections assume the form of a shaped WA. 
The Canberrans make it clear that the NM conditional per se (i.e. potentially 
shapeless conditional) does not constitute a principle of the sort in which the 
principlists believe (Jackson et al., 2000, p. 85). Why? Remember that the NM 
conditionals are short for a raft of necessarily true conditionals like the following: 
I f N ] , t h e n X i s right. 
If N2, then X is right. 
As we have seen in section § 3.2.2, for the Canberrans, these true conditionals merely 
follow from the fact that the thesis of moral supervenience is true. Presumably, the 
particularists do not deny the truth of moral supervenience. Hence, they do not deny 
that there are these necessarily true conditionals. However, they do deny that there are 
any necessarily true moral principles in the sense of "patterned connections between 
descriptive ways things might be and moral ways things might be." It can be inferred 
from this that a moral principle is not a necessarily true conditional for a particularist. 
Hence, for there to be a real disagreement or debate between the principlists and the 
particularists, a necessarily true conditional cannot be the sort of moral principle the 
principlists believe. What they believe is what the particularists deny—moral 
principles in the sense of "patterned connections between descriptive ways things 
might be and moral ways things might be." These moral principles, as I have pointed 
out a while ago, must take the form of a shaped NM. 
(3.4.3) PIO: If there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx -^Mx) ', it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P8, P9 
Hypothetical Syllogism) 
Anyone familiar with first-order logic can see that PIO is derived from P8 and P9. 
(3.4.4) C3: There is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P7, PIO 
Modus Ponens); absolute principlism is true; (extreme) particularism is thus falsified. 
Anyone familiar with first-order logic can see that C3 is derived from P7 and PIO. It 
has to be noted, though, the sort of moral principle that is established is the absolute 
kind of moral principle we mentioned in chapter 1. For as PIO indicates, the 
necessarily true natural-moral moral principle takes the following form: '(x) 
(Nx->Mx)'. As we have explained in chapter 1, there is an intuitive distinction 
between absolute moral principles and non-absolute ones. A moral principle that does 
not have any hedging clause is an absolute moral principle. The moral principle of the 
form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' fits the bill. It does not have any hedging clauses such as 'prima 
facie', 'pro tanto' or 'ceteris paribus' in it. Hence, what we have got from the 
supervenience argument eventually is a moral principle of the absolute kind. Hence, if 
the supervenience argument is sound, absolute principlism will be proved to be true 
whereas extreme particularism will be proved to be false. 
Chapter 4 A Critique of the Supervenience Argument I: 
Supervenience and Conceptual Competence 
In chapter 3,1 reconstructed the Canberrans' supervenience argument and divided it 
into three stages. Let me briefly recapitulate the goals of the three stages. To begin 
with, the first stage is concerned to show that there is a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' . The second stage is concerned to show that 
the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped in the sense that there is a 
pattern in the various Ns. The last stage is to show that there is a necessarily true 
natural-moral moral principle. Whether the three stages can succeed in achieving their 
goals of course depends on whether the conclusions of each stage can have adequate 
support from their premises. By this, I mean that the arguments of which the three 
stages are consisted have to be sound—their premises have to be true, to say the very 
least, in order to provide adequate support for the conclusions of each stage. In this 
chapter and the next, I will argue that none of the three stages are supported by sound 
arguments. Or at the very least, the Canberrans have not provided any compelling 
arguments to convince us that they are. 
The plan of this chapter is as follows: section § 4.1 casts some doubts on the 
soundness of the argument of the first stage. The argument of the first stage is 
problematic, because, as I will argue, there is no good reason to believe that P2 is true. 
Section § 4.2 divides P4 and P5 contained in the second stage of the supervenience 
argument respectively into P (4.a), P (4.b), P (4.c) and P (5.a), P (5.b), P (5.c). As the 
arguments contained in the second stage are enormously complex, I will deal with P 
(4.a), P (5.a) in this chapter and leave the rest for the next one. Section § 4.3 discusses 
three objections to P (4.a) made respectively by Dancy, Garfield and McDowell(ians) 
and argues that they are all toothless. I will advance an objection that I think is more 
damaging to P (4.a) at the end. Section § 4.4 reminds the readers of the truth of P 
(5.a). 
4.1 First Stage 
Let me first of all remind readers of the argument contained in the first stage. 
It can be presented as follows. 
PI: The thesis of moral supervenience is true. 
P2: If moral supervenience is true, there is a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) (Nx^Mx) ' . 
CI: There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx^Mx) ' . (PI, P2 Modus Ponens) 
To see whether the above argument is sound, we need to examine PI and P2 closely to 
see whether they are true. This is exactly what I will do in what follows. 
(4.1.1) Is PI true? 
PI is the claim that the thesis of moral supervenience is true. Recall that the 
Canberrans take the thesis of moral supervenience to be equivalent to the inter-world 
global version: descriptively identical worlds are morally identical. Is there any 
possibility that this inter-world global version might come out false? To put it 
differently, is it possible that descriptively identical worlds are morally different? The 
Canberrans suggest that the only chance for the inter-world global thesis to come out 
false is if moral properties are 'sui generis' properties. The idea is that moral 
properties have to be entirely autonomous, floating free completely of the constraints 
of the descriptive properties. To illustrate, it has to be possible for two descriptively 
identical worlds that one of them is immoral whereas the other is not. So for the 
Canberrans, the idea of moral properties being sui generis is incompatible with the 
thesis of moral supervenience. If the idea that moral properties are sui generis can 
hold, then the thesis of moral supervenience will be falsified. 
Now, a natural question to ask here is this: can the particularists endorse the idea 
of moral properties being sui generis to disarm the supervenience argument? The 
Canberrans (Jackson et al., 2000, p. 88) contend that the particularists had better not 
do so for the following reason: 
Jejune Thesis: If particularists appeal to the idea that moral properties are sui 
generis to disarm the supervenience argument, particularism can be accused of 
"false advertising"—"the new and exciting thesis that there are no moral 
principles collapses into the jejune doctrine advanced by Moore at the turn of the 
century: moral properties are sui generis." (emphasis added) 
Some comments about the jejune thesis are in place here. First of all, although it is 
true that Moore (1962) advocated the idea that moral properties are sui generis, he 
also held the thesis of moral supervenience (or is plausibly interpreted as doing so). 
There does not appear to be, therefore, any inconsistency in holding both the thesis 
that moral properties are sui generis and the thesis of moral supervenience. By this I 
mean, in holding both theses, one is not thus committed to the inconsistency of 
holding true both p and - p . It is a bit unclear, therefore, why the particularists, cannot 
follow in Moore's footsteps in holding both the sui generis thesis and the thesis of 
moral supervenience. It is also unclear why the Canberrans think that if particularism 
espouses the sui generis thesis, it will have to negate the thesis of moral 
supervenience. 
Perhaps the Canberrans object to the marriage between the sui generis thesis and 
the thesis of moral supervenience on grounds of incoherence instead of inconsistency. 
It is incoherent to hold both the sui generis thesis and the thesis of moral 
supervenience just as it is incoherent to hold both the claim that the object is colored 
and the claim that the same object is not extended.^'' Although this incoherence 
objection is not explicitly stated, one can discern some clues of it in Jackson's book 
(2000, especially chapter 5), From Metaphysics to Ethics. If my understanding is 
correct, Jackson in that book holds that if the thesis of moral supervenience is true, i.e. 
if moral properties supervene on natural ones, or if there cannot be a moral difference 
without a natural difference, then there must be an explanation for the modal 
connection between moral properties and natural ones ('cannot' is a modal term). 
Moore would presumably admit this. For anyone who admits that there must be an 
explanation for the modal connection, Jackson apparently thinks that s/he cannot 
coherently hold true the claim that moral properties are sui generis. For if moral 
properties were sui generis in the sense that they could float free of the constraints of 
the natural properties, there would be no explanation for the modal connection. 
However, the question to ask here is: what is the standard of coherence? As we 
have seen, Jackson contends that the sui generis thesis may not be coherently 
maintained with the thesis of moral supervenience because the sui generis thesis does 
not provide an explanation for a logical consequence of the thesis of moral 
supervenience—i.e. it does not provide an explanation for the modal connections 
between moral properties and natural ones. However, it is important for us to note that 
the sort of standard of coherence adopted by Jackson is not the only sort people adopt. 
He owes us an explanation as to why the one he adopts is better than the other ones. 
Many people, for instance, construe coherence in terms of logical consistency. On 
such construal, it is coherent to hold both A and B if A and B are logically consistent 
(or A and B can be true at the same time). Such being the case, it is not clearly 
^^  All colored objects seem to be extended. It therefore seems incoherent to hold true both the claim 
that an object is colored and the claim that it is not extended. However, holding true both claims does 
not seem to commit one to flat-foot inconsistency as holding true both the claim that an object is 
colored and the claim that it is not colored does. 
/>7Coherent to hold both the sui generis thesis and the thesis of moral supervenience. 
For as we have seen, just as claiming that the object is both colored and not extended 
is not clearly logically inconsistent, the conjunction of the sui generis thesis and the 
thesis of moral supervenience is not clearly logically inconsistent either since it does 
not really come out in the form of (p and -p ) . 
Finally, even if we agree with the Canberrans' conclusion that the particularists 
should not endorse the idea of moral properties being sui generis, it is not clear that 
the Canberrans' reason for making this claim is right. To be more specific, I don't 
think there is anything wrongper with a doctrine being jejune. It may well be the 
case that we were not fully aware of the implications of a jejune doctrine when it was 
firstly advanced, but only came to discover them after several years of hard 
philosophical work. Consider Duhem's thesis of under-determination. Its 
philosophical influence was relatively minor when it was first advanced in 1914.^^ It 
was not until Quine's putting forward his idea of meaning holism in 1953 that people 
realized what devastating implications Duhem's thesis of under-determination had for 
verificationists' theory of meaning.^^ Likewise, it may well be the case that when 
Moore firstly put forward the idea of moral properties being sui generis, people at that 
time were not fully aware of what implications it had for the principlism/particularism 
debate. It was not until the rise of contemporary particularists that people came to 
know better its implications. There is nothing wrong with a doctrine being collapsed 
into a jejune doctrine per se. 
On a more charitable understanding, the claim the Canberrans should have made 
is this: the jejune doctrine is wildly implausible; that's why it's very bad for 
particularism to collapse into this jejune doctrine. For the sake of argument, let us 
assume with the Canberrans that the jejune doctrine is wildly implausible. An 
interesting question to explore here is however: does particularism collapse into this 
jejune doctrine? I think this is dubious. 
Let us note first of all that although G. E. Moore (1962) clings to the jejune 
doctrine that moral properties are sui generis, he is by no means a particularist. In fact, 
he is a so-called ideal utilitarian, or an absolute principlist about the principle of utility 
holding that there are some objective goods in our world such as beauty or happiness 
that ought to be promoted.^^ 
Second, Dancy (2004, p. 110) also notes that particularism might well admit that 
moral properties are not sui generis and still cling to the particularists' central thesis 
that there are no true moral principles. So the truth of particularism does not depend 
" See Duhem (1914) 
See Quine( 1953) 
To be fair to the Canberrans, they also acknowledge this point in their article (2000, p. 93, footnote 
1 1 ) . 
on the idea that moral properties are sui generis. For even if moral properties can be 
reduced to and therefore are natural properties, it might still be the case that there are 
no true moral principles in the sense of there being patterned connections between the 
two kinds of properties. Dancy's view here is somewhat analogous to Donald 
Davidson's anomalous monism (1980b, pp. 207-227) in broad outlines. For Davidson, 
although mental events are physical events, he contends that there are no strict laws 
governing these two types of events such that all pain events are a specific type of 
events. There is merely token identity between a physical event token and a mental 
event token. To be more concrete, the view of anomalous monism, while holding that 
mental events are physical events, leaves open the possibility that mental events are 
physically 'multiply realizable'^^—they are not physical events of the same type; 
rather they can be individually, let's say, C-fiber firing events, D-fiber firing events, 
and F-fiber firing events, etc. Likewise, particularism, even if it holds the view that 
moral properties are natural properties, still leaves open the possibility that moral 
properties are naturally multiply realizable. This shows that particularism can still 
stick to their guns by claiming that there are no true moral principles in the sense of 
there being any patterned connections between the natural and the moral. 
Given the two comments I made above, I think it is doubtful whether 
particularism really collapses into the jejune doctrine that moral properties are sui 
generis. Having said so, I think that the Canberrans are right to point out that 
particularism should not reject the thesis of moral supervenience, not because by 
doing so, particularism will collapse into the jejune Moorean doctrine that moral 
properties are sui generis, but because, in my view, the thesis of moral supervenience 
seems very plausible such that denying it will impose a heavy theoretical burden on 
the particularists. This theoretical burden is not necessary for the particularists to bear. 
For as we shall see, there are some other places in the supervenience argument the 
particularists can point their finger to. 
It might rightly be wondered at this point: haven't some philosophers already 
voiced their doubts about moral supervenience? Dancy (1993, p. 78; 2004, p. 87), for 
instance, points out that the truth of moral supervenience might well be trivial because 
it is not clear whether action a and action b can be descriptively identical without 
being numerically identical. If they can't, then moral supervenience is merely trivial. 
For it says nothing more than the claim that self-identical action has the same moral 
property. However, I suspect that Dancy takes the thesis of moral supervenience to be 
^^  It has to be noted here that Davidson himself does not favor a property-exemplification view of 
events. See for instance Davidson (1980a, pp. 181-187). But for our purpose, this should not be a 
concern because nothing really hangs on taking this view of events. Moreover, as Kim (1993, p.42) 
argues, "there are no irreconcilable doctrinal differences between Davidson's theory of event discourse 
as a semantic theory and the property-exemplification account of events as a metaphysical theory". 
trivial only because he adopts a controversial reading of 'descriptively identical'; on 
his reading, for action a and action b to be descriptively identical, they have to be 
identical with respect to 'being identical to action a ' and 'being identical to action b ' . 
On such a reading, it is indeed (trivially) true that descriptively identical actions are 
numerically identical. However, on a different reading of 'descriptively identical', 
action a and action b can differ in aspects o f ' be ing identical to action a' and 'being 
identical to action b ' while remaining 'descriptively identical'. On such a reading, it is 
not true that descriptively identical are numerically identical^^; Dancy has not 
provided very compelling reason for adopting one reading rather than another. So 
there can be a reading on which moral supervenience is not trivial. Hence, Dancy's 
objection is not very powerful. 
To sum up our discussion in this section, it seems to me that to disarm the 
supervenience argument, it would be wise of the particularists not to place too many 
of their bets on the rejection of moral supervenience. 
(4.1.2) Is P2 true? 
P2, as we stated it, is the claim that if moral supervenience is true, there is a 
necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' ? Is it true? It 
seems that there is no good reason to think so. It seems to me instead that even if 
moral supervenience is true, it might still be the case that there is not a necessarily 
true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' . The Canberrans think that 
the consequent of P2, viz. the claim that there is a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' , is entailed by its antecedent, viz. the claim 
that moral supervenience is true, only because, I think, they mistakenly confuse moral 
supervenience with moral necessitation. 
The idea of moral necessitation is well explained by Alexander Miller (2003, p. 
54) as follows: 
Moral Necessitation: "To say that natural properties necessitate moral properties 
It is noteworthy here that there is a parallel debate about whether qualitatively identical spheres are 
numerically identical. See Black (1952). On one reading of 'qual i ta t ively identical ' , sphere a and 
sphere b have to be identical with respect to 'being identical to sphere a ' and 'being identical to sphere 
b ' to be qualitatively identical. However, on a diflferent reading, they don' t . If they don' t , then 
qualitatively identical spheres are not numerically identical. Black adopted the reading on which sphere 
a and sphere b do not have to be identical with respect to 'being identical to sphere a ' and 'being 
identical to sphere b' to be qualitatively identical. Likewise, with regard to moral supervenience, one 
might well adopt the reading on which action a and action b do not have to be identical with respect to 
'being identical to action a ' and 'being identical to action b ' to be descriptively identical. If so, then 
descriptively identical actions need not be numerically identical. So when the thesis of moral 
supervenience claims that descriptively identical actions are morally identical, it need not be 
understood as the trivial claim that self-identical action has the same moral property 
is to say that, in any possible world, all of the moral properties of an act or event 
are determined by its complete naturalistic description N. To explain further, 
necessitation means that, for a given moral property M, it is necessarily the case 
that: if an act or situation has N, then it has M." (Or to paraphrase for our 
purpose, there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
( N x ^ M x ) ' ) 
We can notice from the above passage that moral necessitation is equivalent to the 
consequent of P2, the claim that there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional 
of the form '(x) (Nx^Mx) ' .^" Such being the case, it follows naturally that the 
consequent of P2 is entailed by moral necessitation. However, our question here is: is 
it entailed by moral supervenience? 
The Canberrans say 'yes' whereas my answer is 'no' . To settle the issue, we need 
to get clear on the relationship between moral supervenience and moral necessitation. 
After all, if moral supervenience entails moral necessitation, and if, as I have 
suggested in the last paragraph, moral necessitation entails the consequent of P2, then 
moral supervenience entails the consequent of P2, too. The argument can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
Supervenience-Necessitation Argument: 
T l : Moral supervenience entails moral necessitation 
T2: Moral necessitation entails the consequent of P2. 
T3: Therefore, moral supervenience (the antecedent of P2) entails the consequent 
of P2. (Therefore, P2 is true.) 
In order to substantiate their view that P2 is true, the Canberrans have to prove that 
the above argument is sound. But is it? I suspect it is not. I think the problems lies in 
T l . The claim of Tl suggests that it is impossible that moral supervenience is true and 
moral necessitation is false. So, if we can find a possible world in which moral 
supervenience is true and moral necessitation is false, then the claim of Tl is falsified. 
Is there such a world? It seems that there is. Imagine the following world: 
World 1: a is N and a is not M. 
There is a complication to be noted soon in the objection below. I will reply to it. For now, we can 
ignore this complication. 
The above world is allowed by moral supervenience. For moral supervenience merely 
says that descriptively (or naturally) identical worlds are morally identical. However, 
World 1 is ruled out by moral necessitation. For moral necessitation, as I have 
suggested earlier, says that anything that has N has M. However, in World 1, a has N 
but it does not have M. So World 1 reveals the possibility that moral supervenience is 
true and moral necessitation is false. So T1 is not true. Therefore, the 
supervenience-necessitation argument that is put forward on the Canberrans' behalf to 
show that T3 is true is not sound. Hence, there is no compelling reason for us to 
believe that T3 is true. Or equivalently, there is no compelling reason for us to believe 
that P2 is true. 
In the rest of this sub-section, I will consider a possible objection to my line of 
reasoning above. I will argue that although there is something right about this 
objection, it is toothless. Besides, I will consider a possible way for the Canberrans to 
duck the difficulties encountered in justifying P2. I will argue, however, that it only 
changes the subject of our discussion and does not affect my point that there is no 
good reason for believing P2. 
Objection: 
It might be objected that World 1 does not really reveal the possibility that moral 
supervenience is true and moral necessitation is false. For moral necessitation does 
not have to take the form '(x) (Nx^Mx) ' . It might well take the form '(x) ( N x ^ ~ 
Mx)' so long as ~ M is necessitated by N. That is to say, moral necessitation might 
well claim that given ~ M (as is given in the scenario of World 1), it is necessarily 
the case that there is a natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ ^ M x ) ' . If so, 
the scenario of World 1 does not prove moral necessitation to be false. It merely 
shows that moral necessitation does not take the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' but takes the 
form '(x) ( N x ^ ~ M x ) ' instead. Therefore, the existence of World 1 does not prove 
T1 to be false. 
Reply: 
I think there is something right about the objection. It is right in pointing out that 
moral necessitation need not take the form '(x) (Nx^Mx) ' . It might well take the 
other form '(x) (Nx-> ~ M x ) ' so long as —Mis necessitated by N. So moral 
necessitation might take either one of the following forms: '(x) (Nx^Mx) ' or '(x) 
(Nx->~Mx) ' . However, I take the above objection to be actually in favor of my 
position. For if the objection is right, then it denies the claim of T2: moral 
necessitation entails that there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the 
form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' . For as the objection itself has shown, moral necessitation does 
not entail this. Rather, what it entails is the following disjunction: there is either a 
necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' or one of the 
form '(x) ( N x ^ ~ M x ) ' . If so, there is no good reason for us to believe that T3 (or P2) 
is true, for the supervenience-necessitation argument that is meant to demonstrate its 
truth is not sound. 
A Way Out? Or Change the Subject? 
It might rightly be wondered here: couldn't the Canberrans' argument in the first stage 
still go through, using the idea of moral necessitation instead of moral supervenience? 
Can't they put forward the following argument instead? 
Moral Necessitation Argument*: 
PI*: Moral necessitation is true. 
P2*: If moral necessitation is true, then there is a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) (Nx-^Mx)' or of the form '(x) ( N x - ^ ~ M x ) ' . 
CI *: There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
( N x ^ M x ) ' or of the form '(x) ( N x ^ ~ M x ) ' . 
The moral necessitation argument* is clearly valid. However, is it sound? As we have 
admitted, P2* is true. So to answer this question, the crucial premise to examine is 
PI *. Is PI * true? The idea of moral necessitation needs some explanation here. As it 
is conceived now, it is the idea that for a given moral property M, it is necessarily the 
case that for any act or situation that has N, it has M whereas for a given moral 
property ~ M , it is necessarily the case that for any act or situation that has N, it has 
~ M . Or to paraphrase for our purpose, moral necessitation is the idea that either there 
is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' or there is 
one of the form '(x) (Nx->~Mx) ' . On such a construal, the idea of moral 
necessitation seems true enough (or so I will concede). So it seems fair to say that 
there is no good reason against believing that PI * is true. So it seems that the moral 
necessitation argument* is sound. Such being the case, it might seem that the 
Canberrans' supervenience argument can still go through, using the idea of moral 
necessitation rather than moral supervenience at the first stage. 
Notice, however, how diflferent PI*, when fully spelled out above, is from the 
original PI, the claim that descriptively identical worlds are morally identical. For the 
claim of PI is entirely compatible with the existence of a Moorean world where there 
are only sui generis moral properties but no natural (descriptive) properties, whereas 
PI * is not. To be more specific. Pi ' s claim may still go through even if there is a 
Moorean world, for it merely claims that any world that is descriptively identical with 
the Moorean world is morally identical with it (Nothing in the claim of PI per se rules 
out the existence of a Moorean world). By contrast, PI * will be falsified should a 
Moorean world exist, because PI * is the claim that moral properties are necessitated 
by natural (descriptive) properties. So according to PI *, there cannot be a Moorean 
world that has only moral properties but no natural (descriptive) ones. The situation 
here is analogous in broad outlines to the one in philosophy of mind. Mental 
supervenience claims that physically identical worlds are mentally identical. Despite 
the general impression, this is entirely compatible with the existence of a fairy world 
where only mental properties exist (Kim, 1998, pp. 10-11). For mental supervenience 
merely claims that any world that is physically identical with the fairy world is 
mentally identical with it (Nothing in the claim of mental supervenience per se rules 
out the existence of a fairy world). However, the existence of a fairy world is ruled 
out a priori by psychophysical necessitation for psychophysical necessitation claims 
that mental properties are necessitated by physical properties. So according to 
psychophysical necessitation, there cannot be a fairy world in which there are only 
mental properties but no physical properties. So psychophysical necessitation and 
mental supervenience are different ideas, because they differ over whether they allow 
the existence of a fairy world. Analogously, moral necessitation and moral 
supervenience are also different ideas, because they differ over whether they allow the 
existence of a Moorean world. 
If the Canberrans appeals to the moral necessitation argument* in the first stage 
instead, this would completely change the subject. The original whole argument 
would no longer be an argument from supervenience, for it does not "take off from 
the fact of supervenience", as the Canberrans (Jackson et al., 2000, p. 86) claim. 
Rather it is an argument from necessitation. If the whole argument from necessitation 
turns out to be sound, this does not affect my point that the Canberrans' original 
supervenience argument is not. Moreover, even if the soundness of the moral 
necessitation argument* above is granted, it only means that the first stage of the 
whole argument from necessitation is sound. This does not mean that the whole 
argument is sound. In fact, as I will argue later, there is good reason to think it is not, 
for there are holes in the remaining two stages of the argument. 
(4.1.2) Is CI true? 
As a reminder, CI is the claim that there is a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) (Nx->Mx)'. CI might well be true; however, its truth is 
not guaranteed by PI and P2. There might be other reasons to show that CI is true. 
However, the Canberrans have not shown us any. If P2 is false (as I have shown that 
there is good reason to think that it is), then the argument contained in the first stage is 
not sound. An argument that is not sound may well have a false conclusion. CI may 
well be false. 
4.2 Second Stage 
Before we start to examine the argument contained in the second stage, let me first 
of all remind the readers of what the argument is. It can be presented as follows: 
P3: Either the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped or (exclusive 
'or ') it is not shaped (or shapeless). 
P4: If the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not shaped, then there will 
be Absurd Consequences (i.e. (a) we cannot think or talk about morality; (b) a 
moral term does not have a correct criterion of meaning; (c) we can not use a 
moral term consistently and thus violate the requirements of rationality). 
P5: But Absurd Consequences are false (i.e. we do think or talk about morality; a 
moral term has a correct criterion of meaning; we can and do in fact use a moral 
term consistently and obey the requirements of rationality). 
P6: It is not the case that the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not 
shaped. (P4, P5 Modus Tollens) 
C2: The necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped. (P3, P6 Disjunctive 
Syllogism) 
Let me quickly point out that P3 is obviously true and P6 is merely making an 
obviously true logical point. So they are not the targeted premises for the particularists 
to attack. Rather, much of the philosophical action is focused on P4 and P5. 
Before we embark on the examination of P4 and P5, however, there is a need to 
be more fine-grained about them. As the truth value of P4 might vary depending on 
whether its consequent is (a) (b) or (c), it is useful to break P4 accordingly into three 
independent theses as follows: P (4.a), P (4.b) and P (4.c). To illustrate, P (4.a) is the 
claim that if the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not shaped, then (a) we 
cannot think or talk about morality, whereas the antecedents of P (4.b) and P (4.c) are 
the same as P(4.a) only with their consequents replaced respectively by (b) and (c). 
Similarly, it will be useftil to break P5 into P (5.a), P (5.b) and P (5.c) in accordance 
with whether they claim (a) (b) or (c) to be false. 
In what follows, I will argue that the Canberrans do not provide us with any 
compelling reasons for believing P (4.a). That is, I argue that even if the antecedent of 
P (4.a) is true, viz. even if the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not shaped, 
we can, contrary to what the Canberrans think, still think or talk about morality. 
4.3 Is P (4.a) True? 
Let me first of all remind the readers of the claim of P (4.a). It is this. If the 
necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not shaped, then (a) we cannot think or 
talk about morality. Let's call the necessarily true natural-moral conditional NM for 
short. What does it mean to say that it is not shaped? As we have previously explained 
in chapter 2, it means the following: there does not even exist a disjunctive 
commonality (or C-commonality, as we previously described) amongst the various 
Ns. 
How does this lead to the absurd consequence that we cannot think or talk about 
morality? As we have previously explained, the Canberrans argue that if there were 
not any commonality, not even the disjunctive one, amongst the various Ns, then it 
would be impossible for us to learn moral concepts, let alone think or talk about 
morality. Why? Because we are finite beings and the items falling within the 
extension of the concept of Tightness, viz. the Ns, can be unlimited in number. It is 
impossible for us to pick up the concept of rightness via acquainting ourselves with all 
the occasions it applies. So the Canberrans infer that there must be some sort of finite 
commonality in the Ns that we latch unto when we learn the concept of rightness. 
Otherwise, our conceptual competence with this concept will become totally 
mysterious. 
For the ease of discussion, let us dub the claim that in order for us to be 
competent with moral concepts, there must be some commonality underlying all the 
various Ns the thesis of conceptual competence. And to focus our discussion, let's 
follow the Canberrans in concentrating on the concept of rightness, although our 
discussion below may well be generalized to apply to other moral concepts. 
In what follows, I will discuss three objections to the thesis of conceptual 
competence, advanced respectively by Jonathan Dancy, Jay Garfield, John McDowell. 
None of them, I will argue, is successful. In the end, I will broach a new objection 
which I think is more damaging to the thesis of conceptual competence. 
(4.3.1) Dancy's Prototype Theory Objection 
How can human beings, as finite creatures with finite learning processes, come to 
acquire the concept of rightness, which can be applied to an infinite number of actions? 
Given that we are finite creatures with finite learning processes, it is of course 
impossible for us to pick up the concept of rightness by acquainting ourselves with all 
the occasions it can apply. Such being the case, the Canberrans think that a reasonable 
explanation for our conceptual competence with the concept of rightness must, inter 
alia, include the following: there must be some sort of finite commonality or pattern 
amongst the various right actions, or the Ns, that we latch unto. 
However, Dancy (1999a, pp. 59-72) objects that to explain our conceptual 
competence with the concept of rightness, there need not be any pattern at all in the 
various Ns. It may well be the case that what we learn when we learn the concept of 
rightness is not any pattern, but rather some 'prototype properties', or those properties 
that are typical of a right action.^' The chief difference between a pattern and those 
prototype properties can be explained as follows: a pattern, construed as commonality 
amongst all the items picked out by a concept, provides necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the concept. Take the concept 'chair ' for instance. If there is a pattern 
or some commonality, let's call it C, that unites all the items picked out by the concept 
'chair ' , then the necessary and sufficient condition for the concept 'chair ' is provided 
by C. The idea can be represented as follows: 
X is a chair iff X has C. 
In contrast, prototype properties do not provide necessary and sufficient condition for 
a concept; rather, the prototype properties are merely had by those items that are 
typical examples of the concept. To illustrate with the concept 'chair ' again, the 
prototype properties are merely had by typical chairs. For those falling on the 
borderline, they might not have all the prototype properties of chairs. 
In my understanding, Dancy (1999a, pp. 59-72) thinks that when we learn the 
concept of rightness, we do not learn the necessary and sufficient condition of the 
concept; rather, what we learn are the prototype properties that are had by those 
paradigmatic examples of right actions. To use an analogy to illustrate, when we learn 
' ' Dancy's objection is fueled by Rosch's prototype theory. See Rosch (1975). 
the concept of a bird, we learn that a bird has the following properties—a bird has 
wings, a bird can fly, a bird has feathers etc. However, these properties do not 
constitute a pattern that provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the concept 
'bird' . A penguin is a bird; however, it cannot fly. Rather, those properties are 
prototype properties that are shared by the paradigmatic examples of a bird—such as 
robins or sparrows, etc. So the following seems to be true: we are fully competent 
with the use of the concept 'bird'; however, there does not appear to be any pattern 
underlying all the items picked out by the concept 'bird' . If so, why should we believe 
that there must be a pattern underlying all the items picked out by the concept 'right' 
to explain our conceptual competence with it? 
In response to Dancy's objection, Jackson (2000, p. 61) independently contends 
that to explain our conceptual competence with the concept 'bird ' , a prototype theorist 
would have to acknowledge that at least we learn the following: 
X is a bird iff X has enough of those prototype properties of a bird. 
For if she doesn't, then she has no way to explain our capacity to distinguish the 
category of bird from the category of non-bird. Hence, somewhat ironically, a 
prototype theorist also subscribes, though implicitly, to a pattern that provides a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the concept 'bird' . So the prototype theory has 
no edge over the pattern theory the Canberrans advocate. If so, the prototype theory 
does no better than the pattern theory in explaining our conceptual competence with 
moral concepts. 
(4.3.2) Garfield's Family Resemblance Objection 
Garfield (2000, p. 190, footnote 25) launches an attack on the Canberrans' thesis of 
conceptual competence from a different front. He thinks that there are three major 
flaws with this thesis. First, he thinks that when the Canberrans advocate a disjunctive 
pattern to explain our conceptual competence with a family resemblance concept, the 
Canberrans misinterpret Wittgenstein's idea of a family resemblance concept. 
According to Garfield, Wittgenstein by no means thinks that the items picked out by a 
family resemblance concept are unified by a disjunctive pattern. I think that Garfield 
is on firm ground here (with a caveat to be noted soon), for Wittgenstein (1963, § 67), 
when discussing a family resemblance concept 'number ' , says the following: 
But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these 
constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties"—I should 
reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: "Something 
runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of those 
fibres." 
From the above passage, we can tell that Wittgenstein by no means thinks that there is 
a disjunctive pattern that is common to all the items the concept 'number ' applies to. 
If Canberrans intend to provide a faithful interpretation of what Wittgenstein actually 
thinks about family resemblance concepts, then Garfield is right that the Canberrans' 
interpretation is obviously wrong. However, the caveat that has to be noted here is 
that there is no sign in their co-authored article showing that the Canberrans are 
interested in interpreting Wittgenstein; in fact, they do not give any reference to 
Wittgenstein at all in that article. Rather, they are presenting their own idea of family 
resemblance. So the first objection about misinterpretation is toothless. Of course, 
from Wittgenstein's perspective, to contend that there is a disjunctive commonality 
underlying the items picked out by a family resemblance concept is merely "playing 
with words". However, we have not seen any reason why the Canberrans are not 
entitled to use the word 'commonality' in that way. 
Second, Garfield charges that the Canberrans get the dialectic between 
particularists and principlists wrong. The particularists usually invoke Wittgenstein as 
an ally. They appeal to the family resemblance concepts to show that our conceptual 
competence with a concept need not presuppose the existence of a unifying pattern 
underlying all the items picked out by the concept. The concept of game is a good 
example. We are fully competent with it; however, there does not appear to be any 
unifying pattern that underlies the items picked out by the concept. Likewise, they 
think that similar things could be said of the concept of Tightness. 
However, on the Canberrans' understanding of a family resemblance concept, 
Wittgenstein turns out to be an enemy of particularists, because there is still a 
disjunctive pattern unifying all the items picked out by a family resemblance concept 
such as the concept of a game. Hence, Garfield thinks that the Canberrans got the 
dialectic wrong. 
However, the Canberrans may well acknowledge that Wittgenstein is still an ally 
of particularists, for their understanding of a family resemblance concept is different 
from Wittgenstein's. As I said on behalf of the Canberrans in my reply to Garfield's 
first objection, the Canberrans are not interested in interpreting Wittgenstein's idea of 
family resemblance. The particularists may sfill side with Wittgenstein in claiming 
that there is no unifying pattern underlying the items picked out by a family 
resemblance concept, in pursuance with Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblance. 
The Canberrans can certainly allow this. What the Canberrans cannot allow is the 
claim that the particularists are right to do so. They don't think that the particularists 
are right to think, pace Wittgenstein, that there is no unifying pattern underlying the 
items picked out by a family resemblance concept. So the Canberrans did not get the 
dialectic between the particularists and the principlists wrong. As to who win the 
dialectic, that's a different issue. 
Third, Garfield contends that the disjunctive sort of pattern the Canberrans 
advocate is simply unleamable because it contains an infinite amount of disjuncts. 
Hence, invoking it to explain our conceptual competence is a project doomed for 
failure. However, I suspect that the sort of disjunctive pattern Garfield attacks is not 
really the sort the Canberrans have in mind. Let us use a family resemblance concept 
'game' to illustrate this. Suppose that Gl , G2, G3, G4, G5, etc. are all games. The 
disjunctive sort of pattern Garfield has in mind might look like the right hand side of 
the following: 
X is a game iff X is Gl or G2 or G3 or G4 or G5, etc. 
Recall that this is the weaker sort of disjunctive pattern I mentioned in Chapter 2. The 
above pattern is apparently unleamable because it contains an infinite number of 
disjuncts. However, it might not be the sort the Canberrans have in mind. The sort of 
disjunctive pattern the Canberrans have in mind might well be some finite disjunctive 
commonality amongst the infinite number of Gs. As I have explained in Chapter 2, it 
might look like the right hand side of the following: 
X is a game iflfX has (PI or P2 or P3 or P4) 
The disjunctive pattern constituted by (PI or P2 or P3 or P4) might well be a common 
property all games share. In that case, it is finite and hence leamable. So Garfield's 
objection about the unleamability of a disjunctive pattern does not work. 
(4.3.3) McDowell's Response-Dependence Objection 
Some might object to the thesis of conceptual competence by saying something like 
the following: It might well be the case that the Canberrans get the location of 
commonality wrong. There might never be any commonality in the various Ns 
themselves. Rather, their commonality comes from us', it is response-dependent. We 
respond to the various Ns in the same way by applying the same concept to them all, 
despite the fact that there is no commonality in them. Our conceptual competence 
with a moral concept is explained not by there being any pattern or commonality 
amongst the things the moral concept applies to and our latching unto that pattern 
when we learn the concept, but by there being some particular way people carve up 
moral reality and our knowing the point why people carve it up in that way, viz. why 
they classify certain actions as being, let's say, pious and others as treacherous. 
John McDowell himself has never made the above objection directly to the thesis 
of conceptual competence. However, it is imaginable that people can make it, drawing 
some implications out of what McDowell (2002, essay 10, pp. 198-218) says in 
"Non-cognitivism and Rule-following". In that article, McDowell argues that moral 
terms, despite their supervening on the natural terms, are response-dependent in that 
there might be nothing in common in the natural things they apply to. Here is what he 
(p. 202) says: 
[H]owever long a list we give of items to which a supervening term applies, 
described in terms of the level supervened upon, there may be no way, 
expressible at the level supervened upon, of grouping just such items together. 
Hence there need be no possibility of mastering, in a way that would enable one 
to go on to new cases, a term that is to function at the level supervened upon, but 
is to group together exactly the items to which competent users would apply the 
supervening term. 
So we can tell from the above passage that for McDowell, there need not be any 
pattern or commonality or "grouping" in the things a moral concept is applied to. 
Hence, McDowell claims that "there need be no possibility of mastering, in a way that 
would enable one to go on to new cases, a term that is to function at the level 
supervened upon." If we want to go on to new cases, what we have to do instead is 'to 
group together exactly the items to which competent users would apply the 
supervening term." That is to say, the extension of a supervening term, (or a moral 
term in our case), depends entirely upon what sort of things we, as competent users, 
would apply the term to. To paraphrase for our purpose, if we, as competent users of a 
moral concept, would apply it to N l , N2, N3, etc, then they are what the concept can 
refer to and there need not be any commonality in the various Ns. 
It might rightly be wondered how McDowell explains our conceptual 
competence with a moral concept though? For according to the thesis of conceptual 
competence, there is really no explaining for it without there being a commonality or 
a pattern in the various Ns that we latch unto. McDowell contends that our conceptual 
competence essentially consists in our sharing the same form of life. It is, he (2002, 
pp. 206-207) quotes Stanley Cavell approvingly. 
a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humor and of 
significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what 
else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when 
an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls 
"forms of life". 
So, being competent with a concept requires one to share the same form of life with 
other competent users of the concept in the same linguistic community. People having 
a different form of life might well lack the sort of vision required for them to see why 
an utterance is an assertion rather than an explanation or an appeal or why Chaplin's 
show is humorous to the locals. To further illustrate, let me use the concept of piety 
for example. A Chinese would regard a senior adult dressed up in colorful costumes 
dancing in front of his aged parents as performing an action of filial piety while a 
foreigner might not have the slightest idea of why the concept of piety can be applied 
to it. The foreigner is not competent with the use of the concept 'piety' in Chinese 
society. Having a different "form of life", he lacks the sort of vision that is required to 
see the senior adult's action as one of filial piety. For McDowell, becoming competent 
with a moral concept does not consist so much in the acquisition of a pattern in the 
various Ns to which the moral concept can be applied as in the acquisition of the 
perspective irom which the locals see things. The foreigner might well have seen the 
same senior adult performing the same sort of actions several times and spotted the 
commonality amongst the various performances, yet still do not have the slightest 
idea with regard to why what they have witnessed is an action of filial piety. "Form of 
life" is what makes all the difference. 
Equipped with a better understanding of a McDowellian sort of 
response-dependent objection, we can now consider whether it poses a serious threat 
to the thesis of conceptual competence. In my view, the answer is 'no ' and the 
Canberrans have a reply to this. They may well acknowledge that to be fially 
competent with the use of a moral concept in a particular linguistic community, one 
has to understand the cultural baggage the moral concept carries with it to apply it 
correctly. They may well also acknowledge that a foreigner who lacks relevant 
cultural vision that is required for competence with a moral concept in that 
community are unable to see things in the moral way the locals do; to learn how the 
moral concept is used in that community, he has to mix himself with the locals, whirl 
in the same organism, so to speak. However, these acknowledgements are entirely 
compatible with there being a pattern in the various Ns. In fact, we should note that 
McDowell can allow there being a pattern in the various Ns too. He only makes the 
weaker claim that there need not be any. He is not committed to the stronger claim 
that there cannot be any. The Canberrans' view differs from McDowell's in that they 
make an even more stronger claim that there has to be a pattern in the various Ns. 
How can they substantiate their view here, given the response-dependent objection? 
Two comments are in place here. First, I think that the Canberrans can meet the 
challenge head on and contend that the pattern or commonality cannot be just 
response-dependent. For if there were no pattern in the various Ns, as the 
response-dependent objection maintains, then the objectors would have to maintain 
that what we are responding to is merely "a mess" at bottom—those actions we call 
right are only randomly related to each other; they don't have anything in common at 
the natural level. However, this seems incredible. If they are so different from each 
other at the natural level, it seems incredible that we apply the same moral concept to 
them so consistently and only to them for that matter. 
In fact, the Canberrans (Jackson et al., 2000, p. 87, p. 93) point out that the 
response-dependent objection violates the platitude that "predication supervenes on 
nature"—predicates apply because of how things are. The example they gave to 
illustrate this platitude is this. If two things are similar in their natural or descriptive 
aspects, the same moral predicate will presumably apply to both of them, unless a 
good reason is given for not doing so. This is why, according to the Canberrans, 
"defenders of abortion are challenged to explain why they oppose infanticide; those 
who oppose contraception on the grounds that it is unnatural are asked to explain why 
they do not oppose the wearing of spectacles." (Jackson et al., 2000, p. 94) So 
similarities or differences in our application of moral predicates must be explained in 
virtue of similarities or differences in how things are. Without paying any heed to this, 
our application of moral concepts would become entirely arbitrary. However, if our 
application of moral concepts were arbitrary, it would be doubtful we could claim any 
competence with them. However, it is a fact that we are fairly competent with these 
moral concepts. So the response-dependent objection, which violates the platitude that 
"predication supervenes on nature", cannot be right. 
Second, the response-dependence objection seems wrong in maintaining that 
there is only commonality in our responses to the various Ns, but no commonality in 
the various Ns themselves. For there is at least the following commonality amongst 
the various Ns: they elicit the same responses from people! If so, this is entirely 
compatible with the Canberrans' thesis of conceptual competence, the claim that in 
order for people to be competent with a moral concept, there must be some 
commonality in the various Ns it applies to. For the Canberrans might well contend 
that the commonality of the various Ns lies in the fact that they elicit the same 
responses from people and to be competent with a moral concept is just to pick up 
people's common responses to the things it applies to. 
(4.3.4) My Objection: Competence or Performance? 
I have argued so far from § 4.3.1 to § 4.3.3 that none of the objections from Dancy, 
Garfield or McDowell poses serious threats to the thesis of conceptual competence. In 
what follows, I will argue, however, that there is a fatal objection to it. To begin with, 
recall the claim of 
the thesis of conceptual competence: In order for us to be competent with moral 
concepts, there must be some commonality underlying all the various Ns. 
That is, it says something like the following: 
If there is not a pattern or commonality in the various Ns, then there will be 
no explanation for our conceptual competence with moral concepts. 
By contraposition, we can get the following logically equivalent statement: 
If there is an explanation for our conceptual competence with moral concepts, 
then there is a pattern or commonality in the various Ns. 
Now, the thesis of conceptual competence, as stated above, actually says something 
that is quite remarkable. The remarkable thing about this thesis is that it forges a link 
between our conceptual competence with moral concepts and there being a pattern or 
commonality in the various Ns. Why is this remarkable? Well, this is because whether 
we are competent with moral concepts is a fact about us whereas whether there is a 
pattern or commonality in the various Ns is something about the world that is 
independent of us. (Recall that the Canberrans deny that the commonality is 
response-dependent). It is quite remarkable that we can infer from a fact about us to a 
fact about the world. These two facts are seemingly irrelevant. After all, whether there 
is a pattern or commonality in the various Ns does not seem to have anything to do 
with whether we are competent with a moral concept or not. 
Let me illustrate with an example. Take the concept 'natural number' for instance. 
There is an infinite number of natural numbers. They are all different, ranging from 0 
to infinity. However, there is a commonality amongst the various natural numbers. 
They all share the common property of satisfying the Peano's axioms. This fact, 
however, does not seem to have anything to do with whether one is competent with 
the concept 'natural number' or not. Even if we are not competent with this concept, it 
still seems to be the case that all the natural numbers share the commonality of 
satisfying the Peano's axioms. 
In order to contend that there is a link between our conceptual competence with a 
concept and there being a pattern amongst the various Ns it applies to, we need first of 
all to puzzle out the relationship between the two. To do so, however, requires further 
clarification of what it takes to be ftilly competent with a concept. There has been a lot 
of discussion of this in the literature. If my understanding of the Canberrans' view 
(2000, p. 91) is correct, they think that it requires at least the following: we know 
what a concept means, i.e. what sort of things it can be correctly applied to. Take 
Jackson and Pettit's view (2004) to illustrate this. For Jackson and Pettit (2004, pp. 
192-193), there exist some conceptual "commonplaces". A mastery of a concept 
requires one to know at least that these conceptual commonplaces in which the 
concept applies hold (p. 193). Take the concept of fairness for instance. To know what 
fairness means, one has to know, at the very least, the following conceptual 
commonplaces hold^^: 
Conceptual commonplaces about justification: If one alternative is fair, and if 
other things are equal, then that is the right option for the agent to desire and 
pursue. The agent may reasonably feel guilt, and others resentment, about failure 
to choose such an option, at any rate where the choice would not have been very 
difficult to make. 
Conceptual commonplaces about justificatory power: Fairness is potentially 
more important in the determination of rightness, and in the justification of 
choice, than being polite or diverting. But fairness is less important in general 
than saving innocent human lives: better be unfair than allow someone innocent 
to perish. 
Conceptual commonplaces about motivational power: Believing one option to be 
fair is likely to motivate an agent more strongly than seeing another as polite or 
diverting, but less strongly than recognizing a further option as a means of saving 
innocent human life. If these asymmetries do not hold, that is probably due to 
some form of practical unreason. 
If we don't know the above-mentioned conceptual commonplaces hold, the claim that 
we are fully competent with the concept of fairness can hardly be maintained. 
" Jackson and Pettit (2000, pp. 192-193) listed seven commonplaces in total about the concept of 
fairness. For the sake of brevity, I omit four of them. 
Notice that the requirement that we know these conceptual commonplaces hold 
is different from the requirement that we be able to articulate them. My grandmother, 
to the best of my knowledge, cannot articulate any conceptual commonplace about the 
concept of morality; however, seasoned with life's experiences, she can reliably 
distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. She is a person of great moral 
wisdom. It would be ridiculous to suggest that she does not know what morality 
means. In fact, I think she knows better than most of us. 
But still, the claim that we know what a concept means is a claim about us. How 
can we derive from this a claim about the world, viz. the claim that there must be 
some sort of pattern amongst the various Ns the concept refers to? Here, what we 
need is a 'bridge' claim, so to speak, to connect the two seemingly irrelevant claims. 
What is this bridge claim? As far as I can see, the Canberrans must claim the 
following: 
(Al) If we know the meaning of a concept, we (must) know its underlying 
pattern. (If P then R) 
And to know the pattern, there must be a pattern amongst the various Ns for us to 
know. That is, the following statement obtains: 
(A2) If we know the pattern, then there is a pattern amongst the various Ns. (If R 
then Q) 
Now, it should be easy for readers to see how the bridge can be established between P 
and Q. From hypothetical syllogism of (Al ) and (A2), we can get 'if P then Q' and 
hence establish the relationship between P and Q the Canberrans is after. 
However, (Al) is highly controversial. It is not necessarily the case, as (Al ) 
claims, that if we know the meaning of a concept, we must know its underlying 
pattern. Here, it is useful to borrow a distinction from Chomsky (1965) to explain our 
knowledge of the meaning of a concept: the distinction between competence and 
performance. On the competence model, if we know the meaning of a concept, it is 
true, as (Al) claims, that we must know the pattern. That is, we know what sort of 
things the pattern can be applied to. For instance, it seems reasonable to think that if 
someone knows the meaning of the concept 'cup' , she has to know that the pattern 
underlying the concept 'cup' , whatever it is, can be applied correctly to cups but not 
to birds. However, on the performance model, this need not be the case in order for 
her to count as knowing the meaning of the concept 'cup' ; she only has to perform the 
right action, so to speak. For instance, whenever she is told to fetch for a cup, she can 
do it right (i.e. she doesn't go after a bird or any object that is non-cup). Then, she can 
pass for knowing the meaning of the concept 'cup' , even if she knows nothing (not 
even implicitly) about its underlying pattern. So on the performance model, (Al) 
might come out false. 
Now, both the competence model and the performance model have their own 
supporters. Which of them is right is highly controversial. I do not mean to settle the 
issue here. However, I think that it is fair to say that the Canberrans are not entitled to 
subscribe to one model rather than the other without providing any argument for it. To 
put things differently, unless there is some good reason for us to think that the 
competence model is the only plausible theory for explaining our knowledge of a 
concept, it seems unreasonable to assume that the claim of (Al), which is based on 
the competence model, is true. For (Al) might come out to be false on the 
performance model. And if (Al ) turns out to be false, the bridge between P and Q will 
collapse. Then it becomes doubtful whether P really entails Q. If so, it will also 
become doubtful whether the thesis of conceptual competence is true because it 
requires the link between P and Q to establish the connection between our conceptual 
competence and there being a pattern. In other words, there is no good reason to think 
that the claim that we are competent with the meaning of a moral term entails the 
claim that there must be a pattern. The thesis of conceptual competence can thus be 
cast into doubt. 
4.4 Is P (5.a) True? 
P (5.a) is the claim that it is false that we cannot think or talk about morality. As I 
have illustrated in section § 3.3.3 of chapter 3, it is obviously true, because we can 
and do think or talk about morality. So here, I shall not elaborate more on this. 
4.5 Summary 
As the chapter title suggests, this chapter focuses on the thesis of moral supervenience 
and the thesis of conceptual competence. If what I have argued so far is right, it seems 
that the first stage of the supervenience argument is problematic, for the reason that 
there is no good reason for us to believe that we can derive a natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) ( N x ^ M x ) ' from the thesis of moral supervenience. 
With regard to the second stage of the supervenience argument, we have argued 
that the thesis of conceptual competence is problematic, despite the failures of 
challenges to it from Dancy, Garfield and McDowell(ians). The main reason is that it 
implicitly contains a highly controversial assumption that has not been argued for by 
the Canberrans. Such being the case, there is reason for us to doubt whether P(4.a) 
contained in the second stage of the supervenience argument is true or not. 
Despite the progress we have made, I have left some businesses unfinished in 
this chapter. I have only examined P(4.a) and P(5.a) of the second stage of the 
supervenience argument, but I have not examined P(4.b), P(5.b), P(4.c) and P(5.c). 
Moreover, we have not examined the argument of the third stage. In the next chapter, 
we will continue with our unfinished businesses of exploring whether the second 
stage consists of a sound argument. Besides, we will look at the argument of the third 
stage. As a brief forecast, in the next chapter, I will argue that the arguments of the 
both stages contain some holes in them. 
Chapter 5: A Critique of the Supervenience Argument II: 
Normativity of Meaning, Rationality and Moral Principles 
This chapter continues with where we leave off our discussion in chapter 4. As the 
chapter title of this chapter suggests, the focus of this chapter will be on two theses 
that are advanced at the second stage of the supervenience argument—the thesis of the 
normativity of meaning and the rational requirement thesis. In addition, we will also 
be examining the Canberrans' conception of moral principles that is advanced at the 
third stage. I will argue that the two theses are not convincing and their conception of 
moral principle problematic. 
Section § 5.1 reviews the claim of P (4.b), the claim that if the necessarily true 
natural-moral conditional (NM) is not shaped, a moral term does not have a correct 
norm of meaning, and reminds the readers of its truth. 
Section § 5.2 argues that there is no strong reason for us to believe the claim of P 
(5.b), viz. the claim that there is a norm that governs our employment of a moral term. 
I argue that the norm that governs our employment of a term in our actual linguistic 
practices allows a garden-variety of ways a term can be legitimately put to uses, 
whereas the norm the Canberrans have in mind is a clear-cut one that does not 
accommodate these variations. Such being the case, I argue that there is no good 
reason to believe there is the sort of the norm the Canberrans have in mind that 
governs our employment of a moral term. 
Section § 5.3 takes issue with P(4.c), the claim that if NM is not shaped, we do 
not use a moral term consistently and violate the requirements of rationality. I raise a 
Kripkean-style rule-following objection against it—the objection that the fact that we 
use a moral term consistently and thus obey the rationality requirement does not show 
that there is a pattern of the sort the Canberrans have in mind. Section § 5.4 is a 
review of the claim of P (5.c), the claim that we can and do in fact use a moral term 
consistently and thus obey the minimal requirement of rationality. Sections §§5.5 and 
5.6 draw some logical conclusions from the discussions of the previous sections. 
Sections §§ 5.7-5.10 examine the soundness of the argument contained in the 
third stage of the supervenience argument. Section § 5.11 provides an overall review 
of the supervenience argument. In view of the many holes in it, I conclude that there 
is no strong reason for us to believe the ultimate conclusion the Canberrans want to 
reach—there are necessarily true natural-moral moral principles. 
5.1 Is P (4.b) True? 
Let mc first of all recapitulate the claim of P (4.b). It is this. If the necessarily true 
natural-moral conditional (NM) is not shaped, a moral term does not have a correct 
criterion of meaning. That is, if there is not any pattern amongst the various Ns, then a 
moral term cannot have a correct criterion of meaning. Let us call the claim of (4.b) 
the thesis of the normativity of meaning. 
There are two questions we need to ask here. First, what does it mean to say that 
a moral term has a correct criterion of meaning? As I have explained in section § 
3.3.2.4.2 in chapter 3, it means that a moral term must have a norm of meaning that 
governs its employment, a norm that marks the correct uses of a term in accordance 
with its meaning from the incorrect ones. Second, how does the antecedent of (4.b) 
lead to the consequent? In other words, why does the fact that there being no pattern 
amongst the various Ns lead to the consequence that a moral term can not have a 
correct criterion of meaning? Again, as I have explained in section § 3.3.2.4.2 in 
chapter 3, the Canberrans contend that a pattern in the Ns (or a shape) is constitutive 
of the right hand side of the norm of meaning. To illustrate, suppose that the term 
'rightness' applies to N1, N2, N3 and N4, etc, then there must be a norm of meaning 
governing the employment of the term 'rightness' which requires that it is only correct 
to apply the term to N1, N2, N3, N4, and all the other various Ns that are right but not 
to others. The norm looks like the following: 
X is right i f fx is N1 or N2 or N3 or N4...etc. 
Now, if there were no pattern or commonality amongst the various Ns that are right 
that sets them apart from the other Ns that are either not right or morally irrelevant, 
then a norm governing the employment of the term 'rightness' would no longer exist. 
For then we can apply the term 'rightness' even to Ns that are not right or morally 
irrelevant. However, it is incorrect, linguistically speaking, for us to do so. So there 
must be a pattern constitutive of the right hand side of the norm. 
I think that the Canberrans' line of reasoning in P (4.b) is reasonable (or this 
much I am willing to concede). However, I think that P (5.b) can be challenged on a 
number of fronts. Or so I will argue in § 5.2. 
5.2 Is P (5.b) True? 
P (5.b) is the claim that there is a norm that governs our employment of a moral term. 
This certainly seems to be true. For it does not seem to be the case that we can apply a 
moral term to anything we like. The statement, 'It is (morally) wrong for trees to 
conduct photosynthesis', seems to reveal the speaker's misuse of the moral term 
'wrong'. For trees' conducting photosynthesis is not the sort of thing a moral term can 
apply to. So it seems reasonable to claim, at least initially, that there is a norm that 
governs our employment of a moral term. 
However, things often turn out to be not what they initially seem. In order to 
determine whether P (5.b) is true, we need to look closer at the Canberrans' notion of 
a norm. As we have seen in section § 5.1.2, for the Canberrans, a norm is constituted 
by a pattern that unites the various Ns a concept can apply to. A concept governed by 
the norm can only apply to the various Ns, but not the non-Ns. To be more specific, 
we can use the following picture to illustrate (Jackson et al., 2000, p. 87): 
In Canberrans' view, the term 'right' applies only to acts that fall within the region 
inside the oval but not to acts that fall outside it because only those acts that fall 
within have the pattern all right acts have in common whereas those outside don't. If 
we apply the term 'right' to those outside the oval region, then we would be misusing 
the term. 
However, the Canberrans' conception of a norm as being constituted by a 
clear-cut pattern that divides the Ns from the non-Ns is problematic in two aspects. 
First, in the cases of vague concepts, their application does not seem to be governed 
by a norm constituted by a clear-cut pattern that divides the Ns from the non-Ns. If 
moral concepts turn out to be vague concepts, as they might well be, then there would 
be no norm of the sort the Canberrans have in mind that governs the employment of a 
moral term. Notice that this is different from saying that there is no norm whatsoever. 
There is still a norm that governs the employment of vague concepts such as 'bald'. It 
is not as if we can apply it to anything we like. To say that jasmine tea is bald 
certainly strikes us as a case of misusing the term 'ba ld ' . " So there is still a norm that 
governs the employment of a vague concept. It is just that the norm is not the kind of 
norm constituted by a clear-cut pattern. Rather it is a norm with blurred edges. 
Second, the norm when conceived as being constituted by a clear-cut pattern that 
" Let's assume that the speaker knows what jasmine tea is. 
divides the Ns from the non-Ns seems too rigid to match the norm that governs our 
linguistic practices. The norm that governs our linguistic practices allows a 
garden-variety of ways a term might be legitimately put to uses. Calling Winston 
Churchill a bulldog is not a case of misusing the term 'bulldog' when it is used in a 
metaphorical context. To call someone a brave coward is neither a case of misusing 
the term 'brave' nor one of misusing the term 'coward' when their combination is 
intended to create an effect of oxymoron. Similarly, calling an action that is 
apparently wrong right may not be a case of misusing the term 'right' either when it is 
stated in a sarcastic tone. To deny these linguistic phenomena is to deny Shakespeare 
of his mastery at word-play. So it seems that the norm the Canberrans have in mind 
that draws a sharp line between Ns (things which a moral term can apply) and non-Ns 
(things which a moral cannot apply) is way too rigid such that there is really no such 
norm in our linguistic practices. 
To bring out the contrast between the norm the Canberrans have in mind and the 
norm that governs our actual linguistic practices, a musical analogy from Schroeter & 
Schroeter (2009, pp. 16-17) can prove to be illuminating. They compare the norm the 
Canberrans have in mind to the common score classical musicians play by, whereas 
the norm that governs our actual linguistic practices is more like the norm that 
governs the performance of a jazz musician, which allows more improvisations and 
variations. Here are Schroeter & Schroeter's remarks (2009, pp. 16-17): 
The members of a classical string quartet achieve a coordinated musical 
performance by settling in advance on a common score. This common score then 
serves as a fixed template, which guides each individual player's performance on 
the crucial night. The classical performance is coordinated and kept on track by 
each player playing the template they've agreed on. The members of a jazz 
quartet, [by contrast], have a very different way of achieving musical 
coordination: instead of settling on a specific template for their performance, jazz 
musicians can rely on their improvisational skills. 
As we can tell from the above remarks, classical music has to go by a common score 
as a fixed template, whereas jazz does not; the latter allows improvised variations. 
This is not to say that anything goes in jazz. It is still governed by a musical structure, 
or a norm in our terminology, that marks jazz from "a cacophony of divergent voices" 
(Schroeter & Schroeter, 2009, p. 17). 
To some extent, the Canberrans' conception of a norm is analogous to the 
common score classical music goes by. If you do not go by the common score, you 
'mess up' the classical music performance, as it were. Likewise, if you apply a term to 
something in violation of a norm, you also 'mess up' your linguistic performance. 
However, it seems that the norm that governs our actual linguistic practices is not as 
strict, as we have demonstrated by the garden-variety of ways a term can be 
legitimately put to uses. We are free to play with words just as jazz musicians are free 
to put various variations on the tunes they play. In our actual linguistic practices, we 
are more like jazz musicians than classical ones. 
True, it has to be admitted that there is still a norm that divides our linguistic 
practices from mumbo-jumbo just as there is still a norm that divides jazz from "a 
cacophony of divergent voices". However, if what I have argued above is right, it is 
not the sort of clear-cut norm the Canberrans endorse. So if the claim of P (5.b) is 
construed as the claim that there is a norm of the kind the Canberrans endorse that 
governs the employment of moral terms, it may well come out to be false. 
5.3 Is P (4.C) True? 
P (4.c) is the following claim: if the necessarily true natural-moral conditional (NM) 
is not shaped, we can not use a moral term consistently and will thus violate the 
requirements of rationality. Let us call this claim the rational requirement thesis. Is 
the rational requirement thesis true? To answer this question, we need to look a bit 
closer at the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent of the thesis and 
what they mean respectively. 
To begin with, what does the antecedent mean? That is, what does it mean to say 
NM is not shaped? As I have explained in chapter 3, it means that there is not a 
pattern in the various Ns the moral term refers to. How does this lead to the 
consequent that we can not use a moral term consistently and thus violate the 
requirement of rationality? Again, as I have explained in chapter 3, the Canberrans 
believe that if there is no pattern, then there would be no norm of meaning that 
governs the employment of a moral term. If so, we might well apply the term 'right' 
arbitrarily or inconsistently if we like. 
I have explained that it is doubtful whether it is true that if there is no pattern, 
then there is no norm of meaning, the main reason being that it is doubtful whether a 
norm of meaning is constituted by a pattern that draws a sharp line between those 
items a term applies to and those to which it doesn't.^"* 
Here, I want to press two different points against the rational requirement thesis. 
As a reminder, rational requirement thesis is the view that if the necessarily true 
natural-moral conditional (NM) is not shaped, we can not use a moral term 
As the graph we have seen in section § 5.2 indicates, the Canberrans think that the pattern draws a 
sharp line between items to which it apphes to (the oval region in the graph) and those to which it does 
not (the region outside the oval). 
consistently and will thus violate the requirements of rationality. By contraposition, it 
is logically equivalent to the view that if we can (and do in fact) use a moral term 
consistently and follow the rational requirement, then NM is shaped (or there is a 
pattern in the various Ns). Against this thesis, I will raise the following two objections: 
(5.3.1) Following the rational requirement, per se, does not get us to the conclusion 
the Canberrans want—there is a pattern in the various Ns. It is entirely compatible 
with the rational requirement that there is no pattern in the various Ns. Or so I will 
argue. (5.3.2) I contend that a Kripkean-style rule-following objection can be mounted 
against the rational requirement thesis in that all that rationality requires is 
consistently following a rule while remaining silent on what sort of rule we follow. 
Such being the case, I argue that there can be rules that we follow consistently, which 
do not give us the kind of pattern the Canberrans have in mind. 
(5.3.1) Objection 1: Rationality Does Not Necessarily Give Us Patterns 
First thing first, why do people think that rationality requirement can give us the 
pattern the Canberrans have in mind? They might reason as follows. Rationality 
requires us to use a moral term consistently; And to use a moral term consistently, as I 
have explained in chapter 3, means, pace Hare, that we have to apply it to anything 
that we judge to be descriptively similar in morally relevant aspects. For instance, if 
we apply the term 'wrong' to an action because it increases suffering and conduces to 
sadistic character, then we have to apply the term to any action that we judge to be 
descriptively similar in exactly these aspects. Otherwise, we wouldn't be using the 
term 'wrong' in a consistent way. As rationality requires consistency, we might rightly 
be accused of being irrational if we do not use the term consistently. To paraphrase, in 
the case we are currently considering, rationality requires us to follow the following 
rule consistently: 
R1: We ought to apply the term 'wrongness' to any act that increases suffering 
and conduces to sadistic character. 
To further illustrate, in a different case where we apply the term 'wrongness' to an act 
because it is lying, then rationality requires us to follow a different rule: 
R2: We ought to apply the term 'wrongness' to any act that is a case of lying. 
In a still different case where we apply the term 'wrongness' to an act because it is 
killing, then rationality requires us to follow a still different rule: 
R3: We ought to apply the term 'wrongness' to any act that is a case of killing. 
As should have been familiar to the readers by now, the Canberrans reason that if 
'wrongness' can be applied to the above acts mentioned in the three rules, there must 
be some pattern those acts have in common. For as I have mentioned in chapter 3, the 
Canberrans hold the view that 'predication supervenes on nature'—if the same moral 
predicate applies to different acts, those acts must have some commonality; the things 
'wrongness' can be applied to cannot be just "a mess" at bottom. If rationality 
requires us to follow R l , R2, and R3, and if there is some common pattern amongst 
the acts mentioned in R l , R2, and R3, let's say, the common pattern of reducing utility, 
for instance, then rationality will also require us to follow the following rule: 
R4: We ought to apply the term 'wrongness' to any act that reduces utility. 
Without the common pattern of reducing utility, then there will not be R4. If there is 
no rule like R4, then this means, according to the Canberrans, we can apply the term 
'wrongness' arbitrarily. However, as we have seen, this is not acceptable to the 
Canberrans. So they contend that there must be a rule like R4. If we don't follow it, 
then we violate the requirement of rationality, because rationality requires us to use a 
moral term consistently. If there is a rule like R4 rationality requires us to follow, as it 
does, then there must be a pattern amonst the various Ns, for R4 is constituted by such 
a pattern. So from rational requirement, we can derive the existence of a pattern 
amongst the various Ns. 
However, I think that the above line of reasoning is defective. Rational 
requirement taken by itself does not imply that there must be a rule like R4 which is 
constituted by a pattern amongst the acts mentioned in R l , R2 and R3. The 
Canberrans err in making the assumption that without a pattern amongst the acts in R l , 
R2, and R3, the rational requirement will break down and we can thus use a moral 
term arbitrarily, as if the rational requirement totally depended on there being a rule 
like R4 constituted by a pattern among the acts mentioned in R l , R2, and R3. 
However, this is not true. As we can observe from Rl , R2 and R3, the rational 
requirement, per se, is not committed to any specific content of the rule. Rather it is, 
in Hare's construal, a requirement of consistency. As long as we are following R l , R2 
or R3 consistently, we will be meeting the requirement of rationality. Such being the 
case, it is entirely compatible with the requirement of rationality that there is no 
pattern or commonality amongst actions of increasing suffering and conducing to 
sadistic character, actions of lying, and actions of killing. The requirement of 
rationality, per se, does not tell us whether there is any pattern amongst the three types 
of actions we apply the term 'wrongness' to. 
One caveat to be noted is that without the pattern in the acts mentioned by rules 
like Rl , R2 and R3, this doesn't mean that we can use a moral term entirely arbitrarily 
in any way we like. Rationality still requires us to follow rules like Rl , R2, and R3 
consistently when we apply the term 'wrongness'. 
(5.3.2) Objection 2: Rule-Following 
I think that a Kripkean-style rule-following objection can pose a serious threat to the 
rational requirement thesis. Here is why. Following the lines of reasoning Kripke 
(1982) uses in his brilliant work, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, in 
using a moral term consistently, we might have all along been following the following, 
a so-called 'bent' rule: 
R4: We ought to apply the term 'wrongness' to any action that is wrong before 
time t and to any action that is right after time t. 
The rationality requirement in itself does not rule out the above possibility. If so, in 
using the term 'wrongness' consistently and following the requirement of rationality 
does not mean that there is some commonality of the sort the Canberrans have in 
mind amongst the various Ns the term refers to. For, as a reminder, the sort of 
commonality they have in mind has to be able to unite the class of wrong actions and 
separate it from the class of right ones. 
True, Kripke's Wittgenstein (or Kripkenstein as it is sometimes called) 
eventually appeals to the iron-clad fact that in our practices (or forms of life in 
Wittgenstein's language), we simply do not regard following R4 as rational (Kripke, 
1982, chapter 3). Or to put it differently, on our community's conception of rationality, 
following R4 is not rational. If Kripkenstein's line of reasoning is right, then R4 does 
not pose any threat to the rational requirement thesis, the view that in following the 
rational requirement of using a moral term consistently, there must be a pattern 
amongst the various Ns the term refers to. For the following of R4 is simply a 
violation of the rational requirement of using a moral term consistently. In order to 
pose a real threat to the rational requirement thesis, we need a case in which we do 
follow the rational requirement of using a moral term consistently but there is no 
pattern amongst the various Ns the term refers to. R4 simply is not such a case. Such 
being the case, it may rightly be wondered why the Canberrans couldn't adopt 
Kripkenstein's view here in reply to the rule-foil owing objection. I think there are two 
reasons for this. 
First, Kripkenstein's view of rationality as being community-relative hardly 
squares with the Canberrans' own view of rationality, especially that of Michael 
Smith's. Famously, Smith (1994) argues that what is morally right in a circumstance C 
is simply what our fully rational selves want our non-fully-rational selves to do in C. 
If the idea of rationality turns out to be completely community-relative, then Smith 
will turn out to be a moral relativist, as what our fully rational selves want our 
non-fully-rational selves to do will become community-relative. That is, relative to 
community A, our fully rational selves may want our non-fully-rational selves to (p. 
But relative to community B, our fully rational selves may want our non-fiilly-rational 
selves not to (p. If Smith or the Canberrans in general want to stick to their moral 
realist position, then Kripkenstein's reply, which is based on a community-relative 
conception of rationality, to the rule-following objection is simply not available to 
them. 
Second, even if Kripkenstein's reply to the rule-following objection is available 
to the Canberrans, Kripkenstein's reply does not exclude the possibility that on some 
community's conception of rationality, following R4 is rational. It merely excludes 
the possibility that on our community's conception of rationality, following R4 is 
rational. Such being the case, I think it is fair to demand from the Canberrans an 
account as to why we should prefer one conception of rationality over another. Until 
such an account is produced, I think that the rule-following objection still looms large. 
5.4 Is P (5.C) True? 
P (5.c) is the claim that we can and do in fact use a moral term consistently and can 
thus obey the minimal requirement of rationality. This claim seems to be true. As I 
have explained in section § 3.3.3 of chapter 3, we do in fact use a moral term such as 
'wrong' or 'right' consistently. We do not call an action of torturing a cat wrong and 
call another similar action right on pains of being irrational. In using a moral term 
consistently, we thus obey the requirement of rationality. 
5.5 Is P6 True? 
P6 is the claim that it is not the case that the necessarily true natural-moral conditional 
is not shaped. Recall that in chapter 3, section § 3.3.4,1 mentioned that P6 follows 
validly from P4 and P5. So if P4 and P5 are both true, then P6 is true too. However, as 
I have shown, there is reason to doubt whether P (4.a), P (4.b) and P (4.c) are true. So 
there is reason to doubt that whether P6 is true too. Moreover, as I have also indicated, 
there is reason to doubt whether P (5.b) is true. If so, it is even more doubtful whether 
P6 is true. 
5.6 Is C2 True? 
C2 is the claim that the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped. Recall 
that in chapter 3, section § 3.3.5, C2 follows validly from P3 and P6. P3 is a tautology. 
However, as I have indicated in section § 5.5 this chapter, there is reason for us to 
doubt the truth of P6. So, it is also reasonable for us to doubt whether C2 is true. 
5.7 The Examination of the Third Stage 
First of all, let me remind you what the argument of the third stage is. It is the 
following: 
P7: There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx^Mx) ' . (C l ) 
P8: If there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx->Mx)', it must be shaped. (C2) 
P9: If a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) (Nx-^Mx)' is 
shaped, it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle 
PIO: If there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx->Mx)', it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P8, P9 
Hypothetical Syllogism) 
C3: There is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P7, PIO Modus 
Ponens); absolute principlism is true; particularism is thus falsified. 
The above argument is valid. The important question for us is whether it is sound. As 
we can see, P7 and P8 are identical respectively with CI and C2. As I have already 
argued, there is reason for us to doubt whether CI and C2 are true. Such being the 
case, there is also reason for us to doubt whether P7 and PS are true. So, there is 
already reason for us to doubt whether the above argument is sound. 
5.8 Is P9 True? 
The claim of P9 is as follows: If a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of 
the form '(x) (Nx-^Mx) ' (NM) is shaped, it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral 
principle. To determine whether the claim of P9 is true, it is obviously important for 
us to clarify the meaning of 'shaped' and the meaning of 'moral principle'. 
As should have been familiar to the readers by now, for a NM to be shaped is for 
there to be a pattern in the various Ns the moral term refers to. How do the 
Canberrans infer from this claim about there being a pattern in the various Ns to the 
claim that there is a moral principle? Well, for the Canberrans, for there being a moral 
principle is just for there being "patterned connections between descriptive ways 
things might be and moral ways things might be." Hence, P9 is true by definition. 
5.9 Is PIO True? 
PIO follows validly from P8 and P9. However, as I have demonstrated, there is no 
strong reason for us to believe P8. So there is no strong reason for us to believe that 
PIO is true. 
5.10 Is C3 True? 
C3 follows validly from P7 and PIO. However, since it is doubtful whether P7 and 
PIO are true, they do not provide strong support for C3. It is therefore also doubtful 
whether C3 is true. 
5.11 A Review of the Supervenience Argument 
With all the holes in the supervenience argument identified, it is now time for us to do 
a bit of review to piece together the big picture. In what ways does the supervenience 
argument fail? Let me lay out the argument in front of you again and review the holes 
in each stage of the argument. 
The Supervenience Argument: 
First Stage: 
PI: The thesis of moral supervenience is true. 
P2: If moral supervenience is true, there is a necessarily true natural-moral 
conditional of the form '(x) (Nx^Mx) ' . 
CI: There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx-^Mx)'. (PI, P2 Modus Ponens) 
The argument in the first stage is valid, but it is not sound chiefly because P2 is not 
true. As I have demonstrated, the Canberrans confuse the idea of moral supervenience 
and the idea of moral necessitation. While the idea of moral necessitation might well 
entail the consequent of P2, the idea of moral supervenience doesn't. So, P2 is 
actually false. The argument in the first stage is therefore not sound. There is no 
strong reason for us to believe CI. 
Second Stage: 
P3: Either the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped or (exclusive or) 
it is not shaped (or shapeless). 
P4: If the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not shaped, then there will 
be Absurd Consequences (i.e. (a) we cannot think or talk about morality; (b) a 
moral term does not have a correct criterion of meaning; (c) we can not use a 
moral term consistently and will thus violate the requirements of rationality). 
P5: But Absurd Consequences are false (i.e. (a) we do think or talk about morality; 
(b) a moral term has a correct criterion of meaning; (c) we can and do in fact use a 
moral term consistently and thus obey the requirements of rationality). 
P6: It is not the case that the necessarily true natural-moral conditional is not 
shaped. (P4, P5 Modus Tollens) 
C2: The necessarily true natural-moral conditional is shaped. (P3, P6 Disjunctive 
Syllogism) 
The argument in the second stage is valid but does not seem to be sound. As I have 
demonstrated, there is no strong reason for us to believe P4 is true, i.e. there is reason 
to doubt P (4.a) and P (4.c) respectively. There is also reason for us to doubt the 
claims of P (5.b). If so, there is no reason for us to believe P6, since P6 follows from 
P4 and P5. Such being the case, there is no reason for us to believe in C2 either, 
because it follows from P3 and P6. 
Third Stage: 
P7: There is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx^Mx) ' . (CI) 
P8: If there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx^Mx) ' , it must be shaped. (C2) 
P9: If a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) (Nx-^Mx)' is 
shaped, it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle 
PIO: If there is a necessarily true natural-moral conditional of the form '(x) 
(Nx-^Mx)', it is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P8, P9 
Hypothetical Syllogism) 
C3: There is a necessarily true natural-moral moral principle. (P7, PIO Modus 
Ponens)-, absolute principlism is true; (extreme) particularism is thus falsified. 
The argument in the third stage is valid; however, there is reason to doubt whether it 
is sound. As I have demonstrated at stage 1 and stage 2, there is no strong reason to 
believe that CI and C2 are true. That is to say, there is no strong reason to believe that 
P7 and P8 are true, since they are exactly identical respectively with CI and C2. So, 
given our explanations at the first two stages, there are already some reasons for us to 
doubt whether the argument in the third stage is sound. Such being the case, I 
conclude that there is no strong reason for us to believe C3, the ultimate conclusion 
the Canberrans want to reach. 
The pro tanto principlists may well appeal to the supervenience argument too. But presumably, the 
argument will face similar sorts of problems we mentioned in chapters 4 and 5. So I will not consider 
this possibility any further. 
Chapter 6 The Argument from the Atomism of Reason 
My goal has been to defend the claim of extreme particularism—the view that there 
are no necessarily true natural-moral moral principles, be they of the absolute kind or 
the pro tanto kind. In the previous two chapters, I have shown that the Canberrans' 
supervenience argument fails to establish the existence of necessarily true 
natural-moral moral principles of the absolute kind. This, we should note, does not 
really disprove their existence. This is merely to say that one major argument that has 
been advanced to prove their existence is no good. Nonetheless, if I am right about 
this, the aim of defending extreme particularism is partly achieved since a major 
threatening attack on extreme particularism has been effectively deflected. 
Now, to complete our defense of extreme particularism, we need to consider a 
different issue, the issue of whether there are necessarily true natural-moral moral 
principles of the pro tanto kind. Saying that there is no good reason for us to believe 
the existence of necessarily true natural-moral moral principles of the absolute kind is 
not the same thing as saying that there is no good reason for us to believe necessarily 
true natural-moral moral principles of the pro tanto kind, since they are different 
creatures. In fact, the pro tanto principlists contend that there are indeed moral 
principles of the pro tanto kind. They support their claim by the argument from the 
atomism of reason^^ (I will explain what this argument is in section § 6.1). In this 
chapter, I will lay out what the argument from the atomism of reason is. In the next 
chapter, I will present objections to it. In the end, I argue that the argument from the 
atomism of reason is not a very persuasive argument. If I am right about this, then pro 
tanto principlism lacks strong support for it. We can thus be more confident about the 
claim of extreme particularism. 
Before I enter into the discussion of the argument from the atomism of reason, 
however, I want to make explicit the connection between these two chapters (i.e. 
chapters 6 and 7) and the previous chapters. As I have clarified in chapters 1 and 2, 
there are various kinds of principlism corresponding to the kinds of moral principles 
they claim there are. My thesis focuses exclusively on the claims of two particular 
kinds of principlism—absolute principlism and pro tanto principlism. They are 
respectively the claim that there are necessarily true natural-moral principles of the 
absolute kind, and the claim that there are necessarily true natural-moral principles of 
the pro tanto kind. And it is important to emphasize that the central tenet of my thesis 
is to argue that there are no strong reasons for us to believe the claims of the 
above-mentioned two kinds of principlism. If I am right, then I think this would 
provide a forceful defense of extreme particularism—the view that there are no 
necessarily true natural-moral moral principles, be they of the absolute kind or the pro 
tanto kind. 
Chapters 3 to 5 focus on the supervenience argument, which the Canberrans 
invoke to justify absolute principlism—the view that there are necessarily true 
natural-moral absolute moral principles. However, as I have argued, due to the 
various holes it has, it does not work. But this does not mean that our defense of 
extreme particularism has finished. No, not yet. To complete its defense, one has to 
deflect not only the attack from absolute principlism but also the attack from pro tanto 
principlism as well. In this chapter and the next (i.e. chapters 6 & 7), I explore an 
argument that is meant to establish the truth of pro tanto principlism—the view that 
there are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral principles. It is the argument 
from the atomism of reason. I will argue, however, that it is not a persuasive 
argument. 
Now, with all the preliminaries in place, we can proceed to explain what the 
argument from the atomism of reason is. 
6.1 Argument from Atomism of Reason 
To begin with, what is pro tanto principlists' argument from the atomism of reason? It 
can be presented roughly as follows: 
Argument from the Atomism of Reason: 
PI: The atomism of reason is true. 
P2: If the atomism of reason is true, there are necessarily true natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles 
C: There are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral principles.^^ 
The above argument is apparently valid in its form. However, is it sound? In order for 
us to assess its soundness, there is apparently a key term we need to clarify, that is, the 
atomism of reason. In order for us to know whether PI and P2 are true, we need to 
know what atomism of reason means. 
6.2 Atomism of Reason 
The atomism of reason is a theory of how (moral) reasons work. To a first 
approximation, it claims that reasons work in an atomistic way in the sense that their 
" According to Dancy (1993, p. 104), this argument provides the rationale for Rossian principlism. 
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status as reasons for or against an action remains constant, independent of the change 
of the contexts. To illustrate, on a certain interpretation of W. D. Ross (2002), the 
feature of keeping a promise constitutes a reason for performing the promised action 
and it always does. Its status as a reason for is never undermined. 
Now, let me motivate the idea of the atomism of reason by way of an analogy. 
Let's look at the following example first. 
Height: Bill's height is 200 centimeters. He is the tallest boy in Class A. 
One day, he transfers to Class B. Class B has a boy, Tom, whose height is 210 
centimeters. Such being the case, Bill is not the tallest boy in Class B. 
In the height case, whether Bill is the tallest boy in the class depends on the context, 
i.e. on which class he is in. He is the tallest boy in Class A, but he is not the tallest boy 
in Class B. Nevertheless, his height does not change according to context. Rather, it 
remains constant. It is just that in class B, his height is exceeded by Tom's. So while 
whether he is the tallest boy in the class depends on the context, his height does not. 
His height is atomic in the sense that it does not change according to the context. 
Now, the atomism of reason contends that the way a reason works is quite 
similar to the way Bill's height works. Its status as a reason for (or against) remains 
constant in all contexts. Now, let's look at an example in support of this view. 
Promise: You promise to meet your friend to have lunch together. Keeping you 
promise is the right thing for you to do. However, on your way to meet your 
friend, you happen to witness a car accident. Several severely injured victims 
need your help; if you do not stop and help them, they will die. Such being the 
case, keeping your promise is not the right thing for you to do. 
In the promise case, whether keeping your promise is the right thing for you to do also 
depends on the context, just as whether Bill is the tallest boy in the class does. When 
you are in a normal context, keeping your promise is the right thing for you to do; 
however, when you are in a context where severely injured victims of the car accident 
are in desperate need for your help, it is not. 
On the other hand, however, just as Bill's height does not change according to 
contexts, the feature of keeping a promise as a reason for does not seem to change its 
status as a reason for according to contexts, either. In other words, the feature of 
keeping a promise seems to be always a reason for. Even in the context of the car 
accident, the feature of keeping a promise still constitutes a reason for performing the 
promised action. It is just that it is outweighed by a weightier reason to save lives. 
(This is why you still owe your friend an apology even if not keeping your promise to 
him is overall the right thing to do in the context of saving lives. If the feature of 
promise-keeping were no reason at all, no apology would be owed.)- Its status as a 
reason for performing the promised action seems to remain constant in all contexts. 
So the promise example seems to provide some support for the view of the 
atomism of reason, which we can formalize with more precision as follows: 
Atomism of Reason: For all F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in 
circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F is 
a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
The above thesis requires some clarification. What does it mean exactly? Let's begin 
by using the above mentioned feature of keeping a promise to illustrate. If the feature 
of keeping a promise is a reason for performing the promised action in a normal 
circumstance, then for all other circumstances, if the feature of keeping a promise 
obtains, then the feature of keeping a promise is a reason for performing the promised 
action in those circumstances. To put it simply, the feature of promise-keeping, if it is 
a reason, is a reason for in all circumstances. In Dancy's terminology (2004, p. 6), the 
feature of promise-keeping has a constant 'positive valcncc'. (Dancy compares a 
feature qua reason to a terminal with positive and negative charge. If it is a reason for, 
then it has a positive valence, whereas if it is a reason against, it has a negative 
valence.) 
Another thing that may require some clarification is the word 'feature'. What does 
it mean exactly? As 1 understand Dancy's view (1993, pp. 73-74; 1999b, p. 25), he 
takes a feature to be a property of an action. An action can have many features or 
properties (I shall use 'feature' and 'property' interchangeably henceforth). Some of 
them are morally relevant; others are not. The morally relevant ones jointly determine 
the moral stams of an action. For instance, to a first approximation, an action can have 
a property of being a lie and it can also have a property of saving lives, etc. These 
morally relevant properties that it has jointly determine its moral status. 
6.3 Two Caveats 
So far, we had been talking as if the way the feature of promise-keeping qua reason 
works is really analogous to the way Bill's height works and it thus provides some 
support for the view of the atomism of reason, since its status as a reason for does not 
change according to contexts. However, this way of talking is, strictly speaking, 
wrong in two aspects. 
First, there is a dis-analogy between the feature of promise-keeping and Bill's 
height. That is, while Bill's height remains constant in all contexts (or so we may 
assume), it is not really clear whether the feature of promise-keeping really retains its 
status as a reason for in all contexts, too. What the promise example shows at most is 
only that the feature of promise-keeping retains its status as a reason for in both the 
normal context and the context of a car accident. That is, the example provides us at 
most two contexts in which the feature of promise-keeping retains its status as a 
reason for. It seems to be a hasty generalization to infer from this example to the 
atomists' view that the feature of promise-keeping is a reason for in all contexts in 
which it appears. In fact, there might even be good reasons for us to think that it is not 
a reason for in all contexts in which it appears. Consider the following example: 
Immoral Promise: You promise to kill your friend's political enemy for him. 
In this example, it seems reasonable to say that the feature of keeping a promise is not 
a reason for performing the promised action. It is not as if the feature of keeping a 
promise is still a reason for performing the action but its moral significance is 
outweighed by that of a weightier reason against killing.'"' The feature of 
promise-keeping in the immoral promise case seems to be no reason at all, or even a 
reason against performing the promised action, since the content of the promise is 
immoral. To put it differently, the fact that you made a promise with immoral content 
seems to be a reason against performing the promised action. So, it seems that the 
feature of promise-keeping can lose its status as a reason for in the context of immoral 
promise. Such being the case, it is not a good example to provide support for the 
claim of the atomism of reason. (In fact, it seems more like a counterexample against 
the claim of the atomism of reason.) 
Second, as we presented the view of the atomism of reason, it is a universal 
claim about how all features qua reasons behave. Even if it is true that the feature of 
promise-keeping is a reason for in all contexts it appears, this shows at most that at 
least one feature is a reason for in all contexts. This does not in any way vindicate the 
atomists' universal claim that all features behave in an atomistic way. Although it may 
well be contended that the fact that there is at least one feature that behaves in an 
Here, the immoral promise example is meant to pump your pre-theoretical intuition. Some might 
have a different intuition and insist that the feature of promise-keeping is still a reason for performing 
the action; it is just that its moral significance is outweighed by that of a weightier reason against 
killing. I have to confess that I find this intuition somewhat incredible and do not share it. I even doubt 
if anyone really has it. Admittedly there are cases in which the immorality of the promised action is 
milder such that the feature of promise-keeping is still a reason for performing the action, despite its 
content is immoral. For instance, you promise your friend to tell a lie to save him from undeserved 
embarrassment (Kagan, 1998, p. 125). But the immoral promise example we are considering here is 
nothing like this. Its content is a serious offense against morality. 
atomistic way provides some support for the atomists' universal claim that all features 
behave in an atomistic way, the support it provides is clearly quite limited. 
Now, we can summarize the above two points as follows: 
(1) The atomism of reason is not clearly supported by the promise example. 
(2) Even if it is, the support it receives is very weak. 
In light of these two points, two sorts of reactions are initially plausible. 
(1) It is useless to seek other examples to provide support for atomism of reason. 
For no matter how many examples you find, the second point mentioned above still 
looms large. If the failure of the confirmation theory in philosophy of science teaches 
us anything, it is this: no matter how many times a universal scientific law is 
confirmed by repeated well-controlled experiments, it is never verified (or proved to 
be true), since the scope of a universal scientific law is infinite and the number of 
confirming experiments is finite."" Moreover, even if the experiments provide some 
support for the universal law, the support is very limited, given the universal scope of 
the universal law. Likewise, the universal unlimited claim of the atomism of reason 
will never come to be verified by limited number of examples. The support it receives 
fi-om them is also very limited. 
So in order for the claim of the atomism of reason to be warranted, the right 
thing to do here is not to find more other examples to confirm its claim but to restrict 
its unlimited scope. Instead of making a universal claim about how all features behave, 
it can weaken its claim to an existential claim about how^o/?;^ features behave. If 
some features can be found behaving in an atomistic way, this weakened variation of 
the atomism of reason can be vindicated. We can formalize the view of this weakened 
variation as follows: 
Weak Atomism of Reason: For some (but not all) F, if F is a reason for (or 
against) V-ing in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F 
obtains in C*, then F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: 
action) 
(2) A second sort of reaction that is plausible, at least initially, is this. The 
Here are Karl Popper's (1968, p. 1) related remarks: "Now it is far from obvious, from a logical 
point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how 
numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many 
instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are 
white." 
atomism of reason is completely unmotivated. Even the more restricted variation as 
mentioned above cannot be vindicated. For there are simply no features that behave in 
an atomistic way. For all features, there must be some contexts in which they change 
their status as reasons for to reasons against (or vice versa). (The example of immoral 
promise we mentioned above seems to bear a testament to this). Or to put it differently, 
no features, qua reasons, behave in an atomistic way. This is in fact the view of holism 
of reason. It can be expressed in a more formalized way as follows: 
Holism of Reason: For no F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in 
circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F is 
a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
The idea of holism of reason requires some explanation. Why is it called holism? One 
reason, I think, is that it is analogous in its broad outline to Quine's holism of meaning. 
According to Quine's holism of meaning, a concept does not have empirical content 
of its own that determines its meaning. Rather, its meaning is determined relative to 
the conceptual scheme it is embedded in. Analogously, according to holism of reason, 
no feature has its own constant valence. A feature can be a reason for in one case, but 
a reason against or no reason at all in another. (Or to put it in valence talk, it can carry 
a positive valence in one case, but carry a negative or neutral valence in another.) Its 
valence is determined relative to the context it is embedded in. Another reason for its 
name, I figure, is that a feature qua reason works in a holistic way in the sense that it 
is context-sensitive—\\. can change its valence from positive to negative (or negative 
to positive) in different contexts. To use the height case we mentioned in section § 6.2 
to illustrate, the truth value of the statement 'Bill is the tallest boy in the class' also 
functions holistically in the sense that it can change from true to false (or from false to 
true) in different contexts. In one class, it is true that Bill is the tallest boy in the class. 
In another, it isn't. Likewise, according to holism of reason, a feature can be a reason 
for in one context, but not a reason for in another. Hence, the name 'holism' of reason. 
6.4 Varieties of Atomism and Holism 
Now, a bit of review is in place before we move on. Now, we have the following 
three theories of reason at hand. 
Atomism of Reason: For all F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in 
circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F is 
a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
Weak Atomism of Reason: For some (but not all) F, if F is a reason for (or 
against) V-ing in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F 
obtains in C*, then F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: 
action) 
Holism of Reason: For no F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in 
circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F is 
a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
As we can see from their formulations, the above three theories are distinguished from 
one another by their quantifiers. Or to put it in mundane language, they are 
distinguished from one another by the quantity of features that they contend behave in 
an atomistic way. 
Now, remember that our goal in this chapter is to lay out the argument from the 
atomism of reason. Structurally, it is the following: 
Argument from the Atomism of Reason: 
PI: The atomism of reason is true. 
P2: If the atomism of reason is true, there are necessarily true natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles 
C: There are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral principles. 
So far, we have been trying to figure out how to understand 'the atomism of reason' in 
the above argument. We have argued by way of the immoral promise example that the 
atomism of reason, the claim that all features behave atomistically, does not seem to 
be a promising contender. The feature of promise-keeping is normally a reason for, 
but does not appear to be so in the context of an immoral promise. Hence, it provides 
a counterexample to the universal claim of the atomism of reason. Such being the case, 
a more promising contender seems to be the weak atomism of reason, the view that 
some features behave atomistically. Yet, as we can see from its formulation and the 
formulation of the holism of reason, the weak atomism of reason faces a threat from 
the holism of reason, since they are clearly incompatible. If the holism of reason is 
true, then the weak atomism of reason will be falsified. If the weak atomism of reason 
is falsified, then this would mean that the argument from the atomism of reason is 
doomed for failure, for the falsification of the weak atomism of reason means that the 
only possible candidate that remains to be the right sort of atomism turns out to be a 
failure. Now, how do we proceed from here, if we want to know whether the weak 
atomism of reason is the right sort of atomism of reason to have in the argument from 
the atomism of reason? Of course, we have to know whether the weak atomism of 
reason is true, because that is simply the requirement of PI. 
Such being the case, there are two possible ways to proceed, as far as I can see. 
One is to try to vindicate the claim of holism of reason. If its claim is vindicated, then 
the claim of the weak atomism of reason is automatically falsified (since they are 
clearly incompatible with each other). However, how can we vindicate the claim of 
holism of reason? Dancy (1993, 2004) tries to do this by giving many examples. 
However, this is not a promising route to take, for the claim of holism of reason is a 
universal one. Recall that it claims in effect that no features behave atomistically. It is 
equivalent to the universal claim that all features behave holistically (in the sense that 
a feature that is a reason for in one case might not be so in another). It is impossible to 
vindicate the holists' universal claim by appealing to a limited number of examples 
just as it is impossible to vindicate the atomists' claim by doing so either. 
A more promising way to proceed, I take it, is to try to vindicate the claim of the 
weak atomism of reason. Since its claim is an existential claim, it can be vindicated 
by a limited number of examples. If some convincing examples can be given, then its 
claim can be vindicated. 
In fact, weak atomists have been trying to produce some convincing examples 
over the years to vindicate their claim. However, none of the examples is without 
controversy, or so I will argue. In what follows, we will examine these examples one 
by one. But before we do so, there is a caveat to be noted. Strictly speaking, the claim 
of the weak atomism of reason does not depend on any of the particular examples 
working in an atomistic way. Even if all of these examples turn out to work in a 
holistic way, the weak atomism's claim that some features behave in an atomistic way 
might still hold. For it may well be the case that although those particular examples do 
not work in an atomistic way, some others might do; it is just that we have not found 
them. But still, the best way to vindicate the claim of the weak atomism is of course to 
display some features qua reasons that do behave in an atomistic way. If none of the 
features given by the weak atomists as examples supporting their claim really behaves 
in an atomistic way, this would of course make us doubt whether there are really any 
such features that behave atomistically. At least, there will be no good reasons for us 
to believe that there are. The claim of the weak atomism of reason will thus be cast 
into doubt. 
Now, with all the above preliminaries in place, we can proceed to investigate 
whether the weak atomists can provide us with some convincing examples of the 
features that behave atomistically qua reasons. If they can, the weak atomism will be 
proved to be true. In what follows, I will focus on three types of features weak 
atomists offer as examples of features that behave atomistically: {6 A.\) Specified 
Features (6.4.2) Morally Thick Features (6.4.3) Morally Thin Features 
(6.4.1) Specified Features 
On a certain interpretation of Henry Richardson's specificationism (1990), it claims 
that specified features behave atomistically; that is, specified features qua reasons do 
not change their status as reasons for (or against) from one context to another; only 
unspecified features do. Take the feature of lying for instance. It can change its 
valence from negative to positive. In the normal context, it is a reason against, 
however, if we are playing a Taiwanese poker game called 'bluflfling', then the feature 
of lying is not only not a reason against, it might even be a reason for since it is 
permitted by the rule of the game and makes the game more exciting. It seems fair to 
maintain that the feature of lying qua reason does not behave atomistically, since its 
status as a reason against is undermined in the context of playing a bluffing game. 
However, according to specificationism, the feature of lying qua reason behaves 
;7o«-atomistically (or holistically) only because it is rather unspecified. Once it is 
specified as a feature of lying-in-a-normal-case-where-the-feature-of-playing-a 
bluflTing-game-is-not-involved, then it is always a reason against. Or alternatively, if 
the feature of lying has a positive valence in the bluffing game, then once it is 
specified as a feature of lying-in-a-bluffing-game, then it is always a reason for. 
(6.4.1.1) Cullity's Noimality Objection 
Cullity (2002) contends that there is a serious defect in the above line of reasoning. To 
use the example of lying to illustrate, he contends that the reason against lying in a 
normal case is just that the action has a feature of being a lie, but not that the action 
has a feature of being-a-lie-in-a-normal-case-where-no-feature-of-playing-a-bluffing 
-game-is-involved. Why? The chief reason for this, he contends, is because "the 
explanation it is rational to give of any phenomenon is relative to background 
expectations of normality" (CuUity, 2002, p. 178)."' He gives the following example 
to illustrate this point: 
If the trees next to the vineyard normally flower before the vintage, it may be 
rational to appeal to the fact that they did not in order to explain why the 
vineyard suffered a lot of bird damage this year; but if not, it will not. If the trees 
This line of reasoning is also pursued by Little & Lance (2008) 
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never flower before the vintage, it may be true that had they done so, there would 
not have been a lot of bird damage; but it does not follow that their not flowering 
before the vintage should be included in an explanation of the bird damage. 
(Cullity, 2002, p. 178) 
The moral we can draw from the above example, Cullity thinks, is that "in general, it 
is fallacious to reason that if A would not have happened in the presence of B, the 
absence of B should figure in a rational explanation of why A happened." (2002, p. 
178) To be more concrete, it is fallacious to reason that if the bird damage would not 
have happened in the presence of the trees' flowering, the absence of the trees' 
flowering should figure in a rational explanation of why the bird damage happened. It 
is fallacious because when it is normal that trees do not flower, then the trees' not 
flowering does not figure in a rational explanation of why the bird damage happened. 
Presumably, the bird damage does not always happen when the trees do not flower. 
To apply the above moral back to the example of lying, if the feature of lying 
would not have a negative valence in the presence of the feature of playing a bluffing 
game, it is fallacious to reason that the absence of the feature of playing a bluffing 
game should figure in a rational explanation of why the feature of lying has a negative 
valence. Why is this fallacious? Well, to explain in detail, if the feature of lying 
normally has a positive valence, then if it does not, it may be rational to appeal to the 
absence of the feature of playing in a bluffing game to explain why this is so. 
However, if the feature of lying normally has a negative valence, as it does, then it is 
not rational to appeal to the absence of the feature of playing in the bluffing game to 
explain why this is so, just as it is not rational to appeal to the absence of the trees' 
flowering to explain why the bird damage happened when the trees normally do not 
flower. For the feature of lying does not always have a negative valence in a case 
where the feature of playing in the bluflfing game is absent, just as the bird damage 
does not always happen when the trees do not flower. For instance, the feature of 
lying in the context of lying to a knave to save an innocent life might well have a 
positive valence, but it involves no feature of playing a bluflfing game. 
When the feature of lying normally has a negative valence, the rational 
explanation or reason we expect people to provide for why an individual feature of 
lying has a negative valence is simply because it is a feature of lying, not because it is 
a feature of lying-in-a-context-where-no-feature-of-playing-the-bluflfing-game is 
involved. So to sum up Cullity's discussions, the specified feature of lying in a normal 
context (where the feature of playing the bluffing game is absent) does not play the 
role of reason at all in a normal context. What plays the role of reason in a normal 
context is simply the feature of lying. 
(6.4.1.2) My Criticism of CuUity's Normality Objection 
Despite the initial plausibility of Cullity's objection, I think it ultimately fails for the 
following reason. It is true, as Cullity implicitly contends, that against the background 
that the feature of lying is normally wrong, the absence of the feature of playing a 
bluffing game is not sufficient for a rational explanation for why an individual feature 
of lying has a negative valence, just as against the background that the trees normally 
do not flower, the absence of the trees' flowering is not sufficient for a rational 
explanation for why there is bird damage either. For there are many cases where there 
is no feature of playing a bluffing game involved, but still the feature of lying does 
not have a negative valence. For instance, the feature of lying in the context of lying 
to save an innocent life might well have a positive valence, but it involves no feature 
of playing a bluffing game. 
However, the absence of the feature of playing a bluffing game is nevertheless 
necessary, to explain why a feature of lying has a negative valence. For if the feature 
of playing a bluffing game were present, then the feature of lying would not have a 
negative valence. So it seems that the absence of the feature of playing a bluffing 
game should figure into a rational explanation for why a feature of lying has a 
negative valence even when it normally has a negative valence. It is true, as Cullity 
(2002, p. 174) noted, that practically speaking, it might sound odd to offer as a reason 
why an individual feature of lying has a negative valence by claiming that we are in a 
context where there is no feature of playing a bluffing game is involved. However, as 
Cullity himself admitted, a specified feature when offered as a reason need not sound 
like music to our ears. So Cullity's objection that specified feature cannot be reasons 
in a normal context cannot be sustained. 
(6.4.1.3) My Objection to Specificationism: 'Specification' Unspecified 
I think that the real problem with specified feature qua reason lies in the fact that there 
is little evidence for us to believe that once a reason gets fully specified, its valence 
does not change. To begin with, specification comes in degrees. It is not clear what 
really counts as a specified feature. True, 'the feature of lying-in-a-bluffmg-game' is 
more specified than 'the feature of lying'. Nevertheless, its valence still can change. 
There is usually no reason against lying when we are playing a bluffing card game. 
However, if doing so will for some reason cause a participant to hurt the other 
participants when he finds out he is being lied to, then perhaps lying in a bluffing 
game does not always carry a neutral or positive valence; it may carry a negative 
valence, too. So, does 'the feature of lying-in-a-bluffing-card-game' count as a 
specified feature? If yes, the view that specified features work atomistically is 
apparently falsified, for as we have seen, even the more specified feature can change 
its valence too. If the answer is no because the feature is not specified enough, then 
there will be the further question of whether all the possible exceptions it might 
encounter can be exhaustively included into its more detailed specification. There 
does not appear to be any evidence that they can. Before such evidence is produced, I 
think it is premature to conclude that there are specified features that behave 
atomistically. 
Perhaps some might counter that what we have shown so far at most is just that 
there is no specified enough feature of lying such that it can behave atomistically, but 
this does not mean that we cannot find other features that are specified enough that 
can do so. Fair enough. In fact, Cullity (2002, p. 182), despite his earlier attack on the 
idea of seeing specified feature as a reason in a normal context, gestures at the feature 
of inflicting suffering on others for your own enjoyment as always carrying a negative 
valence. However, the question to ask here is: does the feature include a law 
executioner's taking delight and comfort in seeing that the unjust and devious suffer 
what they deserve? If yes, it is not entirely clear to me that such a feature always 
carries a negative valence. If no, the burden is on the weak atomists who hold the 
view that specified features behave atomistically to tell us exactly what such a 
specified feature includes. So still, the evidence is not conclusive for the claim that 
there is a specified feature that behaves atomistically. 
(6.4.2) Morally Thick Features 
On a certain interpretation of Crisp (2000) and McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 
they hold the view that morally thick features behave atomistically qua reasons. Let's 
call them thick feature atomists for short. They attempt to justify this view by way of 
a distinction between primary reason and secondary reason."^ In what follows, I will, 
first of all, recap the idea of morally thick features. Then, I will proceed to explain 
why Crisp, McNaughton and Rawling think that the distinction between primary 
reason and secondary reason can help to justify their view. To a first approximation, 
the idea is that if morally thick features are primary reasons, they will behave 
atomistically since primary reasons behave atomistically. Finally, I will argue that 
there is no good reason for us to believe that morally thick features are primary 
reasons. 
Crisp (2000) makes a similar distinction, using a different terminology. His distinction is between 
ultimate reasons and non-ultimate reasons. But nothing hangs on using any particular terminology. 
(6.4.2. l)Morally Thick Features Recapped 
First thing first, morally thick features, as we have explained in chapter 1, are features 
that are thick with cultural implications such that only insiders sharing the same 
culture can fully understand their meaning. Take filial piety for instance. Only people 
who share the Chinese culture can understand why a seemingly preposterous dance 
performance of an old man dressed up in colorful costumes counts as an act of filial 
piety when performed before his aged parents. To put it differently, only people with 
the relevant cultural vision can tell whether the dance is an act of filial piety. The 
lesson here can be generalized. It also takes people from the same culture to know 
whether telling falsehood is an act of dishonesty, or whether eating animals is an act 
of cruelty, etc, since moral features such as dishonesty or cruelty are also thick with 
cultural implications. 
(6.4.2.2)Primary Reason VS. Secorida)y Reason 
According to Crisp (2000) and McNaughton and Rawling (2000), the realm of (moral) 
reasons can be divided into primary reasons and secondary reasons. A feature is a 
primary reason for or against acting in a certain way if it is always a reason for or 
against acting in that way, whereas a feature is a secondary reason (or non-primary) 
for or against acting in a certain way if it "brings about" a primary reason for or 
against acting in that way. For instance, the feature of lying is merely a secondary 
rather than a primary reason against performing the action, because it is not always a 
reason against taking the action. In the case where we are playing a Taiwanese card 
game called 'Bluffing', according to the rules of which lying is permitted, the feature 
of lying is not a reason against lying in the card game at all; indeed, it even provides a 
reason for doing so because doing so adds to the excitement of the card game. The 
feature of lying only provides a reason against taking that action when it "brings 
about" a feature of dishonesty, which is a primary reason, according to McNaughton 
and Rawling, against performing the action. 
(6.4.2.3)Are Morally Thick Features Primary Reasons? 
Now, as we have seen above, primary reasons behave atomistically. So if morally 
thick features are primary reasons, then they will certainly behave atomistically. The 
natural question to ask here is: are morally thick features primary reasons? 
In order to answer this question, we need to focus in a bit on the concept of a 
primary reason. What does it mean exactly? From the discussion above, we can gather 
one of its central characteristics: 
(i) Explanation: It provides an explanation for why a feature qua secondary 
reason can have different valences 
The above characteristic requires some explanation. Let's use the feature of lying to 
illustrate. As we have argued, it can be a reason against in one context, but not so in 
another. Presumably, it does not do so by magic. So, how it can switch its valence in 
different contexts requires some explanation. The primary role of a primary reason is 
to provide such an explanation. A natural explanation would be along this line: the 
feature of lying is a reason against if it brings about a feature of dishonesty whereas if 
it does not, then it is not a reason against. Here, the feature of dishonesty plays the 
role of a primary reason, for it helps to explain why the feature of lying switches its 
valences in different contexts. In order for the feature of dishonesty to play the role of 
a primary reason, it is supposed to carry a constant negative valence. Otherwise, it is 
hard to explain why, when it is brought about, the feature that brings it about is 
conferred the status of being a reason against. Here, we can derive a second 
characteristic of a primary reason: 
(ii) Atomic: Any feature that plays the role of a primary reason behaves 
atomistically. 
In the case we have just given, the feature of dishonesty does seem to play the role of 
a primary reason, because it seems to provide a nice explanation for why the feature 
of lying switches its valence (i.e. it seems to satisfy (i)). Such being the case, the 
feature of dishonesty seems to be a primary reason. And according to (ii), it behaves 
atomistically. From this, we can conclude that at least the morally thick feature of 
dishonesty behaves atomistically. The same line of reasoning may well be applied to 
other morally thick features as well. Take the feature of cruelty for instance. It seems 
to provide an explanation for why the feature of causing pain has a negative valence 
in the case of torturing a cat but not so when it is constitutive of giving a shot to a 
child to inoculate him against bird flu. It has a negative valence in the former case 
because it brings about the feature of cruelty whereas in the latter case it does not 
because it does not bring about the feature of cruelty. So feature of cruelty seems to 
play the role of a primary reason too, and thus seems to behave atomistically. To 
conclude, it seems that morally thick features qua reasons play the role of primary 
reasons and thus have a constant valence. 
(6.4.2.4)My Objection to Thick Feature Atomism 
The thick feature atomists' line of reasoning can be reconstructed and summarized as 
follows: 
Stage 1: There is a distinction between primary and secondary reasons. The 
primary reason plays the functional role of explaining the valence-switching 
phenomenon of secondary reasons. If there is no primary reason, the 
valence-switching phenomenon of secondary reasons will be left explained, 
which is apparently absurd. So there must be some features that play the role of 
primary reason. 
Stage 2: Whatever plays the role of primary reason must have a constant valence. 
For if it did not, it would lose its explanatory power and hence could not be a 
primary reason. From the examples we have seen, morally thick features seem to 
play the role of primary reason because they seem to provide good explanations 
for the valence-switching phenomenon of secondary reasons. So, morally thick 
features must have a constant valence. 
I think that there is something wrong about both stages. Let me explain. First of all, 
what's wrong with stage 1 is the statement, "If there is no primary reason, the 
valence-switching phenomenon of secondary reasons will be left explained". This is 
certainly not the case. The valence-switching phenomenon may well be explained by 
the feature's sensitivity to the context. Take the feature of lying for instance. It is a 
reason against in a normal context, but it is not so in the context of playing a bluffing 
game. The change of the context explains the change of valence. So even if there is no 
such thing as primary reason, the valence-switching phenomenon can still get 
explained. There is no need to invoke the notion of primary reason in the first place 
unless we think that the explanation for the valence-switching phenomenon can only 
be provided by a primary reason. However, there is no good reason to think so. 
On the other hand, even if the notion of primary reason is needed to explain the 
valence-switching phenomenon, it is not clear that morally thick features play the role 
of primary reasons. Morally thick features do not provide a good explanation for the 
valence-switching phenomenon as they firstly appear. This is where stage 2 gets it 
wrong. Take the feature of dishonesty for instance, it is claimed by the thick feature 
atomists that when it is brought about, it makes the feature of lying to be a reason 
against. However, this is not always the case, there are cases in which the feature of 
dishonesty is brought about but the feature of lying seems to be not a reason against, 
or at least, not clearly. It seems that telling your three-year-old kid Santa Claus is 
coming to town on Christmas eve is dishonest as you clearly know there is no Santa 
Claus. However, it is not clearly the case that the feature of dishonesty makes the 
feature of lying as such wrong-making, especially if you make up yourself in the 
appearance of Santa Claus and show up in front of your kid on Christmas Eve. Similar 
things could be said about the feature of cruelty. It is claimed by thick feature atomists 
that when the feature of cruelty is brought about, it makes the feature of causing pain 
to be a reason against. When it is not brought about, the feature of causing pain is not 
a reason against. Again, this is not clearly the case. There are cases in which the 
feature of cruelty is brought about, but the feature of causing pain is not a reason 
against, or at least, not clearly. For instance, causing pain to an infantry soldier by 
ordering him to inhale tear gas in the gas chamber is cruel, but it is not clearly a 
reason against, especially when it is part of the training and the soldier is about to be 
sent to the battlefield of Iraq. So I suspect that morally thick features do not play the 
role of primary reasons, for they do not really provide a good explanation, contrary to 
what they might appear initially, for why a feature as secondary reason changes its 
valence. It is not as if when the features of dishonesty or cruelty are brought about, the 
features that bring them about will necessarily have a negative valence, as it is 
implicitly contended by thick feature atomists. So I suspect that morally thick features 
in general cannot claim to have the constant valence primary reasons have. 
(6.4.2.5) Is the Feature of Injustice Exceptional? 
Here, we have to note that although in the last sub-section, § 6.4.2.4,1 have argued 
that there is no good reason to believe that morally thick features such as cruelty or 
dishonesty play the role of primary reasons, it can still be coherently maintained that 
there is good reason to believe that other morally thick features do. In fact, Crisp 
(2000, p. 37) contends that the feature of injustice, as a morally thick feature"''*, plays 
the role of a primary reason. It is somewhat exceptional amongst the morally thick 
features, in that unlike other morally thick features, it seems to provide a good 
explanation for why some features as secondary reasons change their valences. For 
instance, it seems to provide a good explanation for why returning what one has 
borrowed is a reason for in a normal context but not so when the thing borrowed is 
stolen. The former case does not bring about a feature of injustice whereas the latter 
does. So the feature of injustice seems to provide a good explanation for why the 
Some contend that the feature of (in)justice is not a morally thick feature; rather, it is morally thin. 
But I shall ignore this complication here. 
feature of returning what one has borrowed can have different valences. However, like 
all other morally thick features we have discussed, I suspect that there are also cases 
in which the feature of injustice is brought about, but this does not make the feature of 
returning what one has borrowed a reason against. For instance, returning a stolen 
thing to your thief friend brings about a feature of injustice, however, returning a 
stolen thing might not be a reason against when it is the only way to save your thief 
friend's mother, and especially when you know that the owner of the stolen thing 
couldn't care less about it. So the fact that a feature brings about the feature of 
injustice does not provide a good explanation for why the feature is a reason against 
(or why the feature has a negative valence), because as the example shows, there are 
cases in which the feature of injustice is brought about but this does not make the 
other feature a reason against. 
However, Crisp (2000, p. 37) takes issue with the above line of reasoning. This is 
due to the thesis of the unity of virtue he implicitly holds. The idea is that the 
requirements of virtues (or at least the core ones) must be of a unity and cannot 
conflict with each other. Hence, if an action satisfies the requirement of one virtue, it 
must satisfy the requirements of other virtues as well. The thesis of the unity of virtue 
can be stated as follows: 
The Unity of Virtue: An action cannot satisfy the requirement of one virtue 
45 without satisfying the requirements of all virtues. 
There can be two interpretations of this statement. On a strong interpretation, the 
unity of virtue implies that if an action has the feature of justice, it has the feature of 
other virtues such as benevolence, kindness or honesty as well. That is, whenever I 
perform a just action, I perform an action of benevolence, kindness or honesty as well. 
However, this strong interpretation seems somewhat incredible, as an action of justice 
might involve nothing about truth-telling at all. It is not clear how it can necessarily 
be an action of honesty as well. So this strong interpretation of the thesis of the unity 
of virtue seems to be a non-starter. However, there is another weaker interpretation 
Crisp can reasonably adopt. On the weaker interpretation, the unity of virtue does not 
imply the above. Rather, it implies that if an action has the feature of justice, it must 
satisfy the requirement of other virtues in the sense that it cannot violate them. So 
when I perform a just action, I do not thereby perform an action of benevolence and 
kindness, but it is impossible for my action to violate the requirements of benevolence 
and kindness. So the idea of a just Scrooge (someone whose actions are just but not 
benevolent and kind) is just incoherent. 
Cf. Penner (1973), Wolf (2007) 
According to the unity of virtue thesis as elaborated above, Crisp (2000) 
contends that it cannot be the case that returning the stolen thing to save your thief 
friend's mother, while being a feature of benevolence, brings about a feature of 
injustice. For this implies that the requirement of benevolence conflicts with that of 
justice. To be more specific, it implies that while the feature of benevolence requires 
returning the stolen thing to your thief friend, the feature of justice requires the 
opposite. (This is why returning the stolen thing, while fulfilling the requirement of 
benevolence, brings about a feature of injustice.) But this just conflicts with the thesis 
of the unity of virtue, for the thesis of the unity of virtue says that the requirements of 
virtue cannot conflict. 
Such being the case, Crisp maintains that to think that the feature of justice 
requires not returning the stolen thing to your thief friend in such a context is to 
misunderstand the meaning of justice. It requires no such thing, in view of the fact 
that returning the stolen thing to your thief fi^iend can save his mother's life. Hence, 
returning the stolen thing to your thief friend in such a context does not really bring 
about a feature of injustice. So it is not a good (counter)example against seeing the 
feature of injustice as providing a good explanation for the valence-switching 
phenomenon. The claim that whenever the feature of injustice is brought about, it 
makes the feature that brings it about a reason against can still go through. 
In reply to Crisp, I go along with Nussbaum (1986) in rejecting the thesis of the 
unity of virtue. As Nussbaum correctly points out, the understanding of virtues in a 
way such that they can never conflict often requires distorting the meaning of the 
virtues. She illustrates this point by Sophocles's Antigone. As Creon, one of the chief 
protagonists in the play, serves as a representative of the city, loyalty requires him not 
to honor treachery by arranging for Polynices' corpse to be buried within Attic 
territory. But on the other hand, as a family member, familial benevolence requires 
him to arrange for the burial. Such being the case, the audience would expect to find 
in Creon, as Nussbaum puts it, "an extremely painful tension between these two roles 
and requirements." But to their surprise, what they would see is "a complete absence 
of tension and conflict." For Creon's use of the virtuous terms is "wrenched away 
from their ordinary use, so that they apply to things and persons simply in virtue of 
their connection to the well-being of the city, which Creon has established as the 
single intrinsic good." Nussbaum (1986, p. 55) continues: 
[Creon] uses the full range of the traditional ethical vocabulary—but not in the 
traditional way. These words no longer refer to features of the world that are 
separate from and potentially in conflict with the general good of the city; for 
Creon acknowledges no such separate goods. Through this aggressively 
revisionary strategy, he secures singleness and the absence of tension, (emphasis 
added) 
Similarly, holding the view that the feature of justice requires returning the stolen 
thing to your thief friend to save his mother, I suspect, commits one to the same sort 
of "revisionary strategy" Creon commits himself to. It ameliorates the conflicts by 
distorting the meaning of justice such that it can never conflict with the requirement 
of benevolence. Although the requirements of justice and those of benevolence are in 
harmony in many cases, there is no good reason for us to believe that they always are. 
(6.4.2.6) A Caveat 
A caveat to be noted here is that the discussion of the morally thick features involves a 
lot of examples that are meant to pump the readers' intuitions. These examples might 
be controversial. Some readers might have very different intuitions. However, I want 
to point out that these examples are not so much meant to destroy the claim of thick 
feature atomists as to cast some doubt on it. To the extent that the examples we gave 
are controversial, this is sufficient for our purpose. For it means that thick feature 
atomists' case is not entirely clear. 
(6.4.3) Morally Thin Features 
Some might argue that although morally thick features might not behave atomistically, 
morally thin features do. Let's call those who contend that morally thin features 
behave atomistically the thin feature atomists for short. As we have explained in 
chapter 1, morally thin features are features that are thin with cultural implications 
such that even an outsider can know what they mean. Typical examples are rightness 
(or wrongness) and goodness (or badness). It does not take an insider to know that 
(moral) rightness and goodness means, inter alia, the thing to be done. 
Thin feature atomists' claim is not much discussed in the literature, perhaps 
because it seems to be trivially true. The feature of (moral) rightness and goodness 
qua reason seems to be always a (moral) reason for. Once an action has the feature of 
(moral) rightness or goodness, this simply constitutes a (moral) reason for doing it. 
Having said so, it is important to note that Simon Kirchin is a rare exception who 
takes exception to the thin feature atomists' claim. Indeed, Kirchin (2007, pp. 31-32) 
gestures at the possibility that the feature of goodness may not behave atomistically. It 
may not even be a reason, under the 'buck-passing account'. Here is what he says: 
Some might wish to defend a buck-passing account of goodness. Instead of 
goodness being a feature that can generate reasons, it is rather a feature that is 
nothing over and above a summation of some other features, such as kindness 
and justice, that a possible course of action might have and, hence, by itself 
goodness cannot generate reasons to act. Any reasons there are to pursue the 
action stem from its kindness, not from its goodness (Hence, when considering 
what reasons one has to act, goodness 'passes the buck'.) 
If Kirchin's remark is right, then thin feature atomists' claim about the thin feature of 
goodness always being a reason for may well be falsified. However, their claim about 
the thin feature of rightness always being a reason for can still go through. 
(6.4.4) Summary 
In this section, section § 6.4, we have been considering whether the view of the weak 
atomism, the view that some features behave atomistically, can be vindicated. Three 
sorts of features are invoked to support this view: specified features, morally thick 
features and morally thin features. 
So far, we have argued that there is no good reason for us to believe that 
specified features behave atomistically and that the case for morally thick features 
behaving in such a way looks pretty suspicious. The only clear exception is perhaps 
the morally thin features, especially the thin feature of moral rightness. It seems to 
behave atomistically and thus seems to support weak atomists' claim that some 
features behave in an atomistic way. Such being the case, 'the atomism of reason' in 
the argument from the atomism of reason can seem to be interpreted as the weak 
atomism of reason (or as thin feature atomism in particular). 
However, in the next section, section § 6.5,1 will argue that neither thick feature 
atomism nor thin feature atomism is the right sort of atomism to have in the argument 
from the atomism of reason, since even if they are true, what they establish are 
moral-moral moral principles. They cannot establish the conclusion of the argument, 
i.e. pro tanto principlists' claim that there are natural-moral moral principles of the 
relevant kind. 
6.5 The Varieties of Atomism Required by the Argument 
Now, with all varieties of atomism in place, we can further elucidate the 
argument from the atomism of reason. As a reminder, the argument can be stated as 
follows: 
Argument from the Atomism o f Reason: 
P I : The atomism o f reason is true. 
P2: I f the atomism o f reason is true, there are necessarily true natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles. 
C: There are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral principles. 
What sort o f atomism we have discussed is required by the argument? To answer this 
question, it is important for us to remember the chief purpose o f the argument. Its 
chief purpose is to establish pro tanto principlists' claim that there are necessarily true 
natural-moral pro tanto moral principles. So now the question can be re-construed as 
the following question: what sort o f atomism can help to establish the pro tanto 
principlists' claim that there are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral 
principles? Now, our choices are as follows: 
Atomism of Reason: all features behave atomistically. 
Weak Atomism of Reason: some (but not all) features behave atomistically. 
Specificationism: specified features behave atomistically. 
Thick Feature Atomism: morally thick features behave atomistically. 
Thin Feature Atomism: morally thin features behave atomistically. 
Which amongst the above choices is the right sort o f atomism to have in the argument 
from the atomism o f reason? Apparently, the right sort o f atomism has to be true. This 
is what the first premise ( P I ) o f the argument requires. And as we have argued in 
sections §§ 6.3 and 6.4, there does not appear to be any good reason for us to believe 
that atomism of reason or specificationism is true. (As a reminder, atomism of reason 
faces the counterexample o f immoral promise whereas specificationism has difficulty 
clarifying the notion of a specified feature.) Although I have also cast my doubts on 
thick feature atomism in section § 6 .4 ,1 shall let it pass the test at this stage, for I 
don't think it can survive the next test, or so I will argue. So now, by method of 
elimination, we are left with the choices below: 
Weak Atomism o f Reason: some (but not all) features behave atomistically. 
Thick Feature Atomism: morally thick features behave atomistically. 
Thin Feature Atomism: morally thin features behave atomistically. 
Now, which amongst them can satisfy the second premise (P2) o f the argument? That 
is, which amongst them, if true, will establish P2's consequent that there are 
necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral principles? To answer this question, 
some preliminary work is necessary. To begin with, as a reminder, if a feature behaves 
atomistically, this just means that the feature has a constant valence. Take the feature 
of lying for instance. If it behaves atomistically, this just means that the feature of 
lying has a constant negative valence or, to put it differently, the feature of lying is 
always wrong. If the feature of lying is always wrong, then a corresponding pro tanto 
moral principle that says so is true. If it is true, it is necessarily true, because the 
feature of lying is always wrong. Besides, the corresponding pro tanto moral principle 
is a natural-moral moral principle, because it connects a natural feature, the feature of 
lying, with a moral feature, the feature of wrongness. 
With the above preliminary in place, we can now proceed to examine whether 
thick feature atomism and thin feature atomism are the right sorts of atomism to have 
in the argument from the atomism of reason. Let's start with thick feature atomism. As 
we have mentioned in the above preliminary, if a feature behaves atomistically, this 
just means it has a constant valence. So, if a morally thick feature behaves 
atomistically, this just means that it has a constant valence. Take the feature of 
injustice for instance. If it behaves atomistically, this just means that it has a constant 
negative valence or it is always wrong. If so, then a corresponding pro tanto moral 
principle that says so is true. Now, here comes the rub: is it a natural-moral moral 
principle? If it is not, then thick feature atomism does not really satisfy the 
requirement of P2, for P2's consequent is that there are natural-moral moral 
principles of the relevant kind. Unfortunately, the sort of moral principles thick 
feature atomism establishes is not natural-moral moral principles. Rather, they are 
what we call moral-moral principles, for they connect a morally thick feature, the 
feature of injustice in the current case, with a morally thin feature, the feature of 
rightness in the current case. So even if thick feature atomism is true, the moral 
principles it establishes are not the sort of moral principles we want. So it is not the 
right sort of atomism to have in the argument from the atomism of reason. 
A similar line can be run against the idea that thin feature atomism is the right 
sort of atomism to be had in the argument from the atomism of reason. For even if 
morally thin features behave atomistically and thus have a constant valence, the sort 
of moral principles thin feature atomism establishes are moral-moral principles, for 
they connect morally thin features, the features of rightness or goodness in the current 
case, with the same sort of morally thin features, the features of rightness or goodness. 
Since the kind of moral principles required by the argument are the natural-moral 
ones, thin feature atomism is not the right sort of atomism to have in the argument 
from the atomism of reason, either. 
Now, by method of elimination, we are only left with the following choice: 
Weak Atomism of Reason: some (but not all) features behave atomistically. 
Can it pass the test by satisfying P2? One thing we can learn from the failure of thick 
feature atomism and thin feature atomism to be the right sort of atomism is that in 
order for any variety of atomism of reason to establish the right kind of moral 
principles, the natural-moral ones, it has to be about the behavior of natural features. 
For only when natural features behave atomistically would it be possible for the kind 
of atomism of reason in question to establish natural-moral moral principles. Take the 
feature of lying for instance. It is a natural feature. If it behaves atomistically, then, as 
we have mentioned, it has a constant valence, or to put it differently, it is always 
wrong(-making), and a corresponding moral principle that says so is true. And the 
corresponding moral principle is a natural-moral one because it connects a natural 
feature, the feature of lying in the current case, with a moral feature, the feature of 
wrongness. Such being the case, if weak atomism is to be the right sort of atomism of 
reason to have in the argument, it seems plausible to think that there is at least the 
following constraint it has to satisfy: it has to be about the behavior of a natural 
feature. So it seems that weak atomism has to be interpreted in the following way in 
order for it to be the right sort of atomism: 
Natural Feature Atomism: natural features behave atomistically. 
If the above doctrine is true, then we can get natural-moral moral principles of the 
relevant kind. It can pass the test by satisfying P2. Now the question is: is it true? Or 
to put it differently, does it satisfy the requirement of PI? I will postpone the 
discussion of question until next chapter. For present purpose, we need only to point 
out that the right sort of atomism need not be a universal claim as implied by natural 
feature atomism. For the consequent of P2 is an existential claim but not a universal 
one. It claims in effect that there are some moral principles of the relevant kind. So, so 
long as there are some natural features that behave atomistically, then it would follow 
from this that there are some corresponding natural-moral moral principles of the 
relevant kind. This would suffice for the purpose of the argument from the atomism of 
reason. Such being the case, the right sort of atomism to be had in the argument might 
well be the following: 
Weak Natural Feature Atomism: some (but not all) natural features behave 
atomistically. 
In chapter 7,1 will discuss several objections to natural feature atomism and weak 
natural feature atomism. For now, let's just keep in mind that natural feature atomism 
and weak natural feature atomism seem to be the only promising candidates that 
remain at the current stage. If they turn out to be false, or not properly supported by 
any evidence, then the prospect for the argument from the atomism of reason to 
establish pro tanto principlism looks bleak. 
6.6 The Step from Atomism to Pro Tanto Principlism 
Before we move on to the next chapter to discuss the objections to the argument from 
the atomism of reason, there is one issue that needs to be further clarified. That is, 
what is the argument from the atomism an argument for? The argument from the 
atomism of reason, as we presented it, is an argument that has been advanced to 
establish pro tanto principlism. However, we have to note that the idea of the atomism 
of reason actually underlies many kinds of principlism we discussed in chapters 1 and 
2. If so, why is it invoked to provide exclusive support for pro tanto principlism? Why 
not appeal to it to support other kinds of principlism, especially absolute principlism, 
which is one of the major concerns in this thesis? In short, the step from atomism to 
pro tanto principlism needs to be clarified. 
To address the above-mentioned issues, the logical relations between the 
atomism of reason and these various kinds of principlism need to be clarified. Here, 
there are several things we need to take note of First, since we have argued that only 
natural feature atomism and weak natural feature atomism remain to be plausible 
candidates for the right sorts of atomism to be had in the argument from the atomism 
of reason, in what follows we shall only focus on their relations with various sorts of 
principlism. Second, since the two major kinds of principlism, i.e. absolute and pro 
tanto principlism, we are concerned with are both of the necessary natural-moral 
kinds, in what follows, when we consider how natural feature atomism and weak 
feature atomism logically relate to various kinds of principlism, we will operate on the 
assumption that these principlisms are of the necessary natural-moral kinds, too. The 
only difference between these various kinds of principlism lie in whether they are of 
the absolute or the non-absolute kind. Now, with the above two points in mind, we 
can proceed to clarify how natural feature atomism and weak natural feature atomism 
relate to various kinds of principlism. 
(6.6.1) pro tanto principlism 
Sufficient: natural feature atomism, and weak natural feature atomism 
Necessary: weak natural feature atomism 
Pro tanto principlism is the view that there are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto 
moral principles. As we have argued in section § 6.5, both natural feature atomism 
and weak natural feature atomism, if true, are sufficient to establish pro tanto 
principlism. On the other hand, weak natural feature atomism (but not natural feature 
atomism) is a necessary condition for pro tanto principlism. For pro tanto principlism 
is an existential claim, it would only take some natural features instead oiall natural 
features to behave atomistically to establish its truth. However, if no natural features 
behave atomistically, then it would not be clear how pro tanto principlism can be true. 
So, weak natural feature atomism is a necessary condition for pro tanto principlism. 
(6.6.2) other-things-being-equalprinciplism 
Sufficient: natural feature atomism, and weak natural feature atomism 
Necessary: weak natural feature atomism 
Other-things-being-equal principlism is the view that there are 
other-things-being-equal moral principles such as 'other things being equal, lying is 
morally worse than not lying'. Suppose that other things can indeed be held equal, 
then the most plausible explanation for the truth of the principle 'other things being 
equal, lying is morally worse than not lying' is that the feature of lying is always 
wrong-making whereas the feature of not lying is always right-making (or at least 
morally neural). So the truth of the other-things-being-equal moral principle 
presupposes the fact that there must be some features that behave in an atomistic way. 
So if there are some true other-things-being-equal moral principles, as 
other-things-being-equal principlism implies, this means that there must be at least 
some natural features that work in an atomistic way. So weak natural feature atomism 
is necessary for the truth of other-things-being-equal principlism. If no features 
behave atomistically, it would not be clear how other-things-being-equal principlism 
could be true. 
On the other hand, both natural feature atomism and weak natural feature 
atomism seem sufficient to establish the truth of other-things-being-equal principlism 
(on the supposition that other things can indeed be held equal). For instance, suppose 
that the feature of lying is always wrong-making whereas the feature of not lying is 
always right-making (or morally neutral), then surely when other things are held equal, 
then lying is morally worse than not lying. Then, the corresponding 
other-things-being-equal moral principle that claims so is true. 
(6.6.3) absolute principlism 
Sufficient: none 
Necessary: weak natural feature atomism 
Absolute principlism, as we presented it in chapter 1, is the view that there are 
absolute moral principles such as 'lying is wrong'. Apparently, neither natural feature 
atomism nor weak natural feature aioxmsm suffices to establish its truth. For they only 
claim respectively that all or some features, when functioning as a reason, always 
carry the same moral valence. They do not claim that an action always carries the 
same moral valence or property. An action can have many features such that it may 
well be the case that one of its features is constantly right-making but the action, due 
to the other features it has, is not overall right. For instance, it may well be the case 
that the feature of promise-keeping is constantly right-making but the action of 
promise-keeping is not because it might involve other features such as the feature of 
disregarding the victims of a car accident who are in desperate need for help, as 
mentioned in our earlier example, such that the action of keeping the promise is not 
right in that context. 
On the other hand, however, weak natural feature atomism is necessary for the 
truth of absolute principlism. For if absolute principlism is true at all, there must be 
some reasons for us to perform (or avoid) the sort of actions enjoined (or prohibited) 
by the true absolute moral principles. For instance, if there is a true absolute moral 
principle against killing, then there must be a constant reason against killing. If no 
features carry a constant valence in different contexts, viz. if weak natural feature 
atomism is false, then it is not clear how there can be a constant reason against killing. 
So if there are some absolute moral principles, there must be at least some features 
that carry a constant valence. That is, the truth of absolute principlism must depend on 
the truth of weak atomism of reason. 
(6.6.4) ceteris paribus principlism 
Sufficient: none 
Necessary: weak natural feature atomism 
Ceteris paribus principlism, as supported by Little and Lance (2008), is the view that 
there are true ceteris paribus moral principles, such as 'ceteris paribus, lying is wrong'. 
It means that, according to Little and Lance, it is in the nature of the feature of lying 
that it is wrong-making. However, neither natural feature atomism nor weak natural 
feature atomism suffices to establish the truth of ceteris paribus principlism. Why? 
Well, this is because both kinds of atomism of reason, as we presented them, are 
claims of de dicto necessity, whereas the claim of ceteris paribus principlism is a 
claim of de re necessity. Since a claim of de dicto necessity does not entail a claim of 
de necessity, neither natural feature atomism of reason nor weak natural feature 
atomism is sufficient for ceteris paribus principlism. Take the feature of lying to 
illustrate this. Let's suppose that both natural feature atomism and weak natural are 
true about it such that the way it behaves is atomistic. Does this mean that ceteris 
paribus principlism is true? No, it doesn't. If the feature of lying behaves atomistically, 
this means that it is wrong in all contexts. We can translate this claim into the 
following de dicto claim of necessity: necessarily, if x is a feature of lying, then it is 
wrong-making. By contrast, the claim of ceteris paribus principlism, when construed 
in terms of the nature of a thing, is, I take it, a claim of de re necessity. Its claim that it 
is in the nature of the feature of lying that it is wrong-making can be understood as the 
claim that if x is a feature of lying, then it is necessarily wrong-making. The de dicto 
claim expressed respectively by natural feature atomism and weak natural feature 
atomism does not suffice to establish the de re claim of ceteris paribus principlism, for 
the former does not carry any ontological commitment to the nature of a thing. Let me 
illustrate this with an analogy. 
(1) Necessarily (The Queen of England is a queen) 
(2) The Queen of England is necessarily a queen. 
(1) is a de dicto claim whereas (2) is a de re claim. The truth of (1) does not suffice to 
establish the truth of (2). In fact, while (1) is true, (2) is actually false. It is certainly 
not the case that the Queen of England is necessarily a queen. She might not be a 
queen should the royal system be abolished in England. (Or to put it differently, being 
a queen certainly is not the nature of the Queen of England.) Likewise, to return to our 
own case, the de dicto claims of both kinds of atomism do not suffice to establish the 
de re claim of ceteris paribus principlism. For just as (I) might be true while (2) 
comes out to be false, it might well be the case that the de dicto claim of natural 
feature atomism or weak natural feature atomism is true while the de re claim of the 
ceteris paribus principlism is false. Neither natural feature atomism nor weak natural 
feature atomism is sufficient to establish ceteris paribus principlism. 
However, weak natural feature atomism seems necessary for the truth of ceteris 
paribus principlism. Let's stick with our example of the feature of lying to illustrate 
this. If the feature of lying is de re necessarily wrong-making, as ceteris paribus 
principlism claims, then de dicto necessarily it is wrong-making. For it seems 
incoherent to maintain that it is in the nature of the feature of lying that it is 
wrong-making, as the de re necessity claim implies, and that it is possible that it is not 
wrong-making. If so, it seems impossible that the de re necessity claim of ceteris 
paribus principlism is true while the claim of weak natural feature atomism is false. 
For there must be some features, when functioning as reasons, that work in an 
atomistic way in order for ceteris paribus principlism to be true at all. Weak natural 
feature atomism is a necessary condition for ceteris paribus principlism. 
How about natural feature atomism, is it necessary too? No, it is not, for ceteris 
paribus principlism is an existential claim whereas natural feature atomism is a 
universal claim. It need not be the case that all features have to behave atomistically 
in order for the existential claim of ceteris paribus principlism to obtain. 
(6.6.5) that s-itprinciplism 
Sufficient: none 
Necessary: weak natural feature atomism 
That's-it principlism, as endorsed by Holton (2002), is the view that there are some 
true that's-it moral principles, such as 'if x is killing and that's it, then x is wrong'. As 
we have explained in chapter 2, the that's-it moral principle only has a truth value in 
the context of an argument. To use the true that's-it moral principle about killing to 
illustrate, it is true when an action has the feature of killing and that's it (or there are 
no more morally relevant features). It is not clear how the truth of natural feature 
atomism or the truth of weak natural feature atomism, is sufficient to establish the 
truth of that's-it principlism. Let's suppose that natural feature atomism and weak 
natural feature atomism are true about the feature of killing such that it has a constant 
negative valence in all contexts. However, this in itself does not tell us anything about 
the moral status of the action of killing, which is what that's-it moral principle 
purports to tell us. So, neither natural feature atomism nor weak natural feature 
atomism seem to be a sufficient condition for that's-it principlism. However, the weak 
natural feature atomism is necessary for that's-it principlism. For if that's-it 
principlism is true at all, there must be some features that behave in an atomistic way. 
Let's take a true that's-it moral principle about killing to illustrate. It says that if an 
action has the feature of killing and that's it, then it is wrong. If the feature of killing 
were not constantly wrong-making, it would not be clear how the that's-it moral 
principle about killing could be true. So that's-it principlism is built upon the truth of 
weak natural feature atomism. 
(6.6.6) prima facie principlism 
Sufficient: none 
Necessary: none 
Prima facie principlism is the view that there are true prima facie moral principles. 
Remember that we construe 'prima facie' as meaning 'at first glance'. So a prima 
facie moral principle which claims that 'lying is prima facie wrong' is tantamount to 
the claim that 'at first glance, lying is wrong'. Suppose that this moral principle is true. 
Its truth has nothing to do with either natviral feature atomism or weak natural feature 
atomism. For the prima facie principle is a generalization about people's psychology. 
People typically think that lying is wrong at first glance. By contrast, both kinds of 
atomism, if they are true of the feature of lying, claim that the feature of lying in fact 
has a constant negative valence, not just at first glance. It may well be contended that 
the truth of weak natural feature atomism provides the most plausible explanation for 
why people typically regard certain features as right-making or wrong-making at first 
glance. This can be readily granted. However, even if weak natural feature atomism is 
true of the feature of lying, it still does not suffice to establish the truth of prima facie 
principlism, in that it may well be the case that, for instance, the feature of lying is in 
fact constantly wrong-making while people do not typically regard lying as wrong at 
first glance (due to their evil nature or whatever). On the other hand, neither natural 
feature atomism nor weak natural feature atomism is necessary for the truth of prima 
facie principlism. For those who think that there are true prima facie moral principles 
can allow that none of the features work in an atomistic way. That is, they can allow 
that a feature behaves in a non-atomistic (or holistic) way even if there is a true prima 
facie moral principle claiming that an action having that feature always appears to 
have a certain valence. For instance, they might well contend that (a) the action of 
lying always appears wrong while maintaining that (b) the feature of lying operates in 
a «o«-atomistic way and changes its valence from negative to positive with the 
change of the context. There is nothing incoherent in this contention for (a) is, as we 
have argued, a generalization about people's psychology whereas (b) is a claim about 
how a feature operates. 
As as side note, a reviewer objected that our understanding of prima facie 
principles here as generalizatoins about people's psychology means that they can only 
be contingently true at their best. Hence, it is not the sort of necessary principlism I 
should be concerned with. In reply, I agree that prima facie principles as 
generalizations about people's psychology can only be contingently true in the sense 
that their truth depends on people's psychology. However, there is a sense of 
'necessary' in which prima facie principles may well be necessary. For instance, one 
may well hold to the following prima facie principle: lying is necessarily prima facie 
wrong. Should this principle turn out to be true, its truth is necessary.''^ 
(6.6.7) dispositional principlism 
Sufficient: none 
Necessary: none 
Dispositional principlism, as endorsed by Luke Robinson (2006), is the view that 
there are true dispositional moral principles such as 'lying is dispositionally wrong'. 
The idea is that moral properties are dispositional properties rather than occurent 
properties. They are only manifested when certain background conditions are satisfied. 
However, neither from natural feature atomism nor from weak natural feature 
atomism can we infer that an action has dispositional moral properties. Let's suppose 
that natural feature atomism and weak natural feature atomism are true of the feature 
of lying. It may well be the case that the feature of lying behaves atomistically while 
the action has no dispositional moral properties. So neither natural feature atomism 
nor weak natural feature atomism is a sufficient condition for dispositional 
principlism. On the other hand, neither natural feature atomism nor weak natural 
feature atomism is a necessary condition for dispositional principlism, either. For it 
may well be the case that there are true dispositional moral principles while both of 
them are false. To put things differently, it may well be the case that some actions 
have constant dispositional moral properties, whereas no features have constant 
valence. To illustrate, let's suppose, for instance, that the feature of lying does not 
have a constant valence (i.e. it is wrong-making in some contexts and right-making in 
some others.) In those contexts where it is right-making, the action that instantiates it 
might still have a dispositional property of moral wrongness that is not manifested in 
those contexts. What we say about the feature of lying can be generalized to other 
features as well. So dispositional principlism is compatible with the negation of 
natural feature atomism or the negation of weak natural feature atomism. In other 
words, neither natural feature atomism nor weak natural feature atomism is necessary 
for dispositional principlism. 
Cf Dancy (2008), pp. 116-117 
(6.6.8) default principlism 
Sufficient: none 
Necessary: none 
Default principlism, as we presented it in chapter 2, is the view that there are true 
defauh moral principles, such as 'lying is wrong by default'. Neither natural feature 
atomism nor weak natural feature atomism is a sufficient condition for default 
principlism. Let's suppose that they are true of the feature of lying. Even so, it may 
still be the case that the feature of lying is constantly wrong-making but it is not 
wrong by default. In some interpretation, Alan Thomas (2007), for instance, has 
argued that the feature of lying, when viewed in isolation from the context, is on the 
same par with the feature of the color of one's shoelace in terms of valence."^ It does 
not carry any particular valence by default. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the 
possibility that the feature of lying when instantiated in the concrete context is 
constantly wrong-making. On the other hand, neither natural feature atomism nor 
weak natural feature atomism is necessary for default principlism. The truth of default 
principlism does not rule out the possibility that no features carry a constant valence. 
In fact, as we have explained in chapter 2, the idea of a feature having a valence by 
default allows for the possibility that it might lose its default valence in a different 
context due to the presence of other features. For instance, even if the feature of the 
color of one's shoelaces is morally neutral by default, this does not exclude the 
possibility that it can be morally significant when it figures into the content of a 
promise. What is said here about the feature of the color of one's shoelaces can be 
generalized to apply to other features too. So the truth of default principlism depends 
on neither natural feature atomism nor weak natural feature atomism. 
(6.6.9) Morals 
Now, we can draw some morals from our classification of how natural feature 
atomism and weak natural feature atomism relate to various kinds of principlism. 
First, for all those kinds of principlism for which weak natural feature atomism is 
a necessary condition, i.e. pro tanto principlism, other-things-being-equal principlism, 
absolute principlism, ceteris paribus principlism, and that's-it-principlism, if weak 
natural feature atomism turns out to be false, they will apparently all be falsified. 
Actually, falsifying the view of weak natural feature atomism is exactly what an 
Here is what Thomas (2007, p. 83) says, "One can hardly hope to classify certain ethically relevant 
considerations as 'central' or 'peripheral' independently of any given particular pattern of inference." 
objection from Dancy's holism of reason aims to do. The objection claims, roughly, 
all features, when functioning as reasons, behave in a holistic (or non-atomistic) way 
(I will discuss this objection in chapter 7). 
Second, for all those kinds of principlism for which neither natural feature 
atomism nor weak natural feature atomism is a necessary condition, i.e. prima facie 
principlism, dispositional principlism and default principlism, a refutation of them 
does not thereby refute those kinds of principlism. Namely, those kinds of principlism 
might still be true while natural feature atomism and weak natural feature atomism are 
proved to be completely false. For our purpose, we can safely ignore the issue of 
whether these kinds of principlism are true, since we focus exclusively on absolute 
principlism and pro tanto principlism in this thesis, both of which depend on weak 
natural feature atomism. So what is important for our purpose is rather to investigate 
whether weak natural feature atomism is true. If it is not, then absolute principlism 
and pro tanto principlism will be falsified. As I will show in next chapter, there is no 
good evidence for thinking that weak natural feature atomism is true. If I am right, 
then absolute principlism and pro tanto principlism are on shaky grounds. 
Third, as we have seen, even if natural feature atomism or weak natural feature 
atomism is true, they are not sufficient to establish absolute principlism. By contrast, 
however, they are sufficient to establish pro tanto principlism. This provides an 
explanation as to why the argument from the atomism of reason is invoked to justify 
pro tanto principlism rather than absolute principlism. To justify absolute principlism, 
on the other hand, the Canberrans' argument from supervenience, as we have 
discussed in chapters 3, 4 & 5, is more fitting (although, as we have seen, it ultimately 
fails). 
Fourth, as I have shown, both natural feature atomism and weak natural feature 
atomism suffice to establish not only the truth of pro tanto principlism, which is one 
of our major concerns in this thesis, but also the truth of other-things-being-equal 
principlism as well, which is not one of our major concerns in this thesis. This should 
not concern us too much, however, unless other-things-being-equal principlism is 
wildly implausible. Then there will be the question of "proving too much", in David 
Lewis's apt terms (2000, p. 49). For if other-things-being-equal principlism is wildly 
implausible, this tells us that natural feature atomism and weak natural feature 
atomism are implausible too. In this thesis, however, I leave open the question of 
whether other-things-being-equal principlism is implausible. For even if it is not, I 
think there are other problems with natural feature atomism and weak natural feature 
atomism, which I will discuss in chapter 7. So my rejection of natural feature atomism 
and weak natural atomism does not rely on the implausibility of 
other-things-being-equal principlism. 
With the above morals in mind, we can now proceed to investigate whether the 
argument from the atomism of reason (of the right sorts) can succeed. 
Chapter 7 Objections to the Argument from 
the Atomism of Reason 
In chapter 6, we have clarified what the argument from the atomism of reason is. As a 
reminder, it takes the following form: 
PI: The atomism of reason is true. 
P2: If the atomism of reason is true, there are necessarily true natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles 
C: There are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral principles. 
To recap the main points we discussed in chapter 6, remember that the only promising 
candidates that remain for the right sorts of atomism to be had in the argument from 
the atomism of reason are natural feature atomism and weak natural feature atomism. 
As a reminder, they are the following views: 
Natural Feature Atomism: all natural features behave atomistically. 
Weak Natural Feature Atomism: some (but not all) natural features behave 
atomistically. 
Or to put it in a more formalized way: 
Natural Feature Atomism: For all natural F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing 
in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F 
is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
Weak Natural Feature Atomism: For some (but not all) natural F, if F is a reason 
for (or against) V-ing in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F 
obtains in C*, then F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: 
action) 
They are the only promising candidates that remain because they are the only sorts of 
atomism that satisfy the requirement of P2, i.e. if they are true, they will give us the 
right kinds of natural-moral moral principles required by the argument. Or to put it 
differently, as we demonstrated in section § 6.6 of chapter 6, they are sufficient 
conditions for the claim of pro tanto principlism. 
Now, remember that to be the right sorts of atomism in the argument from the 
atomism of reason, they not only have to satisfy the requirement of P2. Perhaps more 
importantly, they have to satisfy the requirement of PI. That is, they have to be true. 
Otherwise, the argument from the atomism is not a sound argument. It will not thus 
provide support for pro tanto principlism. Now, the crucial question to ask here is: are 
these two sorts of atomism true? 
In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss two objections to the claim that they 
are true. They are respectively the objection from holism of reason and the objection 
from counterexamples. These two objections, however, are toothless. At the very most, 
the objection from counterexamples shows that natural feature atomism is false; 
however, they leave the claim of weak natural feature atomism unscathed. Or so I will 
argue. So at the very least, it seems fair to say that there is no good reason for us to 
believe that weak natural feature atomism is not true. Such being the case, weak 
natural feature atomism of reason may well be the right sort of atomism to have in the 
argument from the atomism of reason. If so, when 'the atomism of reason' in the 
argument from the atomism of reason is interpreted as weak natural feature atomism, 
it might seem that it might well come out to be a sound argument. 
However, we have to note that the fact that the above two objections to weak 
natural feature atomism are not compelling does not mean that there are therefore 
good reasons to believe that it is true. In fact, in the second part of this chapter, I will 
argue that it is completely unmotivated. For the best case that has been presented to 
support it is not very convincing. Or so I will argue in section § 7.4. If I am right 
about this, there is even good reason for us to doubt whether weak natural feature 
atomism is the right sort of atomism for the argument from the atomism of reason. 
But let's suppose for the sake of the argument that both natural feature atomism and 
weak natural feature atomism are true and that the argument from the atomism of 
reason is therefore sound, does this mean victory for pro tanto principlism? I doubt it 
too. For, as I will argue in section § 7.5, both natural feature atomism and weak 
natural feature atomism face a problem of individuation of features. Due to this 
problem, their claims are trivially true in the sense that they do not really tell us 
whether natural features behave atomistically or not. 
Finally, in section § 7.6,1 will present a critique of the argument from the atomism 
of reason from a dialectical perspective. I will argue that even if it is a sound 
argument, it is hard to win over its opponents, because it uses as its premise a claim 
that is not well-motivated and its opponents simply rejects—the atomism of reason, 
regardless of whether it is interpreted as natural feature atomism or weak natural 
feature atomism. If so, the argument from the atomism of reason fails to be a 
persuasive argument. 
7.1 Holism of Reason 
The first objection to the claims of natural feature atomism and weak natural 
feature atomism comes from Dancy's holism of reason. As a reminder, holism of 
reason is the view that no features behave atomistically or, to put it in a different way, 
all features behave holistically. As we mentioned in chapter 6, its view can be stated 
as follows: 
Holism of Reason: For no F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in 
circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F is 
a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
As we can see from the formulation of holism of reason, it contends that no features 
behave atomistically. Surely natural features are no exceptions. So, if holism of reason 
is true, then of course, both natural feature atomism and weak natural feature atomism 
will be falsified, as they are respectively the claims that all and some natural features 
behave atomistically. But now, the question is: is there any reason for us to believe 
that holism of reason is true? 
Dancy (1993, pp. 60-61) appeals to some examples to motivate the idea of 
holism. Here are some adapted ones for our purpose. A feature of lying is normally a 
reason against, but it is not when we are playing a bluffing game. A feature of 
promise-keeping is normally a reason for, but it is not when the content of the promise 
is evil. A feature of causing pain is normally a reason against, but it is not when giving 
a child a shot to inoculate him against a deadly disease. These examples seem to 
demonstrate that the way a feature qua reason works is holistic, i.e., there must be 
some circumstances in which a feature qua reason might lose its status as a reason for 
or against. However, this way of looking at things faces a serious challenge from 
Joseph Raz. 
(7.1.1) Raz's Objection to Holism: Intelligibility of Value 
Raz (2000) contends that holism of reason is fundamentally wrong because it violates 
a thesis of what he dubs as the intelligibility of value. Take the feature of lying to 
illustrate this. According to Dancy's holism of reason, the feature of lying has a 
negative valence in a normal case but not so when we play a bluflfing game. It even 
has a positive valence because it makes the game much more fun and exciting. 
However, Raz contends that it cannot be the case that in the two cases of lying, it is 
the same feature of lying at work. If so, the feature of lying really fails to motivate the 
idea of holism, because as we can observe in our formulation of holism, it is really the 
same feature F that operates as reason in both circumstances C and C*. As Dancy 
(2004, p. 7) himself puts it, "a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at 
all, or an opposite reason in another" 
Why does Raz think that it cannot be the same feature of lying at work in both 
circumstances? As I have mentioned, Raz's critique of holism is based on a view 
which he dubs as "the intelligibility of value". The view can be formulated as follows: 
Intelligibility of Value: "[T]here is nothing 'arbitrary' in the domain of 
value.. .There is an explanation for everything, an explanation for why what is 
good is good, what is bad is bad, etc." (Raz, 2000, p. 50; also quoted in Cullity, 
2002, p. 175) 
Given the above view, it is not enough to claim that a feature can carry a negative 
valence in one case but a positive one in another. There must be some differences in 
these cases that explain the different valences (Cullity, 2002, p. 175). Can Dancy 
provide a satisfactory explanation? 
According to Dancy, what explains the differences in valences of the feature of 
lying is the enabler. In the case of lying in the bluffing game, the feature of lying has 
a positive valence because of the presence of the enabler—the feature of playing 
bluffing. The enabler enables the feature of lying to have a positive valence. On the 
other hand, in a normal case of lying, due to the lack of such an enabler, the feature of 
lying does not have a positive valence. 
However, Raz argues that Dancy's way of looking at things is wrong, because 
what constitutes a reason for lying in the case of lying in the bluffing case is not just 
the feature of lying simpliciter, but the feature of lying-in-the-bluffing-game. The 
feature of lying by itself cannot constitute a reason for in the bluffing game. For if the 
feature of lying were not accompanied by the feature of playing the bluffing game, it 
in itself would not suffice to constitute a reason for lying in the bluffing game. So the 
feature that constitutes a reason for lying in the bluffing case is different from the one 
that constitutes a reason against lying in a normal case. 
In reply, Dancy contends that despite the fact that it requires both the feature of 
lying and the feature of playing a bluffing game to work together in order for the 
feature of lying to have a positive valence in the case of lying in a bluffing game, 
nevertheless they still play different roles. The feature of lying plays the role of a 
reason whereas the feature of playing a bluffing game plays the role of an enabler. An 
enabler, even when it is included into the content of a reason, still retains its role as an 
enabler. It does not therefore become a reason by itself. 
To illustrate this, Dancy (2000, p. 153) provides the following example. Suppose 
that 'ought implies can'. The fact that you can do A is not among the reasons why you 
ought to do A. It merely enables other features to be the reasons they are, viz. the 
reasons why you ought to do A. To be more concrete, "if I were not alive", Dancy 
(2000, p. 153) contends, "the reasons that there are for me to help the needy would 
not be able to be the reasons they are. But this does little to show that among the 
reasons why I should help the needy is the fact that I am alive." That is, the fact that I 
am alive merely plays the role of an enabler. It in itself is not a reason. Likewise, it 
may well be contended that the feature of playing the bluffing game is merely an 
enabler that enables the feature of lying to have a positive valence. However, it in 
itself is not a reason. 
So to sum up, even though the differences in moral valences of the feature of 
lying might well have to be explained by the differences of the features of the 
situation, as Raz contends, nevertheless they might well be explained by the 
differences of the enablers. The features that function as reasons in both cases, 
according to Dancy, are still the same. 
(7.1.2) My First Objection to Holism: Individuation of Features 
Having argued that the objection from Raz's thesis of the intelligibility of value fails, 
I have to make it clear that I do not thereby think that Dancy's holism is right. In fact, 
I think there is good reason for us to think that it is wrong. Let me recap a bit before I 
move on to show why it is wrong. 
Remember that Dancy's holism contends that it is the same feature of lying that 
has different valences in different cases. In reply to Raz's criticism, Dancy contends 
that what explains its different valences in different cases is the presence or the 
absence of an enabler. The enabler in itself is no part of the feature that functions as a 
reason. 
However, in order for Dancy to be able to say so, he has to presuppose that the 
enabling feature can be individuated from the lying feature that functions as a reason. 
Why? For if the enabling feature cannot be individuated from the lying feature that 
fijnctions as a reason, it is not clear how Dancy is justified in claiming that it is the 
lying feature alone, rather than its fusion with the enabling feature as a whole, that 
functions as a reason. 
However, in the lying in the bluffing game example, it is not clear that the 
feature of lying can be individuated from the feature of being in the context of playing 
the bluffing game, i.e. from the so-called enablers. This is due to what I call the 
'embedded character' of the feature of lying: 
Embedded Character: The feature of lying is always embedded in a context 
which involves, inter alia, the following factors: a liar, her motive for lying, a 
person being lied to and the consequences of the lie. (Tsu, 2009, p. 90) 
To use the case of lying in a bluffing game to illustrate, the feature of lying involves 
the following factors in that context: the liar is a participant in the bluffing game, her 
motive for lying is, inter alia, to win the game, the person being lied to is another 
participant in the game, and the consequences of the lie are the increase of excitement 
of the game. Two things to be noted about these factors. 
(1) Enabler: These factors, with their concrete contents, are what enable the 
feature of lying to have a positive valence in that particular context. They are the 
so-called enablers. It is not hard to imagine that if they were to take on a 
different content, let's say, if the person being lied to were not a participant in the 
game, then the feature of lying might well take on a different moral valence. 
(2) Constitution: These factors, without taking on any particular concrete 
contents, are essential to the feature of lying. To clarify, they are not only 
essential to the feature of lying in the bluffing game but essential to any feature 
of lying in any other contexts. They are in fact what constitute the feature of 
lying. If the feature of lying were stripped of these factors, say, if it did not 
involve a liar at all, then it would not be a feature of lying at all. It would not 
make any sense to maintain that a feature of lying, absent these factors, could 
still carry a moral valence. Absent these factors, the feature of lying would 
disappear, as it were. 
For the ease of exposition, I shall henceforth call those factors without any particular 
concrete contents the general factors and those factors that have taken on particular 
concrete contents the particular factors. To summarize, whereas the general factors 
are what constitute the feature of lying in general, the particular factors are enablers to 
enable the feature of lying in the bluffing case to have a positive valence. 
It is interesting to note here that the general factors are also enablers in some way. 
For without these general factors, there would not even be a feature of lying in the 
bluffing game. It would then not even make sense to maintain that the feature of lying 
in the bluffing game carries a positive valence, for there would be no such feature. 
The presence of these general factors enables, as it were, the presence of the feature 
of lying. It also enables, albeit in a derivative way, the feature of lying to have a 
positive valence. Absent these general factors as enablers, the feature of lying in the 
bluffing game would not be able to have a positive valence, for, as we have mentioned, 
there would be no such a feature of lying at all. And since the feature of lying is 
constituted by these general factors, no feature of lying can be individuated from these 
general factors qua enablers. 
For our purpose, however, the major issue that concerns us is not whether the 
feature of lying in the bluffing game can be individuated from its general factors qua 
enablers, but whether it can be individuated from its particular factors qua enablers. 
Remember that our purpose is to argue that the feature of lying in the bluffing game 
cannot be individuated from its particular factors qua enablers so as to prove that the 
feature of lying is in the bluffing game is different from the feature of lying in a 
normal case. 
Now, with the above preliminaries in place, we can proceed to address the 
question of whether the feature of lying in the bluffing game can be individuated from 
its enablers, i.e. from its particular factors. The answer, I suspect, is 'no'. I take it that 
if the feature of lying in the bluffing game can be individuated from its enablers, this 
implies that the feature of lying in the bluffing game can exist without any enablers, 
for they are different things. To use an analogy to illustrate, if a table can be 
individuated from its attendant chairs, this implies that the table can exist without any 
chairs, for the table and chairs are different things. 
However, it simply cannot be the case that the feature of lying in the bluffing 
game can be individuated from its enablers (or its particular set of particular factors), 
unless the feature of lying is a feature in the abstract. For in order for the feature of 
lying in the bluffing game to be individuated from its enablers, this would require us 
to imagine a feature of lying sitting in vacuum, as it were, without any particular 
factors. Even if there is such an abstract feature of lying, it cannot be the sort of 
feature Dancy has in mind. For it is not clear whether such an abstract feature of lying 
is capable of having any moral valence (since it lacks any particular factors that 
determine the valence of a feature of lying), let alone change its valence from 
negative to positive in different contexts. 
Three comments are in place here. First, if the feature of lying, qua reason, 
cannot be individuated from the enablers in its embedded context (which I have 
shown by the bluffing example above), then the enablers are certainly part of the 
feature of lying in the context of the bluffing game. To use an analogy to illustrate, if 
chai tea cannot be individuated from the melted sugar in it, then the melted sugar in it 
is certainly part of chai tea. Given that the feature of lying, qua reason, cannot be 
individuated from the enablers in its embedded context, I think that Dancy is not 
entitled to claim that the enablers cannot be part of the feature of lying qua reason. 
For if the feature of lying is a reason, then surely the enablers, as part of the feature of 
lying, are part of what constitutes the reason. 
Second, worse still for Dancy, if the feature of lying, due to its embedded 
character, cannot be individuated from its enabling particular factors, then the feature 
of lying qua reason cannot be the same in the bluffing case and in a normal case. This 
is because the enablers of the feature of lying in the bluffing case are absent in the 
feature of lying in the normal case. So, two features of lying, instead of one, are 
actually at work here. If so, the lying example often employed by Dancy to support 
his holism of reason actually does not support it, for his holism of reason requires that 
the same feature of lying can have different valences in different contexts whereas, as 
we have seen, in the lying example, what are actually at work are two different 
features of lying with different constituents. 
Finally, it may well be objected that the truth of holism of reason does not 
depend on this one example of lying. Our argument so far has only illustrated that the 
example of lying fails to support the claim of holism of reason. However, this does 
not mean that holism of reason itself is false. 
However, if this is the objection, it will be not very useful in salvaging Dancy's 
holism of reason. This is because the embedded character is not the unique character 
of the feature of lying. Rather, it is a general character, I suspect, of all the features in 
the likes of stealing, or killing, or helping, or telling the truth, etc. Our argument 
above can be generalized to apply to these other features as well. Take the feature of 
killing for instance. If it is enabled to have a positive valence in the context of 
self-defense, then it cannot be individuated fi-om its enabler(s) in that context either. 
Dancy s Objection Reconsidered 
A bit of review is in place here before we move on. So far, we have argued that the 
feature of lying in the bluffing game, qua reason, cannot be individuated from those 
its enabling particular factors in the embedded context. Thus, it cannot be maintained 
as Dancy does that it is the feature of lying alone, rather than its fusion with the 
enablers as a whole, that carries a moral valence in the context of the bluffing game. 
How about Dancy's objection earlier that even if the enabler is included into the 
reason, it in itself does not play a role as a reason and what plays the role of reason is 
still the feature of lying? With our analysis above, I think we are in a position to 
contend that this objection is misguided. As I have argued, the feature of lying cannot 
be individuated from its enabler in the embedded context (vice versa/^. Such being 
the case, it does not make sense to speak of the existence of the enabler independent 
of the feature of lying. So surely the enabler in itself does not play a role as a reason, 
but not for the reason Dancy suggested, i.e. not for the reason that the enabler is a 
feature independent of the feature of lying and plays its role as an enabler in that 
particular context. Rather, it is for the reason that the enabling feature cannot be 
individuated from the feature of lying. The enabler is an inalienable part of the feature 
of lying in the particular context. So the enabler, in itself, does not play the role of a 
reason. Rather, as we have argued, it is the fusion of the feature of lying and its 
enabler that plays the role of reason in the bluffing game. 
It might be thought that our line of reasoning might resuscitate Raz's claim. 
However, it does not. For Raz also supposes with Dancy that the enabler can be 
individuated from the feature that fiinctions as a reason. The difference between his 
view and Dancy's lies in the fact that he thinks that the enablers are also part of the 
reason, whereas Dancy is of the view that they are not. However, if our line of 
reasoning above is correct, they are both wrong in assuming that the enabler can be 
individuated from the feature that fianctions as a reason in the embedded context. 
(7.1.3) My Second Objection to Holism: No Enough Motivation 
Despite my first objection to holism above, let's suppose with Dancy for the sake of 
the argument that it is really the same feature that is at work as a reason in different 
cases, does this mean that the examples he gave can prove holism of reason to be true? 
I think the answer is 'no' . Here is why. Although those examples do seem to show us 
that there are some natural features that behave holistically, yet the claim of holism of 
reason is a universal claim. It claims in effect that no features behave atomistically. 
This is logically equivalent to the universal claim that all features behave holistically. 
This universal claim cannot be proved to be true by just a few examples. I think that it 
is a hasty generalization to infer from these few examples to the holists' universal 
claim that all features behave holistically. There is really no enough motivation for 
holism of reason. And since Dancy's holism of reason cannot be proved to be true, an 
objection based on it is therefore not a very forceful one. At the very least, it is not 
conclusive against the claims of natural feature atomism or weak natural feature 
atomism. 
7.2 Counterexamples 
The relation of individuation is symmetrical. If A can be individuated from B, then B can also be 
individuated from A. On the other hand, if A cannot be individuated from B, then B cannot be 
individuated from A, either. 
A second way to object to natural feature atomism and weak natural feature 
atomism is by giving counterexamples. Due to the intuitive plausibility of the 
examples we mentioned in section 1, it is generally accepted that there are at least 
some natural features that behave in a «o«-atomistic way. Take the natural feature of 
causing pain for instance. As we have mentioned in section 1, the feature of causing 
pain is normally a reason against; however, it might not be so when it is constitutive 
of giving a child a shot to inoculate him. 
However, if we are right about the embedded character of a feature qua reason, 
as we have pointed out in the last section, then the feature of causing pain in a normal 
case is really different from the feature of causing pain in the case of inoculating a 
child. And remember that for either natural feature atomism or weak natural feature 
atomism, when they talk about a feature behaving atomistically, they are talking about 
the same feature. This can be easily seen in their formalized views: 
Natural Feature Atomism: For all natural F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing 
in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F 
is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
Weak Natural Feature Atomism: For some (but not all) natural F, if F is a reason 
for (or against) V-ing in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F 
obtains in C*, then F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: 
action) 
Notice that for both kinds of atomism, it is the same F that works as a reason in 
different circumstances, C and C*. So, the counterexample, being about two different 
features of causing pain, is not really effective against either sort of atomism. 
Moreover, even if this strategy of appealing to counterexamples succeeds, it is only 
effective against the claim of natural feature atomism. It shows at its best that there 
are some natural features that behave non-atomistically (or holistically). This is 
entirely compatible with the following claim of weak natural feature atomism: 
Weak Natural Feature Atomism: some (but not all) natural features behave 
atomistically. 
As we can see from the formulation of weak natural feature atomism, it can allow for 
the possibility that some natural features behave non-atomistically. Such being the 
case, while the strategy of appealing to counterexamples might be effective against 
natural feature atomism, the claim of weak feature atomism is not going to be 
defeated by these examples that are meant to demonstrate that some features work 
non-atomistically. 
7.3 Interlude 
Having argued that the objection from counterexamples is only effective against 
natural feature atomism at its best but not against weak natural feature atomism, and 
that the objection from holism of reason is effective against neither natural feature 
atomism and weak natural feature atomism, it seems plausible, at least initially, to 
think that since there is no good objection against weak natural feature atomism, it 
might well come out to be true. However, it is one thing to claim that there are no 
effective objections against one doctrine, it is quite another to claim that we have 
good reason to believe it. In fact, in what follows, I will argue that there is no good 
reason to think that weak natural feature atomism is true, since the best case presented 
for it is not that convincing. 
7.4 No Reason 
So far, we have only argued that there are no good objections against weak 
natural feature atomism. This doesn't mean, however, there are positive reasons for us 
to believe its claim that some features behave atomistically. Is there any positive 
evidence supporting the claim of weak natural feature atomism? The best evidence 
that has been presented is the following: 
Torture 1: the feature of torturing an innocent merely for fian is always a reason 
against. 
If the above claim is true, then weak natural atomism's claim that some features 
behave atomistically is vindicated, because there is at least the feature of torturing as 
presented in Torture 1 that behaves atomistically. 
However, I suspect that Torture 1 is not really a convincing example. First, it is 
not clear, as I have mentioned in chapter 2, that the feature of torturing an innocent 
merely for fun is a reason against when it is constitutive of a consensual masochist 
sexual intercourse (I imagine that the participants of which are both innocent). The 
masochists get immense gratification out of the sexual intercourse exactly because 
they get tortured. In a context like this, it is not clear that the feature of torturing an 
innocent merely for fun is a reason against. Second, it is not clear, as Mark Timmons 
(2002, p. 259) correctly points out, that 'innocent' is a natural term. It is morally 
loaded. If so, Torture 1 merely shows that there is a moral feature that behaves 
atomistically. This in no way helps to vindicate the weak natural feature atomists' 
claim that some natural features behave atomistically. Third, the word 'merely' does 
not appear to be describing any natural feature either. So we have even more reason to 
doubt whether the feature of torturing an innocent merely for fun is a natural one. 
Having said so, weak natural feature atomists might feel tempted to massage the 
Torture 1 example a little bit and try to crank out an example that avoids the 
above-mentioned difficulties. They might come up with an example as follows: 
Torture 2: the feature of torturing a child for fun is always a reason against. 
Notice that in this example, all the morally loaded terms that were used to describe the 
feature of torturing in Torture 1 have been taken out. Besides, a child can't really 
consent to having sexual intercourse in the full-blooded sense of 'consent', for she 
might yet lack the capacity required for decision-making. Now, have we got a 
convincing example that illustrates a feature that behaves atomistically? 
Still, I don't think the example is clear. Notice that 'for fun' seems to suggest that 
the torturing is done for no good moral reasons. If so, what we have got here in 
Torture 2 is still a moral feature instead of a natural one. It in no way helps to 
vindicate weak natural feature atomists' claim that some natural features behave 
atomistically. At this juncture, it will be no wonder that the natural feature atomists 
might feel tempted to massage their example even more, but it will be no wonder 
either that particularists will come up with more stories to tell why the newly cranked 
out example are not convincing. This to-and-fro dialectic might go on forever, as 
Little (2000, p. 279) rightly comments. There is no reason for us to think that weak 
natural atomists will eventually win the day. 
Incidentally, in spite of our earlier examples against natural feature atomism in 
sections §§ 7.1 and 7.2, some people might still remain unconvinced and retain their 
sympathies for natural feature atomism. For those people, they can at least take the 
following lesson from the above discussion: if weak natural feature atomism is not 
properly motivated, natural feature atomism certainly will not be. For if there is no 
convincing example showing that some features behave atomistically, then surely 
there is no convincing example showing that all features behave atomistically. 
7.5 Individuation of Features Revisited 
In the last section, we have argued that there are in fact no good reasons for us to 
believe either the claim of natural feature atomism or that of weak natural feature 
atomism. Now, I am going to argue that there are in fact good reasons for us to 
disbelieve them. For their claims face a similar sort of problem that plagues Dancy's 
holism—the problem of the individuation of features. Due to this problem, their 
claims are trivially true and do not really tell us how a feature qua reason behaves. 
To begin with, let me recap the claims of natural feature atomism and weak 
natural feature atomism: 
Natural Feature Atomism: For all natural F, if F is a reason for (or against) V-ing 
in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F 
is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
Weak Natural Feature Atomism: For some (but not all) natural F, if F is a reason 
for (or against) V-ing in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F 
obtains in C*, then F is a reason for (or against) V-ing in C*. (F: feature; V: 
action) 
Notice what these two claims have in common is that they both contend that it is the 
same feature F that works as a reason in both C and C*. To illustrate, suppose for the 
sake of the argument that both kinds of atomism are true of the feature of lying. So, 
this means that if the feature of lying is a reason against in a normal case C, then if it 
obtains in a bluffing game case C*, then it is a reason against in the bluffing game 
case C*. 
However, there are two problems with natural feature atomism and weak natural 
feature atomism as characterized above. First, as we have argued in § 7.1.2, due to the 
embedded character of the feature of lying, the two cases, i.e. the normal case and the 
bluffing case, really have two different features of lying at work as reasons. To recap, 
the feature of lying in the bluffing game cannot be individuated from its particular 
enabling factors that enable it to have a positive valence in that context. If so, it is a 
feature different from the feature of lying in a normal case. Such being the case, both 
natural feature atomism and weak natural feature atomism, like holism of reason, are 
wrong in supposing that it is the veiy same feature of lying that operates as a reason in 
both cases. 
Second, if it is the case that there are two features of lying at work in different 
cases (as we have shown, it is indeed so), then the claims of both natural feature 
atomism and weak natural feature atomism will come out trivially true. They are 
trivial, because they do not tell us anything about how a feature qua reason behaves. 
To illustrate, let us recall the formalized claim of natural feature atomism again: 
Natural Feature Atomism: For all natural F, if F is a reason for (or against) V in 
circumstance C, then for all circumstances C*, if F obtains in C*, then F is a 
reason for (or against) V. (F: feature; V: action; C: circumstance) 
Weak Natural Feature Atomism: For some (but not all) natural F, if F is a reason 
for (or against) V in circumstance C, then for all other circumstances C*, if F 
obtains in C*, then F is a reason for (or against) V in C*. (F: feature; V: action) 
Now, let us suppose that they are both true of the feature of lying. They both claim: if 
the feature of lying is a reason against in a normal circumstance C, then if the feature 
of lying obtains in the bluffing game C*, then it is a reason against in C*. 
Now, notice the following two things. First, the above claim has the following 
logical structure: P - > ( Q ^ R ) . Second, as we have argued, the feature of lying in the 
bluffing game is different from the feature of lying in a normal case. So the feature of 
lying that obtains in C does not really obtain in C*. Such being the case, Q is false. If 
Q is false, (Q-^R) is true anyway, regardless of whether R is true or false. For the 
only situation a conditional comes out false is one in which the antecedent is true and 
the consequent is false. In the current case where the antecedent Q is false, the 
conditional is true anyway, regardless of the truth value of the consequent R. Now, if 
(Q-^R) is true, P ^ ( Q - > R ) is clearly true, for P merely states the fact that the feature 
of lying is a reason against in the normal circumstance C. In other words, since both P 
and (Q->R) are true, P ^ ( Q ^ R ) is true. Now, why is it trivially true though? The 
reason, as I have suggested, is that it does not tell us anything about how a feature qua 
reason behaves. For P ^ ( Q ^ R ) is true, even when R is false. (Don't forget that P is 
true and Q is false). Namely, it is compatible with the claims of both natural feature 
atomism and weak natural feature atomism that the feature of lying is not a reason 
against in the bluffing game. Such being the case, these two kinds of atomism do not 
really tell us how a feature qua reason in C behaves in other circumstances C*. 
7.6 Begging the Question 
Now, having argued that both natural feature atomism and weak natural feature 
atomism are not only ill motivated but also not very informative about how a feature 
qua reason behaves, this should suffice for us to conclude that the argument from the 
atomism of reason is not a persuasive argument. Here, however, I want to set aside 
these issues for the moment and press a different point against the argument from the 
atomism of reason. For I do not think that it is a very persuasive argument for pro 
tanto principlism (or against extreme particularism) anyway, even without the burden 
of the problems we already mentioned above. As a reminder, the argument from the 
atomism of reason can be stated as follows: 
PI: The atomism of reason is true. 
P2: If the atomism of reason is true, there are necessarily true natural-moral pro 
tanto moral principles 
C: There are necessarily true natural-moral pro tanto moral principles. 
So now, let us suppose for the sake of the argument that the atomism of reason is true 
(it can be either natural feature atomism or weak natural feature atomism) and the 
argument from the atomism of reason is sound. Does this mean that the argument 
from the atomism of reason is a persuasive argument for pro tanto principlism? I 
suspect that the answer is 'no. ' Before I provide an explanation for this, it has to be 
pointed out that not all sound arguments are persuasive arguments. A sound argument 
might fail to be persuasive in that the premises of the argument presuppose the truth 
of the conclusion it is meant to establish. To illustrate, let's look at the following toy 
argument: 
• • • Q 
Let us suppose that the above argument is sound and let us suppose that it is an 
argument meant to convince those who have some doubts about Q. It seems that in 
order to do so, you can do it by convincing those skeptics about Q of the truth of P. 
However, if they are not convinced of the truth of P either, it is useless to invoke Q to 
justify P, for that will bring us full circle to where we begin and begs the whole 
question against those skeptics about Q. So if our only reason to believe P is Q, then 
the argument fails to be persuasive, for it will not move those skeptics about Q. 
Likewise, even if the argument from the atomism of reason is sound, this does 
not mean automatically that it is a persuasive argument for the claim of pro tanto 
principlism. Just as our toy argument above fails to be persuasive for the reason that 
the premise of the argument, P, presupposes the conclusion it is meant to establish, the 
argument from the atomism of reason might also fail to be persuasive for similar 
reasons. In fact, I suspect that there are good reasons for thinking that the argument 
from the atomism of reason fails to be persuasive exactly for the sort of reasons the 
toy argument fails to be so. 
For in the argument from the atomism of reason, its first premise PI seems to 
presuppose the truth of its conclusion C. In other words, the atomism of reason seems 
to presuppose the truth of pro tanto principlists' claim that there are pro tanto moral 
principles of the relevant kind. How so? For a pro tanto moral principle of the relevant 
kind maintains that a feature F is wrong (or right). This is very close to the claim of 
the atomism of reason: a feature F, qua reason, is wrong (or right). The claim of the 
atomism of reason seems to presuppose that such pro tanto moral principles must be 
true. For if they were not, it would not be clear how the atomism of reason can hold. 
Such being the case, the argument from the atomism of reason fails to be persuasive 
for the same sort of reason the toy argument fails to be, for all of us who are skeptical 
about C, or the pro tanto principlists' claim that there are pro tanto moral principles of 
the relevant kind, will not be moved by PI , or the claim of the atomism of reason. In 
order for the argument from the atomism of reason to be persuasive, there have to be 
some independent reasons to believe PI , to say the very least. Absent independent 
reasons, as is in the current case, the argument from the atomism of reason is not 
persuasive. 
To sum up our discussion, the argument from the atomism of reason is not a 
persuasive argument for pro tanto principlism. So even if the atomism of reason turns 
out to be true and informative against all the odds, still the argument from the 
atomism of reason fails to be persuasive for those of us who are skeptical about pro 
tanto principlism. 
Conclusion 
In my thesis, I have examined two major arguments that have been advanced by 
principlists to attack extreme particularism. They are respectively the argument from 
supervenience and the argument from the atomism of reason. The argument from 
supervenience is meant to establish absolute principlism, the view that there are 
necessarily true absolute natural-moral moral principles, whereas the argument from 
the atomism of reason is meant to establish pro tanto principlism, the view that there 
are necessarily true pro tanto natural-moral moral principles. I have argued that 
neither of them succeeds. What is the moral we can draw from this? 
I think it is this. If what I have argued so far is right, I think that we can be more 
confident in the claim of extreme particularism, the claim that there are no necessarily 
true natural-moral moral principles, be they of the absolute kind or the pro tanto kind. 
Notice that this is not to say that the view of extreme particularism is absolutely right; 
this is only to say that there have been no compelling reasons for us to disbelieve it. 
Perhaps principlists who maintain the existence of relevant moral principles of the 
absolute kind and the pro tanto kind will have some compelling reasons to offer in the 
future. But until we are shown this is indeed so, extreme particularism is still very 
much a live option. 
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